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Opaque communities confound homeland security situational awareness and integration 
efforts, which generates pervasive threat perceptions that have often escalated into 
governmental interventions and violent confrontations. Governmental failures to 
effectively communicate with, and judiciously address past incidents involving opaque 
communities, have led to tactical response disasters; future inabilities to foster contact 
with such groups could present grave, unforeseen challenges to homeland security and 
surrounding community resiliency efforts. Utilizing a structured focused method, this 
thesis explores whether governmental entities adopt a common set of operational 
assumptions regarding threats emanating from opaque communities and, if so, whether 
alternative interactional frameworks for integrating such communities into homeland 
security efforts are available. This thesis presents case study analysis of interventions 
involving the opaque communities of the Branch Davidians at Waco, MOVE in 
Philadelphia, and FLDS YFZ Ranch in Eldorado and finds that ingrained default 
oppositional frameworks influenced governmental deliberations throughout each event. 
This inquiry concludes that targeted constructive communication strategies utilizing 
dedicated interlocutors knowledgeable about a given community will assist in preventing 
future unnecessary and costly official interventions.  
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Opaque communities confound homeland security situational awareness and integration 
efforts, which generates pervasive threat perceptions that often escalate into 
governmental interventions and violent confrontations. As a result of their closed and 
often arcane nature, opaque communities frustrate governmental efforts to conduct law 
enforcement functions, proactively detect homeland security threats, coordinate disaster 
planning, and prevention activities, and optimize incident response. Unable to 
comprehensively assess voids on the map within their respective areas of responsibility, 
homeland security stakeholders exhibit a default tendency to perceive threat streams 
emanating from such groups and employ a respective confrontational posture. 
Concurrently, authorities have repeatedly attributed member’s individual crimes and 
discrete instances of illicit behavior to the entire community, creating self-imposed 
barriers to viable alternative investigative and enforcement options. Governmental 
failures to communicate with and effectively address past incidents involving opaque 
communities have led to tactical response disasters; future inability to foster contact with 
such groups could present grave, unforeseen challenges to homeland security and 
surrounding community resiliency efforts. 
This thesis introduces the term opaque community as a categorization for social 
configurations that withdraw to a shared domicile, enclave, or compound and disassociate 
with their surrounding area. Such groups create unique impediments to the maintenance 
of homeland security due to their size and corresponding potential to constitute de facto 
extra-territorial spaces within a given jurisdiction’s area of responsibility. Numerous 
unsuccessful enforcement actions targeting opaque communities over the past 50 years 
demonstrate such groups generate perennial challenges to government actors at all 
jurisdictional levels. Though most previous official interventions into such groups have 
been predicated on the suspected existence of criminal activity and threats, all phases and 
aspects of homeland security planning, prevention, response, recovery, and resiliency 
building are potentially negatively impacted by their existence. 
 xiii 
Research determined that existing literature on opaque communities has largely 
failed to analyze the prelude to tactical operations involving opaque communities from 
the viewpoint of the practitioner. This study’s line of inquiry presupposes that the 
inestimable or unfathomable nature of one’s neighbor inherently undermines one’s ability 
to estimate and plan for his or her own safety. Using a structured focused method, this 
thesis employs case studies involving failed interventions into domestic opaque 
communities situated in both urban and rural settings and impacting decision makers at 
the federal, state, and local levels. Case studies include the 1993 federal siege of the 
Branch Davidians at Waco, Texas, the 1985 assault of the MOVE property in 
Philadelphia, and the 2008 Texas raid of the Fundamentalist Latter Day Saints Yearning 
for Zion Ranch in Eldorado, Texas. The author identifies indicators of official 
presumption of intending absconders, projected and often unfounded concerns for women 
and children community members, and suspicions regarding behavior that is either illegal 
or offends the prevailing social conscience as political pressure catalysts which motivated 
government actors to intervene into these closed groups. Research explores a recurring 
phenomenon which suggests the unavailability of situational awareness information 
prompts officials to harbor unsubstantiated and default perceptions indicative of threats 
emanating from these opaque communities. The menace of self-fulfilling group 
narratives due to amplified miscommunication compounded by governmental 
intervention under duress is likewise examined as a causative factor for previous failed 
compelled interactions. Governmental outreach strategies that pursued constructive 
dialogue, educated by an understanding of the ideological, eschatological, and worldview 
differences of these groups, were hypothesized to be the independent variable that had the 
greatest effect on the outcome of each case.   
This thesis determines that a lack of situational awareness information, 
aggravated by the emergence of official oppositional frameworks regarding opaque 
communities, negatively impacted the interactional trajectory of all cases examined. It 
furthermore concludes that targeted constructive communication strategies utilizing 
dedicated interlocutors knowledgeable about a given community will assist in preventing 
future unnecessary and costly official interventions. Findings suggest that federal and 
 xiv 
state agencies would be best utilized in roles providing support and assistance to the 
office of county sheriff or equivalent trusted local law enforcement entity when 
attempting to integrate opaque communities into homeland security planning and 
response efforts. Finally, various operational, practical, and legal considerations 
regarding official efforts to both identify and avoid oppositional framework tendencies 
and obtain situational awareness intelligence on opaque groups are highlighted, along 











Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. 
 
–George Santayana, The Life of Reason, 1905–06; 
quote displayed above Jim Jones pulpit chair at the 
site of the People’s Temple mass suicide in 





The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ, 
Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor Wit 
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line, 
Nor all thy Tears wash out a Word of it. 
 
–Omar Khayyam, The Rubaiyat, 11th Century 
Persian poet, mathematician, and philosopher,  
 
 xvii 




A. PROBLEM STATEMENT—RESEARCH QUESTION  
Opaque communities confound homeland security situational awareness and 
integration efforts, which generates pervasive threat perceptions that often escalate into 
governmental interventions and violent confrontations. As a result of their closed and 
often arcane nature, opaque communities frustrate governmental efforts to conduct police 
and community relations, investigate criminal allegations, proactively detect homeland 
security threats, coordinate disaster planning and prevention activities, and optimize 
incident response. Opaque groups’ disinclination to interact with the surrounding public 
stymies the capabilities of governmental situational awareness that is necessary for these 
activities. This prompts homeland security stakeholders to embrace a default tendency to 
perceive threat streams emanating from such groups and employ a respective 
confrontational posture. Concurrently, authorities have repeatedly attributed member’s 
individual crimes and discrete instances of illicit behavior to the entire community, 
creating self-imposed barriers to viable alternative investigative and enforcement options. 
Governmental failures to communicate with and effectively address past incidents 
involving opaque communities have led to tactical response disasters; future inabilities to 
foster contact with such groups could present grave, unforeseen challenges to homeland 
security and surrounding community resiliency efforts. This thesis explores whether 
governmental entities adopt a common set of operational assumptions regarding threats 
emanating from opaque communities and, if so, whether alternative interactional 
frameworks for integrating such communities into homeland security efforts are 
available.  
B. PROBLEM SPACE 
Various seminal law enforcement events over the past 50 years have involved 
closed groups and communities residing in enclaves, communes, and other detached 
geographic venues. These social configurations create unique challenges to the 
maintenance of homeland security due to their size and corresponding potential to 
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constitute de facto extra-territorial spaces within a given jurisdiction’s area of 
responsibility. Though most previous governmental interventions into such groups have 
been predicated on the suspected existence of criminal activity and threats, all phases and 
aspects of homeland security planning, prevention, response, recovery, and resiliency 
building are potentially negatively impacted by the existence of such opaque 
communities.   
1. Context and Background 
Prior to discussing the inherent threats posed by opaque communities, it is 
necessary to establish a common definition of what constitutes an opaque community, 
identify what existing critical inquiry frameworks regarding such phenomena exist, and 
justify why research into these social formations is relevant to homeland security 
stakeholders at various governmental levels.   
a. Definition of Term “‘Opaque Community” 
For the purposes of this study, an opaque community displays the following traits: 
first, opaque communities are groups of two or more families or cohabitation partnerships 
that are inaccessible to non-members, affiliates, or associates either through explicit or 
implied restriction of member interaction outside of the group. Such restrictions may be 
voluntarily adopted by members and can range from disassociation and refusal to 
willingly engage with outsiders to direct hostility and organizationally enforced secrecy. 
Second, opaque communities are those that gather at or relocate to a physical enclave 
where members have established permanent domicile, access to which is normally 
restricted to those belonging to the opaque group. Living arrangements could range from 
a shared multi-family dwelling to a private acreage, including a compound with 
numerous structures.  
Note that just as germane to the definition of what constitutes an opaque 
community is what types of social collectives do not fulfill the aforementioned set of 
characteristics. Many groups are socially impenetrable to outsiders due to their arcane, 
foreign, or anomalous nature. However, many such communities simply appear opaque 
or befuddle interactions by outsiders primarily due to cultural, linguistic, or social 
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barriers to entry rather than outright reject contact through active disengagement or 
defense against intrusion from non-members. As an example, many Americans may find 
the comparatively fundamentalist and anachronistic beliefs and practices of many 
Anabaptist communities make these groups closed and indiscernible to non-believers. 
Yet, few would likely view a local Amish community as a homeland security challenge. 
This is potentially because although the Amish, Mennonites, Hutterites, and other 
fundamentalist or faith-based colonies or communal groups restrict membership and 
exhibit social and behavioral practices that are foreign to their surrounding communities, 
these groups neither purposely eschew outside contact nor expressly restrict non-member 
access to their domiciles or common areas. Though this lack of threat attribution could be 
linked to these groups’ professed pacifism, other closed pacifistic religions, such as the 
Family International or the non-violent Fundamentalist Latter Day Saints, have 
repeatedly been the focus of domestic intervention efforts. Urban racial ghettos, regional 
ethnic, and cultural diasporas of foreign-born citizen, and concentrations of native non-
English speaking minority groups likewise all constitute groups that may seem 
unapproachable but are not impenetrable to their surrounding communities. It may 
therefore be due to this very access that although there have certainly been repeated 
cultural misunderstandings between such groups and their surrounding neighbors, rarely 
have large scale governmental interventions targeting perceived threats in such 
communities been deemed necessary.  
This thesis proposes the novel and inaugural use of the term “opaque community” 
as a means of differentiating socially closed and physically disassociated groups from the 
aforementioned alternative sub-community categories. There is no known usage of the 
term within the existing literature, a fact that itself suggests that such groups have not 
been previously categorized according to these situational and worldview-neutral 
identifiers. Though known opaque communities tend to adopt at least informal 
hierarchies and exhibit social unification via a common set of beliefs or shared cultural 
traits, the chosen term is purposely intended to describe groups independent of their 
ideology or organizational structure. This study presumes that regardless of an opaque 
community’s given collective belief set or hierarchical nature, any social grouping that 
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physically detaches from a surrounding jurisdiction and exists in a purposely closed and 
secretive manner generates challenges to the establishment and maintenance of a secure 
and resilient homeland.  
b. Existing Critical Inquiry Frameworks 
Official inquiries into tragic or problematic governmental interventions involving 
opaque communities often fail to view the prelude to tactical operations from the eyes of 
the practitioner. Both governmental investigations and secondary literature normally 
gravitate towards and focus critique on tactical errors and the collapse of effective 
intergroup communications from the first instance or moment of compelled contact rather 
than on the prologue to this juncture. However, this anteceding period is often both 
lengthy and potentially ripe with bilateral missed opportunities for conflict avoidance. 
Given that duress and emotional distress necessarily impact all stakeholders in any 
governmental intervention or use of force scenario, it seems logical that identification of 
alternative avenues of peaceful interaction could be more readily discovered at 
government/community relationship junctures absent these aggravating factors. Rather 
than examine the catastrophic interplay of competing tactical agendas and clashing 
worldviews between government agents and opaque communities already engaged in 
conflict, this study proposes an examination of whether governmental oppositional 
frameworks towards opaque communities develop prior to attempted interventions and, if 
so, what alternative frameworks might assist future interactions.  
In addition to the limitations of embarking on studies of a failed intervention from 
the point of first contact, barricade or negotiation scenario, or armed siege, restricting the 
aperture of critical analysis to only the ideologies of opaque groups ignores the 
government actor’s underlying oppositional motivations. Rather than comprehensively 
examine the political and operational environment preceding failed interactions, most 
existing studies primarily seek answers in the unique characteristics, ideology, or 
contextual backdrop to a given opaque community. Yet regardless of stakeholder 
agencies’ understanding of a given opaque community’s potentially obscure beliefs or 
esoteric behavior, the closed and unknowable nature of opaque groups in and of itself 
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appears to lead to offensive posturing and reactive official decision making that 
exacerbates the negative trajectory of the government/community relationship. Existing 
literature on this topic has broadly identified interventions into opaque communities as 
isolated clashes between opposing, often unsympathetic worldviews. Yet this body has 
neither established commonalities between the underlying dangers commonly perceived 
by homeland security stakeholders as emanating from opaque communities with varying 
ideological tenets nor proposed a framework for effectively addressing such closed 
groups absent prejudiced, subjective, or worldview-blinded assessments. In short, an 
examination of the circumstantial prologue to enforcement events involving opaque 
groups from the operational perspective of homeland security stakeholders appears to be 
both a novel and potentially fertile area of study.  
The aforementioned factors often attributed to failed interventions—tactical errors 
and communication barriers between actors holding diverging world views—are likely 
only further exacerbated by a group’s closed nature and officials’ resulting lack of 
situational awareness regarding its intentions and capabilities. Arguably, it is primarily 
because responsible officials are unable to regularly interact with—and thereby 
effectively assess—opaque communities that perceived needs for governmental 
intervention—and thus duress-inducing events—emerge. Such situations generate a 
domino effect in which an inability to interact and communicate inhibits situational 
awareness and foments suspicions of illicit behavior, thereby engendering a perceived 
need among officials to intrude and intervene. This framework in turn inhibits objective 
and unbiased official interactions with the community, which acts as a stimulus for 
impositions of governmental sovereignty and will. Mutual distrust grows, prompting 
community resistance and cascading bilateral escalation of force responses to imminent 
threats now manifested, often initiated in self-defense. Such situations culminate in 
further duress-induced miscommunication and misinterpretation of reactive behavior, 
ultimately leading to seemingly intractable tactical calamity. It seems therefore prudent to 
examine the default oppositional framework adopted by homeland security stakeholders 
when dealing with opaque communities as a potential catalyst for this dialectic.  
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c. Relevancy 
Homeland security stakeholder agencies and officials from all levels of the United 
States’ federalist system of government have an inherent interest in maintaining 
situational awareness of the jurisdiction for which they are responsible. Whether law 
enforcement or firefighter, emergency manager or public health practitioner, all entities 
holding a mandate to provide for the safety and security of the public need to be able to 
detect baseline abnormalities and threats, respond to calls for action and assistance, and 
maintain an ability to assess the potential needs and challenges emanating from the 
constituency to whom they provide governmental services. Consequently, opaque 
communities existing within a homeland security practitioner’s jurisdiction constitute 
potential real and perceived threats and challenges to these efforts simply due to their 
opacity.  
By examining past cases of governmental interventions into opaque communities, 
this research identifies whether a common phenomenon involving adoption by 
governmental actors of oppositional frameworks vis-à-vis opaque communities exists. 
Furthermore, it explores how, and to what extent should, state and local governments 
attempt to monitor opaque communities as well as suggests methods of proactively 
interacting with these constituencies to prevent miscommunication, confusion, and 
unanticipated consequences during periods of duress. The goal of this inquiry is to 
educate homeland security practitioners about suspected recurring oppositional 
frameworks that emerge when dealing with opaque communities, identify opportunities 
that exist for establishing constructive dialogue-based situational awareness, and suggest 
methods for integrating such groups with homeland security prevention, planning, and 
response activities while respecting 1st and 14th Amendment, privacy, and civil 
rights/civil liberties protections.1 
1 Among other enumerated freedoms, the 1st Amendment guarantees the free exercise of religion and 
freedom of speech; the 14th Amendment ensures equal protection of the laws, limiting the actions of state 
and local officials and preventing governmental discrimination against classes of citizens.  
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2. Inherent Threats/Vulnerabilities 
The inestimable or unfathomable nature of one’s neighbor inherently undermines 
one’s ability to estimate and plan for his or her own safety. National security strategists 
increasingly view such voids on the map or “denied areas” as defense challenges that 
require the “maintenance of credible deterrent capabilities forward in key regions,” yet 
ones which often simultaneously transcend potential military contributions by nation 
states to the maintenance of geopolitical stability.2 The global political and contingency 
planning challenges such spaces present are equally relevant to smaller jurisdictional 
elements where constrained response capacity and budget-sensitive governmental service 
footprints must be optimized to the served constituency’s articulable needs. Beyond 
potential outward-facing threats, such situations likewise frustrate official interest in 
protecting those within a given opaque community who potentially either do not know 
where or how to ask for governmental assistance, aid, or protection, or who are being 
actively prevented from doing so.  
a. The Threat of the Unknown 
This threat of the unknown also manifests itself via political pressure to address 
the fears of impacted parties, real or conceived, that emerge within the community 
surrounding or adjacent to the opaque group. From a social constructionist theory 
perspective, Wright notes that governmental stakeholders are often compelled to perceive 
such social enigmas as, “‘threats’ to cherished values or institutions by groups of people 
who are effective in bringing the issue to the attention of authorities.”3 He further states: 
If authorities do not feel sufficient pressure to address a grievance, it may 
not receive the attention it deserves. On the other hand, if authorities are 
confronted with intense or concerted pressure by interest groups or social 
movement organizations, they are more likely to respond to grievance 
claims in order to appear responsive to constituents or selected groups 
2 Nathan Freier, “The Emerging Anti-Access/Area-Denial Challenge,” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, May 17, 2012, https://csis.org/publication/emerging-anti-accessarea-denial-challenge   
3 Stuart A. Wright, “Deconstructing Official Rationales for the Texas State Raid on the FLDS,” in 
Saints under Siege: The Texas State Raid on the Fundamentalist Latter Day Saints, ed. Stuart A. Wright 
and Stuart A. Richardson (New York and London: New York University Press, 2011), 125. 
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even when the problem is not severe or as threatening as claims-makers 
allege.4 
Impacted surrounding communities, acting as such interest groups, can apply such 
pressure on governmental entities by expressing a variety of moral, cultural, prejudicial, 
or xenophobic grievances regarding neighboring opaque communities. However, the 
potential or latent “threat of the unknown” posed by opaque groups situated in impacted 
parties’ “own backyard” in and of itself constitutes a visceral motivator to demand just 
such official attention in the forms of reconnaissance, intrusion, enforcement, and 
intervention. 
b. Historical Incidence of Manifested Threats 
In additional to potential emotional fears of the unknown, articulable direct and 
indirect homeland security threats could and have been found to reside in opaque 
communities. Potential direct threats emanating from an opaque community may include 
the covert formation of a revolutionary militia, such as the Covenant, Sword, and Arm of 
the Lord (CSA), formed by Christian Identity follower James Ellison on a 224-acre 
property in northern Arkansas in 1976.5 It could likewise include a terrorist conspiracy or 
a doomsday plot such as those contrived by the Rajneeshee movement in their salmonella 
poisoning bioterror attack in Wasco County, Oregon in 1984 or the Japanese Aum 
Shinrikyo group’s numerous violent schemes during the mid-1990s. As with any criminal 
or terrorist conspiracy, operational security concerns for secrecy have motivated 
countless perpetrators to seek secluded areas as safe refuges from which to pursue their 
nefarious plans. Because governmental ability to detect preoperational planning and 
suspicious behavior indicative of future criminal or terrorist intent necessitates some 
degree of contact with such clandestine groups, overt or otherwise, opaque communities 
pose a recurrent and enduring problem to homeland security practitioners holding the 
mandate to detect, deter, and disrupt such activity.  
4 Ibid. 
5 Michael Barkun, Religion and the Racist Right: The Origins of the Christian Identity Movement, rev. 
ed. (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 216. 
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c. Effects on Disaster and Contingency Planning 
Opaque communities also constitute potential latent threats to their surrounding 
jurisdictions through their nonparticipation in both disaster and contingency planning and 
emergency management exercises. First responders often have no visibility over the 
numbers and makeup of opaque community populations, which limits their ability to plan 
for emergency response, evacuations, or other life and safety contingencies. An opaque 
group existing outside public health monitoring programs could develop a viral pandemic 
threat through lack of necessary vaccinations, unhygienic practices, or other dangerous 
behavior. Opaque groups in wooded areas could fail to undertake countermeasures to 
ensure wildfire abatement and/or timely fire suppression, potentially endangering 
neighboring areas. Improper wastewater management, various other forms of pollution, 
the harboring of dangerous or diseased animals, and numerous additional potential 
hazards constitute threats with potential impact to adjacent jurisdictions. In addition, the 
lack of the ability to monitor and assess these threats or the capabilities and intent of the 
community’s potential nefarious members, homeland security practitioners 
understandably perceive opaque communities as a largely inestimable challenge to their 
ongoing efforts to ensure for the safety and security of their entire area of responsibility.  
From a broader homeland security perspective, regulatory infractions, quasi-
criminal behavior, and socially negligent activities have been highlighted as potential 
areas into which the state’s interest in rule of law and domestic order extends. 
Historically, opaque groups have been accused of failure to report unattended births and 
deaths, violation of zoning laws and construction standards, evasion of  taxes, failure to 
enroll children in compulsory attendance school systems, and distributing controlled 
medications without prescriptions.6 Such comparatively “minor” infractions, even if 
pursued due an opaque group’s cultural or religious beliefs, lifestyle practices, or lack of 
awareness rather than outright disregard for laws and regulations, could have significant 
impact on homeland security entities and the surrounding populace. Here again, it is less 
6 Jean Swantko Wiseman, “Strategic Dissolution and the Politics of Opposition: Parallels in the State 
Raids on the Twelve Tribes and the FLDS,” in Saints under Siege: The Texas State Raid on the 
Fundamentalist Latter Day Saints (New York and London: New York University Press, 2011), 204. 201–
220 
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the articulable suspicion or knowledge but rather the potential that such activity may be 
occurring within an opaque community—particularly in the absence of an outlet to gather 
disconfirming evidence to the contrary—that frustrates governmental planning efforts 
with regard to such groups.  
3. Collection Limitations 
Given that homeland security practitioners, governmental agencies, and their 
civilian leaders have a valid requirement for situational awareness intelligence regarding 
opaque communities, the question arises as to what legal methods, sources, repositories, 
and protocols exist for obtaining such information.7 Two fundamental impediments 
quickly surface when exploring potential solutions. First, when dealing with a group or 
community that purposely eschews governmental contact, one must look either to 
methods for obtaining situational awareness regardless of the community’s tacit 
agreement with or participation in its collection or to opportunities and processes where 
contact with agencies and officials is compulsory. Second, stakeholders must explore the 
availability and means of collecting, handling, processing, storing, and disseminating 
such information in a manner that is both legal and fully respectful of opaque community 
members’ privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. Because governmental actors are 
widely restricted from collecting information on the identities and activities of private 
persons, particularly those operating outside the public sphere, without a legal 
authorization to do so, prudent examination of any intelligence gathering activity is 
warranted prior to its initiation. Because officials and agencies may also be subject to 
blue-sky laws regarding governmental transparency, the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA), legislative and departmental oversight, and other information auditing and public 
disclosure procedures, official actors must pay strict attention to the purpose, form, 
protection, and potential political repercussions of any collection and storage activities.  
7 Note that this thesis differentiates situational awareness intelligence from situational awareness 
information in that the former has undergone some type of analytic process to render assessments, 
judgments, conclusions, or other intellectual output for use by the consumer whereas the latter refers to the 
data or raw unevaluated observations used for intelligence production.   
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a. Constitutionally Protected Activities 
The 1st Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees freedom of 
religion and prohibits Congress from promoting one religion over another.8 The 14th 
Amendment ensures equal protection of the laws and stipulates that states shall not, 
“make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States,” thereby preventing discrimination by state and local officials against 
classes of citizens.9 Together, these constitutional protections clearly restrict 
governmental intrusions into opaque groups, in particular those organized around 
common or communal religious practice. The very beliefs and societal expectations that 
motivate a given population to withdraw from its surrounding community may constitute 
1st and 14th Amendment as well as general civil rights, liberties, and privacy protected 
behavior. Accordingly, the anomalous behavior or obscure ideologies that by their nature 
draw governmental attention and public scrutiny often enjoy enhanced protections from 
the same. In reviewing the legitimacy of any governmental interactional framework 
employed with regard to closed communities, the inviolability of these constitutionally 
protected rights and immunities must be respected and upheld, regardless of any 
perceived but uncorroborated threats or governmental preferences to the contrary. 
Though not itself an opaque community, the March 2012 acquittal by a federal judge in 
Michigan of five members of the Hutaree militia who had been charged with rebellion 
against the United States and seditious conspiracy demonstrates the degree to which even 
antisocial and threat-laced utterances by groups who clearly embrace violent ideologies 
enjoy constitutional free speech protections.10 
b. 28 CFR Part 23 
United States Code of Federal Regulations Chapter 28, Part 23 is a guideline that 
governs criminal intelligence systems operated by or on behalf of state and local law 
8 “First Amendment,” Cornell, accessed July 14, 2014, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/first_amendment. 
9 “14th Amendment,” Cornell, accessed July 14, 2014, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/amendmentxiv. 
10 Jerome P. Bjelopera, The Domestic Terrorist Threat: Background and Issues for Congress 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 26–27. 
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enforcement agencies that derive funding from the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, as amended. First issued by the U.S. Department of Justice in 1980, 
the regulation was created to ensure rights and constitutional protections of individuals 
are protected.11 The regulation defines a criminal intelligence system as, “the 
arrangements, equipment, facilities, and procedures used for the receipt, storage, 
interagency exchange or dissemination, and analysis of criminal intelligence 
information,” which in turn is defined as  
data which has been evaluated to determine that it: (i) is relevant to the 
identification of and the criminal activity engaged in by an individual who 
or organization which is reasonably suspected of involvement in criminal 
activity, and (ii) meets criminal intelligence system submission criteria.12 
Moreover, the regulation stipulates:  
A project shall not collect or maintain criminal intelligence information 
about the political, religious or social views, associations, or activities of 
any individual or any group, association, corporation, business, 
partnership, or other organization unless such information directly relates 
to criminal conduct or activity and there is reasonable suspicion that the 
subject of the information is or may be involved in criminal conduct or 
activity.13 
As the de facto national standard for sharing criminal intelligence information, 28 
CFR Part 23 sets the operational standard for law enforcement entities collecting 
intelligence on opaque groups. However, the regulation does not govern agencies’ 
collection of “tips and leads” information, case and record management systems, or 
retention of criminal history records.14 Single-agency databases holding information that 
is not shared with multijurisdictional intelligence systems or outside agencies are 
11 Institute for Intergovernmental Research, “28 CFR Frequently Asked Questions,” Criminal 
Intelligence Systems—Operating Policies (28 CFR Part 23), accessed July 14, 2014, 
http://www.iir.com/28CFR_Program/28CFR_FAQ. 
12 Institute for Intergovernmental Research, “28 CFR Part 23 Executive Order,” Criminal Intelligence 
Systems—Operating Policies (28 CFR Part 23), accessed July 14, 2014, 
https://www.iir.com/28CFR_Program/28CFR_Resources/Executive_Order/. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Institute for Intergovernmental Research, “28 CFR Frequently Asked Questions.” 
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likewise exempt from 28 CFR Part 23 requirements.15 As such, 28 CFR Part 23, while 
not limiting the day-to-day activities of homeland security practitioners, does prevent 
existing law enforcement intelligence databases from being employed to collect 
information regarding opaque groups without criminal predicate. Though the regulation 
neither expressly applies to systems funded solely through state and local revenue sources 
nor extends to non-law enforcement state and municipal agencies, any official attempts to 
purposely design and fund intelligence systems simply to avoid 28 CFR Part 23 
requirements could be perceived to be violating long established mechanisms for 
guaranteeing privacy, civil rights, and civil liberty protections.  
c. Federal versus State Authorities 
Though 28 CFR Part 23 regulates the intelligence collection activities of state and 
local entities, the measure does not apply to activities undertaken by federal authorities 
with regard to opaque groups. Various federal law enforcement and, to a lesser degree, 
intelligence agencies have a potential interest in monitoring activity and enforcing federal 
violations occurring in and committed by members of opaque groups. In particular, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
(BATF), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)—all within the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ)—could have investigative interest in illicit activities 
occurring within opaque communities. Historically, the BATF has frequently become 
involved in federal enforcement actions targeting opaque groups due to the existence of 
potential and verified infractions of federal firearm regulations. However, with regard to 
intelligence collection and monitoring, the FBI possesses far greater authorities to collect 
information on opaque groups as described in The Attorney General’s Guidelines for 
Domestic FBI Operations.16  
According to this guidance, the FBI, “is an intelligence agency as well as a law 
enforcement agency,” whose “basic functions accordingly extend beyond limited 
15 Institute for Intergovernmental Research, “28 CFR Part 23...a Guideline,” accessed July 28, 2014, 
http://www.iir.com/Documents/28CFR/Laymans_Guide_to_28_CFR_Part_23.pdf. 
16 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Attorney General, The Attorney General’s Guidelines for 
Domestic FBI Operations, September 29, 2008, http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines.pdf 
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investigations of discreet matters, and include broader analytic and planning functions.”17 
In particular, a form of official inquiry referred to as an FBI assessment, “require(s) an 
authorized purpose but not any particular factual predication.”18 As, “detecting and 
interrupting criminal activities at their early stages, and preventing crimes from occurring 
in the first place, is preferable to allowing criminal plots and activities to come to 
fruition,” the FBI is widely authorized to conduct such broad detection activities, albeit 
with a minimum level of intrusiveness:  
Hence, assessments may be undertaken proactively with such objectives as 
detecting criminal activities; obtaining information on individuals, groups, 
or organizations of possible investigative interest, either because they may 
be involved in criminal or national security-threatening activities or 
because they may be targeted for attack or victimization by such activities; 
and identifying and assessing individuals who may have value as human 
sources.19 
Obviously, the scope of such intelligence gathering interest could easily extend to 
activities conducted within and by members of opaque communities, particularly given 
the FBI’s limited capacity to detect the incidence of federal crime within such groups and 
its organizational mandate to investigate such infractions.  
In addition to DOJ agencies, numerous components of the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) have both statutory authorities and potential vested interests 
involving opaque groups. Both U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) and U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) mandates would require these agencies to 
interact with opaque communities sponsoring, harboring, or including foreign national 
members or persons suspected of violating federal customs and immigration laws. The 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) could have contact with opaque 
groups impacted by declared disasters or seeking homeland security grant funding. U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Transportation Security Agency (TSA) 
17 Ibid., 9. 
18 Ibid., 17. 
19 Ibid. 
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would likewise have contact with members of opaque groups undertaking domestic or 
foreign travel. 
Aside from contact, these DHS components may have with opaque community 
members during the course of fulfilling their normal duties, the DHS Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has a potential role in overcoming the situational 
awareness challenges posed by such groups. I&A acts as the department’s conduit for 
providing federal support to the national network of state and local owned and 
administered fusion centers. These in turn, “provide interdisciplinary expertise and 
situational awareness to inform decision-making at all levels of government. They 
conduct analysis and facilitate information sharing while assisting law enforcement and 
homeland security partners in preventing, protecting against, and responding to crime and 
terrorism.”20 Though like the FBI, DHS I&A is member of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community (IC), and I&A has no federal investigative authority or mandate.21 Rather, 
I&A acts as the federal lead in sharing and integrating information between the IC and 
state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, as well as the private sector.22 I&A also 
acts as the departmental lead in managing the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting 
(SAR) Initiative (NSI).23 Given these duties, I&A potentially plays a key role in assisting 
state and local jurisdictions in detecting, assessing, monitoring, and supporting situational 
awareness related to any NSI suspicious activity or threat stream intelligence emanating 
from or associated with members of opaque communities. 
20 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers,” accessed 
July 15, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers 
21 White House, “Executive Order 12333,” December 4, 1981, 
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/ic-legal-reference-book-2012/ref-book-eo-12333  
22 Note that E.O.12333 and the Interim Intelligence Oversight Procedures for the Office of 
Intelligence & Analysis, dated April 3, 2008, dictate the scope and nature of I&A’s intelligence activities 
related to U.S. persons. Due to this document’s current designation as “For Official Use Only” (U//FOUO), 
additional discussion of I&A’s interim authorities, potential contributions, and organizational protocols has 
been limited to allow unrestricted dissemination of this thesis. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
Interim Intelligence Oversight Procedures for the Office of Intelligence & Analysis (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008). 
23 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “More about the Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
Mission,” accessed July 15, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/more-about-office-intelligence-and-analysis-
mission#1 
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Though not presented as an exhaustive list, collectively, these federal agencies 
possess authorities and missions that have a high likelihood of placing them in a position 
to investigate, interact with, or collect and process information on opaque community 
members, organizational activities, and any homeland security related threats or issues 
emanating therefrom. Note that other federal agencies with tangential homeland security 
related missions such as the U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Health and Human Services, and 
the Social Security Administration have separate but potentially relevant cause and 
authority to interact with and collect various forms of information on members belonging 
to closed groups.24 For the purposes of this study, it should be recognized that numerous 
federal stakeholders have a mixture of statutory authorities, valid authorized purposes, 
and designated databases and repositories with potential relevance to the collection and 
maintenance of situational awareness intelligence on opaque communities. This thesis 
will discuss some of the issues and challenges to comprehensively leveraging these 
federal resources in support of state and local governments in later chapters. 
 
 
24 U.S. Census Bureau, “What We Do—About Us—U.S. Census Bureau,” accessed July 15, 2014, 
https://www.census.gov/aboutus/; U.S. Social Security Administration, “About the Social Security 
Administration,” accessed August 19, 2014, http://www.ssa.gov/agency/; U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, “About HHS,” accessed August 19, 2014, http://www.hhs.gov/about/ 
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II. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
A. CASE STUDY METHOD 
This thesis relies on a comprehensive analysis and review of historical instances 
of failed governmental interactions with opaque communities as a means of identifying 
the existence of oppositional frameworks employed by homeland security stakeholders. I 
will examine the following three domestic case studies of homeland security events 
involving opaque communities: the 1993 federal raid on the Branch Davidian’s Mount 
Carmel compound near Waco, Texas; the 1985 Philadelphia Police Department raid of 
the MOVE commune; and the 2008 Texas raid on the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter Day Saints (FLDS) Yearning for Zion (YFZ) Ranch in Eldorado, Texas.  
These cases are relevant first and foremost because they had significant homeland 
security impact within respective jurisdictions. Two cases—Branch Davidians and 
MOVE—resulted in significant loss of life and destruction of property. The YFZ Ranch 
raid, though resolved without casualties, created significant challenges to law 
enforcement response that overwhelmed stakeholder capabilities. All of these cases 
presented unique and largely unforeseen challenges to investigating and responding 
agencies, as well as to their respective political leadership. The differing scope, 
ideological contexts, membership makeup, and associated jurisdictional settings buttress 
the assessed relevancy of these cases, as they provide a variety and depth that 
corroborates situational uniformity between all opaque community types. In addition, 
these cases were selected as they offer a mix of opaque communities located in both 
urban and rural settings, and each includes either a federal, state, or local homeland 
security stakeholder agency as the primary governmental actor, thereby allowing 
comparison across a spectrum of jurisdictional boundaries further enhancing their 
relevance in establishing a uniform assessment of stakeholder agency behavior. In all 
these cases, there exists a sufficient record of the societal context and basis for 
intervention underlying the manifested homeland security event.  
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B. SELECTION CRITERIA 
These cases were selected based on three criteria: these groups were closed to 
non-members/affiliates/associates and either by explicit or implied means restricted 
member interactions outside of the group; these communities gathered at or relocated to a 
physical enclave where members established permanent domicile; and removal or 
recession of these groups from the surrounding community led to governmental 
intervention, duress-induced miscommunication and disaster, and/or gross mistrust and 
alienation from the surrounding community. 
The use of these selection criteria for this case study sample set is based on the 
following. First, communities comprised of a restricted or closed membership groups, 
which do allow unrestricted access by members to their surrounding communities, have 
not generally created significant homeland security challenges. As mentioned in the 
definition section above, many sub-cultures potentially constitute groups that exhibit 
unique ideologies, cultural practices, or other barriers to membership or effortless social 
interaction by non-members. However, most such groups’ members freely communicate 
with non-members and their surrounding community at will: they associate without 
integrating, a distinction that further illuminates the unique challenges that completely 
opaque communities engender.  
Second, a focus on opaque groups that withdrew to a distinct, secluded physical 
location at which members reside was deemed a limiting criterion because this appears to 
be a sufficiency prerequisite for relevance to homeland security situational awareness and 
planning. Groups whose members congregate but do not cohabitate do not constitute 
separate constituencies for homeland security stakeholders, as these individuals and their 
families are subsumed by the existing communities in which they live for the purposes of 
disaster planning, situational monitoring, and provision of essential services. Only by 
establishing a physically separate enclave, compound, commune where members 
reside—one neither over which first responders and governmental entities have full 
visibility nor with which they maintain routine communication—does an opaque 
community frustrate homeland security processes by presenting a geographic void for 
detection, deterrence, disruption, response, and recovery activities.  
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Thirdly, only communities whose opaque nature and withdrawal have resulted in 
significant homeland security events (primarily enforcement actions, safety and welfare 
interventions, or tragedies) precipitated by the group’s distrust of government or 
compelled by political pressure from their surrounding communities are being selected as 
case studies. The reason for this is twofold. First, occurrence of such events is what 
constitutes this topic’s relevance to the discipline and provides the potential policy impact 
motive for critical study. Second, it appears the reasons such groups withdraw and 
establish themselves as “opaque” is often intrinsically linked with their distrust of or 
disassociation from the surrounding community and, perhaps more importantly, their 
rejection of governmental contact, sovereignty, and oversight. An opaque community’s 
disinclination to interact with public safety, first responder, emergency management, and 
other governmental agencies is possibly the primary causative factor for its constituting a 
homeland security threat (i.e., it likely becomes a threat to homeland security through this 
disassociation). As such, by selecting cases that enable an exploration of this link 
between the basis for a closed community’s withdrawal and non-cooperation in homeland 
security activities and a subsequent tragedy or event that was predicated by this behavior, 
a more thorough analysis of the aggravating communicative barriers is possible.  
This thesis has purposely not focused on a collection of related but incompatible 
cases involving closed or clandestine groups or organizations that either do not fulfill one 
or more of the above selection criteria or which are deemed anomalous for other reasons. 
Religious cults such as Heaven’s Gate (San Diego, 1997) or Solar Temple (Canada and 
Switzerland, 1990s) were closed groups that allowed limited outside interaction by 
members, pursued some isolated cohabitation, and experienced tragic dissolutions. 
However, due to the relatively small size of these groups, their failure to interact with a 
surrounding community and retreat to a single large residence or property does not fulfill 
the sufficiency test for homeland security relevancy. Likewise, cases involving a very 
small number of individuals, an extended family, or a conspiratorial group (such as the 
1992 Weaver family standoff with the FBI in Ruby Ridge, Idaho or the 1983–84 crime 
spree committed by Robert Jay Mathews and his group The Order) is assessed as 
unproductive, as such groups are deemed too small and isolated to offer constructive 
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lessons to a broad set of homeland security practitioners. Note that both the BATF raid of 
Ellison’s CSA Zarephath-Horeb community in 1985 and the 1996 FBI standoff with the 
Montana Freemen at the “Justus Township” near Jordan, Montana constitute compelling 
models of successful interventions into opaque communities that avoided violence and 
bloodshed, albeit ones that did not outright avoid such altercations, as discussed in later 
chapters.25 
Finally, I purposely did not select cases that occurred in foreign countries due to 
the existence of uncontrolled variables in these jurisdictions. Insights gleaned from 
problematic interventions into foreign opaque communities, such as those associated with 
the Aum Shinrikyo group in Japan, the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten 
Commandments of God in Uganda, the Doukhobors of British Columbia, or the Ogyen 
Kunzang Choling Tibetan Buddhist community near Castellane, France, would seem to 
have domestic applicability, but as these cases fall under a vastly different set of laws and 
social conventions, they were assessed as too incompatible to provide reliable case-
derived comparative evidence. Though certainly a significant opaque community with 
profound social dynamic relevance to homeland security studies, Jim Jones’ People’s 
Temple movement was similarly rejected as a case study due to the group’s relocation to 
Guyana in the late 1970s. Though primarily composed of U.S. national members, the 
extra-territorial circumstances surrounding the Jonestown tragedy prevent its full 
exploitation as a case study relevant to domestic homeland security efforts. 
C. INFORMATION SOURCES 
This thesis utilizes two forms of scholarly literature for this case study: 
governmental case reports and secondary sources. Although some of this literature draws 
from primary sources, such as previous or current group members, eyewitnesses, 
absconders, and government stakeholder officials, the majority of the case information is 
only available through these secondary sources.  
25 Lane Crothers, Rage on the Right : The American Militia Movement from Ruby Ridge to Homeland 
Security (Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, MD, 2003), 153–54; Barkun, Religion and the Racist Right, 216. 
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D. STRUCTURED FOCUS METHOD AND VARIABLES 
This study examines the underlying issues and challenges that opaque 
communities present to homeland security practitioners, integrating evidence from the 
individual cases according to a set of identified common underlying themes and issues 
affecting governmental stakeholders that appear to permeate all of the selected cases. 
These commonalities are grouped and examined according to a structured focused 
method in which the following influences affecting official decision making (outlined 
below) are examined for potential relevancy to the preexistence of default oppositional 
frameworks among governmental actors and ultimate success or failure of the 
governmental interaction and intervention with opaque communities: 
I. Community and political pressure on local and state governments to 
intervene into the activities and potential threats emanating from opaque 
groups due to: 
a. Presumption of intending absconders 
b. Projected, unfounded concern for women and children members 
and/or 
c. Suspected activities that offend the prevailing social conscience or 
preface illegality 
II. Emergence among officials of a pervasive, perceived threat emanating 
from the community due unavailability of situational awareness, and 
III. The danger of self-fulfilling group narratives due to amplified 
miscommunication compounded by governmental intervention under 
duress 
In addition to the aforementioned framing issues that permeate governmental 
interaction with opaque communities, outreach strategies that pursued constructive 
dialogue, educated by an understanding of ideological, eschatological, and worldview 
differences, appears to be the independent variable that had the greatest effect on the 
outcome of each case. These cases enlighten an inquiry into this key aspect both in terms 
of actions that can be taken in a steady state or period of tranquil coexistence as well as 
immediately before and during instances of compelled interaction or duress through 
forced governmental intervention. By highlighting the context to the 
community/government relationship (or lack thereof) as viewed by each side through the 
lens of these cases, this study illuminates patterns and correlative factors that transcend 
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each of these cases individually and have the potential to inform future homeland security 
endeavors. 
E. PURPOSE AND GOALS 
Through critical inquiry of these communication failures between homeland 
security officials and opaque community leadership in a variety of urban and rural 
settings throughout the United States over the last 35 years, this research method provides 
a strong basis for exploration of the convergent underlying themes that engender 
divergent contextual frameworks between governmental and community actors. Though 
the communities’ makeup, ideology, and tendencies towards violence differ, their 
common opaque nature present contextual similarities that can be applied to all such 
groups, regardless of their unique characteristics. By comparing and contrasting the 
various outcomes of these cases through the optics of the aforementioned frameworks, 
this inquiry provides a unique insight into the homeland security academic canon that has 
topical relevancy and will enlighten and enhance future preparedness, prevention, and 
response efforts.  
The larger goal is to provide the reader with a better understanding of the broad 
homeland security challenges these themes create in dealing with an opaque community 
in a given jurisdiction. Rather than simply dissecting the success or failure of intervention 
strategies targeting isolated instances of opaque communities, this study will determine if 
the above themes are indeed common phenomena applicable to a broad range of closed 
groups, independent of their given ideological background, location, makeup, or stated 
purpose. Based on the findings, later chapters offer some recommendations for future 







III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
The existing body of literature regarding homeland security stakeholder 
oppositional frameworks related to opaque communities is limited in both breadth and 
depth. Two broad veins of potentially applicable literature tangentially address such 
communities but fail to specifically identify a group’s opacity as a critical impediment to 
homeland security efforts. Instead, relevant studies tend to approach opaque communities 
as either community policing “special need” groups or as sociological case studies. A 
phenomenon that appears to be less comprehensively explored is the framework by which 
the governmental actors themselves approach closed or opaque communities, regardless 
of the ideology, new religious movement beliefs, or worldviews to which its inhabitants 
subscribe.  
1. General Literary Veins 
The first and much broader concept of community policing has been the focus of 
an extensive canon of both theoretical and operational study. Police engagement 
strategies, such as officer visibility, counseling, public education, and apprehension 
efforts, are highlighted as effective alternatives to enforcement-only contact between law 
enforcement and citizens, with effective communication identified as a key enabler in 
their implementation.26 This analysis typically identifies the niche or intra-community 
ethnic, cultural, and language barriers facing public safety and law enforcement agencies 
as challenges that can be substantially overcome through cultural awareness and via 
proactive, tailored public outreach at the interpersonal level in interactional venues absent 
enforcement or investigative agendas. It should be noted that such efforts require 
voluntary reciprocity and cooperation from the policed constituency, and the existing 
literature generally neglects discussion of groups that purposely avoid or reject such 
contact. 
26 Mary S. Jackson, Policing in a Diverse Society: Another American Dilemma (Durham, NC: 
Carolina Academic Press, 2006), 16–17. 
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The second vein largely examines opaque communities as a subset of new 
religious, alternative lifestyle, fundamentalist, anti-government, or other variant of 
obscure social phenomena. This body of literature emerges from the underlying 
disciplines of sociology, religious studies, and psychology. The existing canon thus tends 
to view a group’s opacity as a facet of the larger ideological, cultural, and psychosocial 
undercurrents to an examined community’s nature and behavioral makeup rather than as 
an independent causational factor underlying tragic governmental interventions. Many 
opaque groups apparently choose to withdraw from society due to their unique 
eschatology, fear or rejection of outside influence, or collective desire to pursue activities 
free from public scrutiny or reproach. A community’s attribute of opacity often then 
appears to be strongly associated with or stem from its foundational or underlying belief 
set. In particular, scholars of both new religious movements and sociology have focused a 
significant body of critical inquiry on millenarian groups, largely because groups holding 
such beliefs may be predisposed to fulfilling their perceived role in intractable, apogean 
confrontations against governmental entities. As such, much of the relevant literature 
dealing with closed groups focuses on contributing or accompanying millenarian, new 
religious movement, or anti-governmental thought and belief. 
2. Relevance of Existing Literature 
Consequently, though both community policing and sociological thought and 
explanatory models are useful in dealing with opaque communities, they appear to fail a 
sufficiency test in providing explanations of homeland security stakeholder frameworks 
vis-à-vis opaque communities. As community policing requires recurring, voluntary 
interaction between government—primarily law enforcement—and a policed 
constituency, its applicability is fundamentally constrained when dealing with physically 
inaccessible or purposely secretive groups. Sociological studies certainly illuminate an 
opaque group’s worldview and clarify cultural and communicative barriers between it, 
the surrounding community, and governmental actors tasked with providing public safety 
services to both. However, these studies largely fail to explain the impact a group’s 
opacity has on officials absent the communication challenges stemming from its 
underlying ideological basis and accompanying worldview. Collectively, the existing 
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literature provides analytic context to the identified hypothesis regarding flawed 
oppositional frameworks, but it fails to adequately identify the unique causative role the 
opaque nature of these groups has played in creating challenges to homeland security 
practitioners. In short, neither areas of study identify homeland security stakeholders’ 
requirements for situational awareness intelligence as a prime motivator for seeking 
interaction with or visibility over the encountered opaque community. Portions of both 
veins of inquiry may, however, be useful in explaining the framework according to which 
these stakeholders’ approach opaque community challenges. After introducing some of 
the current critical thought in this area, a review of the applicable literature involving 
historical case studies involving opaque groups will be highlighted. 
B. DIVERGENT WORLDVIEWS 
Millennialism, in particular, and violence stemming from chiliastic beliefs is the 
focus of much critical study with applicability to opaque groups. Wessinger offers a 
typology for violent apocalyptic religious groups useful to homeland security 
stakeholders in approaching and interacting with such groups. She identifies millenarian 
beliefs as either catastrophic or progressive and categorizes groups as exhibiting fragile, 
assaulted, or revolutionary motivational traits, contextualized by members’ immutable 
“ultimate concern[s].”27 By rationalizing any organizational embrace of violence on the 
existing mixture of internal group turmoil and members’ perception of external threats, 
Wessinger presents a model with which to successfully approach millennial groups when 
seeking resolution of conflict. This typology is especially applicable to opaque 
communities, and Wessinger uses domestic case studies such as the Branch Davidians, 
Peoples Temple, and Chen Tao in demonstrating its utility. She identifies a failure to 
recognize millenarian groups’ worldviews and properly understand and contextualize 
negotiation and conflict resolution dialogue based on members’ ultimate concerns as 
shortcomings among responding officials.28 However, this framework is intrinsically 
group-centric rather than situational, and it does not comprehensively address homeland 
27 Catherine Lowman Wessinger, How the Millennium Comes Violently: From Jonestown to Heaven’s 
Gate (New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2000), 24. 
28 Ibid. 
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security stakeholder framework limitations in interacting with closed groups prior to 
forced intervention scenarios. 
Sullivan, with specific reference to the Branch Davidians, focuses on 
misunderstanding or lack of true empathy among law enforcement with regard to closed 
religious groups. He suggests that it is by discounting religious motivations or context 
that law enforcement agencies fail to establish constructive dialogue during interventions 
into criminal activity perpetrated by religious groups. He notes, “the risk is that, in 
trivializing religion as a motivation, government officials diminished their capacity to 
understand the motives and actions of citizens.”29 The often devout convictions of 
millenarian closed communities certainly present unique challenges to such law 
enforcement operations but are arguably only one of multiple information deficit 
challenges faced by homeland security stakeholders when dealing with opaque groups. 
Just as officials’ ignorance of religious belief is detrimental to establishing inter-group 
dialogue, the lack of knowledge of a group’s activity, intent, capabilities, and makeup 
present additional challenges in assessing potential threats from such a community. 
Though Sullivan’s recommendation for the development of greater religious knowledge 
among law enforcement agencies constitutes perhaps the most critical aspect to this suite 
of communicative barriers, it both fails the sufficiency test and disregards the resultant 
effects that officials’ adoption of oppositional frameworks plays in dealing with opaque 
communities.  
Newport does not address opaque communities directly separate millenarian 
ideologies and their impact on police crisis negotiations. However, he does highlight the 
dangers for totalitarian control by a group leader claiming privileged access to, “the 
source of legitimization of his or her authority.”30 He notes, “In a religion in which 
access to the source of authority is closed to all but the leader, the actions of the leader 
cannot easily be questioned by followers, since no one else has access to the source of the 
29 Lawrence E. Sullivan, “‘No Longer the Messiah:’ U.S. Federal Law Enforcement Views of 
Religion in Connection with the 1993 Siege of Mount Carmel near Waco, Texas,” Numen-International 
Review for the History of Religions 43, no. 2 (1996): 220.  
30 John P. Newport, “Cults, Religious Conflict, Religious Liberty and Frameworks of Order,” Journal 
of Police Crisis Negotiations 2, no. 1 (2002): 10. 
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revelation.”31 With specific reference to the Branch Davidians, Newport likewise stresses 
the importance of understanding eschatological beliefs in “end times,” “signs,” and 
apocalyptic themes when dealing with groups following such ideologies, as such 
knowledge will prevent authorities from inadvertently manifesting prophesized intrusion 
by the “forces of evil.” He notes,  
As Waco has shown, violence is a product of interaction and therefore 
may be partially controlled by the state. The state may not be able to 
change a group’s doctrinal propensities, but it can control its own 
reactions, and in doing so may exert significant leverage over the 
outcome…If, on the other hand, they naively become co-participants in 
millenarian’s end-time script, future Wacos will be not merely probable; 
they will be inevitable.32  
Though Newport points out the need for “‘worldview’ interpreters” and highlights 
belief in continuing revelation by living prophets as issues for governmental entities 
dealing with arcane or unconventional religious movements, he does not extend these 
interactional best practices to a broader understanding of the challenges posed by secular 
as well as religious closed communities. He likewise does not identify officials’ own 
operative assumptions and desires for situational awareness as impediments to open and 
constructive dialogue with these groups prior to situations of duress.  
C. SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR OPACITY 
Though Newport restricts this discussion primarily to organizations grouped 
around strong religious beliefs, he does offer commentary on the phenomenon of 
survivalist groups in general that is equally applicable to opaque communities that harbor 
isolationist tendencies: 
Survivalist groups are defensive communities designed to keep at bay a 
world they despise and fear. They often deny the legitimacy of 
government and other institutions. For some, the reign of antichrist has 
already begun. For them, no social contract can exist between themselves 
and the enemy–the state. Their sense of besiegement and their links to 
paramilitary subcultures virtually guarantee that, no matter how 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 14. 
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committed they may be to lives of isolation, they will inevitably run afoul 
of the law. The flash-point could involve firearms regulations, the tax 
system, or the treatment of children.33 
This statement encapsulates many of the issues critical though not singular to 
opaque communities’ interaction with homeland security stakeholder agencies, 
particularly at the county and municipal levels. Though Newport correctly characterizes a 
group’s withdrawal from society as the basis for any oppositional behavior, resistance, or 
open conflict, he accentuates a group’s underlying ideology as the sole causative factor 
rather than identifying the operational and interactional constraints its closed nature 
presents to law enforcement as an additional catalyst for failed dialogue and 
organizational belligerency.34  
In Learning Lessons from Waco, Docherty deconstructs the societal relationship 
between the Branch Davidians and their surrounding community, noting that material, 
social, and symbolic resources all contribute to potential misunderstanding between these 
entities.35 In particular, she notes that opponents frequently utilize “atrocity tales” as 
symbolic activity to discredit unpopular religions. Docherty suggests, “alleged atrocities 
usually fall under the headings of psychological violation of personal freedom and 
autonomy, physical abuse of members, and disregard for conventional gender and 
familial relationships.”36 By alleging that criminal activity and violent acts were being 
committed, opponents successfully employ atrocity narratives to attract the attention of 
law enforcement, thereby earning allies in their efforts against the targeted group. Though 
Docherty’s analysis explains one of the key aggravating factors affecting official 
oppositional frameworks regarding opaque groups, it does not unearth the underlying 
motivations for illuminating the true actions and intentions of such groups.  
Without specific reference to closed communities involving religious minorities, 
Wright and Richardson suggest there exists a compelling argument that social intolerance 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Jayne Seminare Docherty, Learning Lessons from Waco: When the Parties Bring Their Gods to the 
Negotiation Table (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2001), 35. 
36 Ibid., 37. 
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and a resulting support for governmental repression of minority faiths exists.37 The 
authors offer the Fundamentalist Latter Day Saints as a case study, as well as juxtapose 
the group against seven other instances of minority religious movements that have 
suffered governmental enforcement and intervention efforts disproportionate to suspected 
offenses or of questionable legality. They conclude that there exists a pattern of 
government raids against new religious movements, obscure sects, and groups that are 
stigmatized due to such groups’ alternative social or cultural practices and beliefs. 
Though they do not limit their study to opaque groups, they do concede additional 
challenges occur in dealing with closed religious minorities. However, in their final 
analysis, Wright and Richardson attribute pernicious interventionist tendencies to in/out 
group and minority/majority social dynamics involving state intolerance and 
discrimination more than officials’ operational desire for situational intelligence and 
elevated perceptions of threat in the absence of interaction and communication with 
opaque groups.38  
In examining the negative repercussions of failed government-community 
relations, Bromley describes the phenomenon of the “dramatic denouement” as a method 
of understanding why and how religious groups, including isolated ones, adopt violent 
behavior. He argues such transcendent episodes of intensified conflict arise from a 
situation of “progressive polarization,” in which parties increasingly become mutually 
subversive, eventually achieving a relational boiling point that culminates in open 
conflict. Bromley comes perhaps closest to outlining a framework to explain how 
organizational secrecy and community opacity contribute to the 
community/governmental polarization, noting,  
Secrecy generally produces greater volatility and unpredictability in 
conflict situations. Given that the parties already assess one another as 
engaged in subversive conduct, secrecy renders presumably hostile 
intentions and actions opaque. The party discovering covert action 
becomes apprehensive that even more subversive conduct may remain 
37 Wright and Richardson, “Introduction,” 16. 
38 Ibid. 
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concealed; the concealing party becomes anxious as time passes and the 
amount of undiscovered clandestine activity mounts.39  
Although this rubric is interchangeable between actors, it does not adequately account for 
the unique added responsibilities and accompanying sense of urgency that the homeland 
security mission appends to any governmental actor’s agenda. Nevertheless, this 
characterization of a self-amplifying mutual perception of increased threat illuminates the 
challenges that opacity and accompanying presumed or intentional secrecy adds to any 
interaction between homeland security stakeholder organizations and closed groups 
within their jurisdiction.  
D. RETROSPECTIVES AND BIOGRAPHIES 
Looking beyond millenarian dogma and psychosocial explanations for opaque 
community behavior, there exists a significant body of biographical literature examining 
tragedies and failed governmental interactions with closed communities. However, this 
material is generally limited to explanatory, retrospective analysis of singular events 
rather than being holistic in nature or providing strategic insights into the overarching 
phenomena of divergent frameworks across a broad range of communities with varying 
ideological underpinnings. Scholars and authors have devoted critical attention primarily 
to three facets of the events surrounding such historical cases: biographies of 
organizational leaders, exploration of a group’s underlying theology/ideology, and 
examination of the legitimacy of governmental actions. These themes are then dissected 
with the goal of describing and analyzing their collective nature and interplay as it 
contributed to misunderstanding and tragic outcomes. Research and critical inquiry has 
been compiled in government investigations, lengthy historical compilations, legal 
journals, and theses, as well as a number of scholarly articles and biographical works of 
popular non-fiction. Because this literature is largely descriptive rather than prescriptive 
in nature, there appears to be neither existing schools of thought nor major contributors 
who have established recognized scholastic frameworks or dominant theoretical models.  
39 David G. Bromley, “Dramatic Denouements,” in Cults, Religion, and Violence, ed. David G. 
Bromley and J. Gordon Melton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 27. 
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1. Official Reports 
Official government reports constitute the first and perhaps most reliable factual 
accounts of official interventions into closed communities. The issues arising from and 
surrounding the two most tragic episodes involving closed communities—the 1993 
federal raid on the Branch Davidian compound near Waco, Texas and the 1985 siege of 
the MOVE headquarters by Philadelphia authorities—have been the subject of numerous 
official inquiries. The failed BATF raid and FBI siege of the Branch Davidian compound 
at Waco has received significantly more official attention, though much of the existing 
studies are likewise critical factual accounts rather than forward-looking analyses. Both 
the Departments of the Treasury and Justice produced comprehensive reports detailing 
their respective agencies’ involvement in the Mount Carmel tragedy.40 Because BATF 
was the lead investigative agency prior to the standoff at Mount Carmel, the Treasury 
report in particular provides pre-event information and background that regarding 
situational awareness and intelligence gathering activities undertaken by the agency.41 
An additional investigation by the 104th Congress into the activities of all federal law 
enforcement agencies’ actions towards the Branch Davidians provides perhaps the least 
department-biased accounting of federal contact with the group.42 This report does offer 
evaluative critique of BATF and FBI actions, but does not explore application outside 
future federal tactical engagements. Collectively, as these reports are themselves 
investigatory in nature; they likewise concentrate almost exclusively on the official 
actions taken during these particular events. As such, they provide limited commentary 
on agency action or policy in general as it relates to monitoring closed communities for 
indicators of threat escalation or other homeland security issues.  
40 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
Investigation of Vernon Wayne Howell also known as David Koresh (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1993); U.S. Department of Justice, Report to the Deputy Attorney General on the Events at 
Waco, Texas February 28 to April 19, 1993, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993).  
41 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. 
42 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform and Oversight and U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Investigation Into the Activities of Federal Law Enforcement 
Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians, 104 Cong., 13 (1996), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-
104hrpt749/html/CRPT-104hrpt749.htm 
 31 
                                                 
Additional federal reports on military assistance at Waco and the BATF’s use of 
force polity provide critical inquiry into tactical issues during the raid and standoff.43 
Likewise, a number of congressional hearings, Congressional Research Service (CRS), 
and U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) reports regarding domestic extremism offer 
tangential commentary on opaque communities.44 Though such reports shed additional 
light on federal perspectives and understanding of these general phenomena, they do not 
examine the frameworks employed by federal agencies and officers when interacting 
with opaque groups in particular, nor do they identify community opacity as an 
impediment to homeland security efforts in and of itself. In short, the existing federal 
investigative literature on this community focuses on reactive, not proactive, 
governmental activity, and designates a rendering of the facts and determination of fault 
as its primary goals. 
With regard to non-federal interventions into closed communities, official reports 
and hearings were held on both the city of Philadelphia’s disastrous siege of the MOVE 
compound in 1985 and Texas Department of Public Safety’s raid on the Yearning for 
Zion Ranch in 2008. In particular, Philadelphia held a series of public hearings regarding 
the MOVE siege. Additionally, the Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission was 
formed to independently investigate the city’s actions surrounding the disaster and 
published its findings in a March 1986 report.45 Following the YFZ Ranch raid, the 
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services issued a self-assessment report on 
its investigative activities at Eldorado.46 Similar to the federal reports, these official 
accounts of governmental actions, though comprehensive, are investigative in nature and 
43 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Assistance Provided at Branch Davidian Incident, 
GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1999); U.S. General 
Accounting Office, Use of Force ATF Policy, Training, and Review Process Are Comparable to DEA’s 
and FBI’s, GAO/GGD-96-17, (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1996).  
44 Bjelopera, The Domestic Terrorist Threat; U.S. Government Accountability Office, Countering 
Violent Extremism—Additional Actions Could Strengthen Training Efforts (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2012). 
45 Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission, The Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations 
of the Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Special Investigation 
Commission, 1986). 
46 Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Eldorado Investigation. 
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focus primarily on establishing the facts and circumstances related to events rather than 
delving into official’s viewpoints or considering potential future interactions with similar 
community subsets. The Philadelphia Commission report does, however, recommend 
changes for the city’s departmental operations and structure, though these are neither 
opaque community specific nor holistic in nature.  
2. Scholarly Works, Biographies, and Popular Literature 
In contrast to the limited official studies on these events, the canon of both 
scholarly and popular literature dealing with these tragedies and the groups involved is 
substantial. The majority of this literature was created in the years immediately following 
the respective tragedies, though Waco in particular continues to be the subject of more 
recent studies. The Waco siege and the Branch Davidians have received much attention 
in the popular canon with well over 80 books having been written on the siege, the 
Davidians themselves, and issues surrounding the federal response. Four substantial 
books chronicling the MOVE tragedy were written during the decade following the 
tragedy, though recent mention of the siege is primarily limited to media commentary 
normally prompted by the remaining MOVE members’ parole hearings and scheduled 
releases from incarceration. 
In general, this popular non-fiction typically offers a chronological account of the 
events while providing background and depth to the differing perspectives of the actors, 
often through personal vignette. However, as with media accounts, such texts are more 
descriptive than prescriptive in their final analysis and offer few general 
recommendations for future avoidance of such miscommunication. Critical 
comprehensive studies of the Waco tragedy, such as those by Reavis, Tabor and 
Gallagher, and Docherty, dissect the events leading to the tragedy, but they fail to extend 
lessons to a broader homeland security concept of closed community interaction.47 
Throughout such works, the contentious government/closed community dynamic is 
premised on negotiation towards peaceful resolution of an existing legal dispute rather 
47 Dick J. Reavis, The Ashes of Waco: An Investigation, (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1995); James 
D. Tabor and Eugene V. Gallagher, Why Waco?: Cults and the Battle for Religious Freedom in America, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Docherty, Learning Lessons from Waco. 
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than on preventative mutual understanding and recognition of “tripwire” developmental 
events. Though not exhaustive, these works demonstrate the tendency of lengthy analyses 
on closed communities to focus almost exclusively on the siege/negotiation/attempted de-
escalation phase of governmental-community interaction rather than on the preventative, 
“left of bang” area of situational awareness and development of mutual understanding.  
A not insubstantial body of popular and some scholarly literature exists on the 
closed FLDS communities in both Eldorado and Short Creek. The majority is comprised 
of human-interest, popular non-fiction involving personal, often sensationalized accounts 
from absconders and excommunicated members. This literature, though useful in 
providing an inside view of this particular closed community, appears to be limited to 
individual stories and does not address the group as part of a larger opaque community 
phenomena. Brower, in his 2011 book Prophets Prey, does delve into the aspects of 
monitoring and establishing lines of communication with the group, albeit primarily with 
a view at assisting absconders and attempting to obtain information on the FLDS leader 
Warren Jeffs.48 Wright and Richardson edited a recent compendium of critical essays on 
the social, legal, and societal issues surrounding the 2008 FLDS raid that does provide 
scholarly insight into the object of study and offers limited comparative study with both 
the Waco and Jonestown tragedies.49 The remaining works appear to focus on polygamy 
and the psychological aspects of being born into a closed community with a 
fundamentalist belief system rather than the challenges the group poses to homeland 
security stakeholder agencies.  
Recent scholarly attention to child custody and family law issues emanating from 
closed communities that emerged following the 2008 Texas raid of the FLDS YFZ Ranch 
offer legal context to the opaque community phenomenon. A significant number of legal 
studies examine the legitimacy of governmental interests in child protection and 
individual versus community-wide removal actions. Since 2008, Barlow, Nilson, and 
Ross have all published legal critiques of Texas’ judicial basis for the removal of over 
48 Sam Brower, Prophets Prey: My Seven-Year Investigation into Warren Jeffs and the 
Fundamentalist Church of Latter-Day Saints (New York: Bloomsbury, 2011).  
49 Stuart A. Wright and James T. Richardson, Saints under Siege (New York: New York University 
Press, 2011).  
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400 children from their families. Although these critiques note some of the difficulties of 
governmental monitoring of children’s domestic well-being in closed communities (e.g., 
lack of reporting from neighbors, no contact with public schools), these issues are only 
mentioned in passing and receive comprehensive examination as a pervasive opaque 
community challenge from none of the authors. Primarily, these works explore the legal 
basis and repercussions to well-intentioned social service enforcement efforts targeting 
closed communities that were found to lack sufficient legal basis, noting that established 
judicial processes for the intrusion into or severance of parental rights face unique 
barriers within closed community settings enjoying freedom of religion protections, as 
will be discussed later.50  
E. THESES 
Regarding critical inquiry into the ideological dangers often stemming from 
closed communities, a number of recent theses provide commentary on the need, if not 
the methods, for maintaining situational awareness of activity within opaque 
communities. This literature looks more to inherent dangers associated with a 
community’s collective set of beliefs—an aspect that does have bearing on the larger task 
proposed in my inquiry. In his thesis, “Imagining the Impossible: Insurgency in the 
USA,” Sauer identifies potential societal changes that could lead to closed communities 
in the form of domestic secessionist groups. Sauer notes, “Preemptive counters to 
mobilizing conditions may be a better alternative than the United States government 
enacting ill-prepared reactive measures in response to violence perpetrated by any such 
group,” but he fails to provide suggestions on how this might be accomplished.51 Baldoza 
confronts right-wing extremism from a collective behavior perspective that, though not 
50 Keith, W. Barlow, “Can They Do That?:” Why Religious Parents and Communities May Fear the 
Future regarding State Interests and Custodial Law,” Brigham Young University Law Review 2012, no. 1 
(2012): 281–312;  
Brittany Nilson, “Yearning for Zion Ranch Raid: Lowering the Standard of Proof for the Termination 
of Parental Rights,” Brooklyn Law Review 305 (2009–2010), 75; 305–43.  
Catherine J. Ross, “Legal Constraints on Child-Saving: The Strange Case of the Fundamentalist Later-
Day Saints at Yearning for Zion Ranch,” Capital University Law Review 37: (2008–2009), 361. 361–410. 
51 Eric F. Sauer, “Imagining the Impossible: Insurgency in the U.S.A.” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2011), 58.  
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opaque community specific, does highlight the need to address ideologies or groups in a 
proactive, non-confrontational manner.52 
In their thesis “Convergence and Religious Terrorism in America,” authors Ashby 
and Brinsfield place instances of domestic religious terrorism within their historical 
context, highlighting the culmination of social and enabling contributing factors.53 
Though not exclusive to closed communities, their recommendations for detecting 
homeland security threats by monitoring group leadership, membership, and converging 
social factors are demonstrated as having profound applicability to this subset. Wong, in 
his thesis “Christian Extremism as a Domestic Terror Threat,” likewise frames domestic 
terrorist activity with examples of extremist religious belief used as justification for this 
violence. His recommendations include, “sustainment of negotiation-oriented tactics as 
the primary option for crisis situations, enforcement of existing anti-militia laws, 
promotion of racial and religious tolerance, and increased community involvement.”54 
Though the latter two suggestions seem applicable to development of opaque community 
frameworks, process specificity and implementation steps are apparently left to future 
scholarship. 
F. EXISTING POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE FRAMEWORKS 
Scholarly articles by Arredondo and Szubin, Jensen and Gregg directly address 
the challenges facing governmental entities in maintaining constructive dialogue with 
opaque communities. Arredondo critiques systemic enforcement missteps that target 
closed religious groups, proposing a model that “seeks to establish partnerships and 
positive contacts with the closed groups while simultaneously insisting on the 
enforcement of regulations and laws, even where such laws contravene the religious 
52 Arnold C. Baldoza, “Assessing Domestic Right-Wing Extremism Using the Theory of Collective 
Behavior” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009). 
53 Christopher B. Ashby and Gregory S. Brinsfield, “Convergence and Religious Terrorism in 
America” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004).  
54 Frederick D. Wong, “Christian Extremism as a Domestic Terror Threat” (master’s thesis, United 
States Army School of Advanced Military Studies, 2011), 46. 
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beliefs of a group.”55 This is one of the few studies that includes recommended initiatives 
to create a “viable policing model;” however, Arredondo falls short by failing to 
elaborate how such enforcement might be useful in systematic detection, monitoring, and 
threat analysis functions by the jurisdiction employing their use. Szubin, Jensen and 
Gregg offer the actual example of successful engagement between the Garland, Texas 
Police Department and a local congregation of the Taiwanese Chen Tao movement in the 
late 1990s as a paradigm for government-initiated outreach and interaction. Though the 
article does propose a pre-enforcement, holistic engagement strategy model for 
approaching closed groups (a designation they restrict to groups imprecisely 
characterized as “cults”), it fails to address various contingencies, such as a group’s lack 
of reciprocal interest in interaction with government actors, that might be covered in a 
comprehensive analysis of the topic.56 
G. GAPS IN CURRENT LITERATURE 
Of note, there is little scholarly literature available that identifies potential threats 
posed by closed communities beyond violence and inherent social dangers. There is a 
scarcity of critical inquiry into such topics as providing governmental services to closed 
communities during natural disasters, ecological and epidemiological threats stemming 
from opaque groups, and potential zoning, water right, public use, and vital record 
burdens posed by un-integrated population sets within a jurisdiction. Although a review 
of such topics would seem germane to schools of public policy and civic affairs, urban 
and regional planning, and homeland security disciplines, it is possible that the low 
incidence and individualized nature of closed communities have frustrated their 
development as a separate focus of study to these fields. Only in those cases where the 
ideologies and practices of opaque communities have resulted in illegal activity and 
subversive or self-destructive behavior by group members or have revealed practices that 
55 Tamara N .Lewis Arredondo, “Toward a Viable Policing Model for Closed Religious 
Communities,” American Journal of Criminal Law 35, no. (2008), 107. 107–144.  
56 Adam Szubin, Carl J. Jensen, and Rod Gregg, “Interacting with ‘Cults:’ A Policing Model,” FBI 
Law Enforcement Bulletin 69, no. 9 (2000, September): 16–24. 
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offend the sensibilities of the surrounding public have they been viewed as objects for 
critical examination and study.  
Collectively, this body of scholarly and critical literature provides the historical 
and legal aperture through which an examination of governmental frameworks that 
emerge when dealing with opaque communities can be viewed. However, much of the 
research on opaque communities deals with discreet events that happened to involve such 
groups rather than on communities themselves as a perennial homeland security 
challenge. Within this scholarship, the group’s theology, ideology, psychosocial 
characteristics, or political aspirations, rather than the practical implications of their 
withdrawal from society and its impact on governmental ability to protect the homeland, 
has been the core focus. Many of the works do identify the development of methods of 
obtaining relevant intelligence and/or models of effective communication and contact 
with closed communities as a recommendation or identified area of further inquiry, which 
suggests this to be a topic in need of additional scholarly attention. As such, it would 
appear that the targeted line of inquiry—namely, whether governmental entities are prone 
to oppositional frameworks when dealing with such communities within their 
jurisdictions—remains a gap in the current body of literature and one that would 





IV. BRANCH DAVIDIANS 
“Look, this is life, this is life and death…theology really is life and death.” 
 
–Vernon Wayne Howell aka David Koresh, speaking during 
911 call to Waco Sheriff’s Department officer as BATF 
assault was underway, February 28, 1993 
 
A. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
In the early 1990s, an obscure Seventh-Day Adventist offshoot known as the 
Branch Davidians and its spiritual leader Vernon Wayne Howell (aka David Koresh) 
became entangled in an intractable standoff with federal authorities. This widely 
misunderstood opaque community of approximately 130 men, women, and children was 
alternatively characterized as a violent apocalyptic cult or a group of brainwashed 
adherents under the complete control of a pedophile megalomaniac posing as a messianic 
prophet. Tragically, governmental consideration of the possible sincerity of the group’s 
fervent though obscure beliefs and professed ultimate concerns was routinely dismissed 
in favor of explanations suggesting the Davidians’ religion was simply window dressing 
for deviant acts and criminal conspiracy. Local, state, and federal law enforcement and 
homeland security officials, disturbed by reports of Koresh’s dominion over community 
members and message of a forthcoming apocalypse, sought various intervention inroads 
into the community that culminated in a federal investigation targeting suspected illicit 
weapons manufacturing. This investigation climaxed with an ill-conceived and poorly 
executed law enforcement raid that resulted in the deaths of four federal agents and six of 
Koresh’s adherents, an intractable 51-day siege, and the incineration of 75 Davidians, 
including 25 children, in an inferno on April 19, 1993.57 
Though both Koresh and other individual members of the Branch Davidians were 
involved in various forms of highly suspicious and very likely criminal behavior, this 
activity neither clearly permeated the entire Davidian community nor was it immune to 
traditional investigative techniques. Rather, the fact that the Davidians were a highly 
57 U.S. Department of Justice, Report to the Deputy Attorney General, 312. 
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devout opaque community that shared a worldview deemed incomprehensible by most 
outsiders seemed to influence homeland security stakeholders’ assessment of and 
interaction with the group. As James Tabor, a religious scholar who was present at the 
Waco siege, notes in his book Why Waco?,  
To the FBI, [Koresh] was a con man using religion to cover his need for 
dominance and pleasure. To the psychiatrists he was psychopathic, 
suffering from delusional paranoia. Such perceptions, whether valid or 
not, obscured the only positive means of dealing with Koresh and his 
followers.58  
In turn, this seems to have limited numerous officials’ capacity to accept alternative 
explanations for the group’s actions and blinded them to available enforcement 
opportunities while simultaneously preventing officials from accurately assessing threats 
emanating from the group. These assessments appear to have been further misinformed 
by official suspicions of systemic child abuse, forced confinement of intending 
absconders, and a prevalence of lewd and criminal activity by the group.  
After providing a historical background and contextual perspective to the 
investigations leading up to the tragic 1993 raid, this chapter will analyze a number of the 
motivations and assumptions that prompted local, state, and federal officials to pursue 
violent intervention into this opaque community as the only perceived tactical option 
available to deal with Koresh. In particular, federal law enforcement’s tendency to 
overestimate the threat emanating from the Branch Davidians due to its opacity, to 
discount the possibility of productive communication using biblical context, and to 
unnecessarily endanger minors and other innocent community members without 
discernable cause will be explored. Through this examination, the guiding framework of 
collective assumptions and logical biases adopted by Texas’ homeland security 
establishment and directly influenced by the closed nature of the Branch Davidians will 
emerge.  
58 Tabor and Gallagher, Why Waco?, 21. 
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1. Seventh-Day Adventist Roots 
Though hastily labeled a messianic cult whose followers were under the complete 
control of their mentally unstable prophet David Koresh, the Branch Davidians are in fact 
a theological offshoot of mainline Seventh Day Adventism (SDA). Like their parent 
religion, the Davidians believed 1) the apocalyptic end of the world was imminent, 2) 
prophecies and statements contained in the King James Version of the Bible were 
applicable to current events and could be deciphered to predict the apocalypse, 3) living 
prophets were needed to interpret God’s Word, and 4) the Sabbath was to be observed on 
Saturday.59 The Davidian SDA “branch” traced its roots to Bulgarian immigrant Victor 
Houteff, a Los Angeles salesman who joined SDA in 1918 and developed an intense 
interest in biblical prophecy 10 years later.60  
Disenchanted with what he saw as the development of SDA into an apostate 
theology, Houteff gradually dissented with mainline SDA doctrine and founded Mount 
Carmel in 1935 as a religious community devoted to maintenance of true Adventist 
beliefs in the imminent end of the world and execution of God’s judgment.61 Whereas 
mainline SDA interpreted scripture to foretell God’s Kingdom as a spiritual existence 
following the apocalypse, Houteff maintained it, “was to be a literal, physical, millennial 
rule on earth” which was drawing near and about which he, as the seventh and final in a 
line of prophesized reformers, had a privileged understanding.62 Houteff’s ideology 
focused on biblical references contained in Revelation 7 that referred to 144,000 
“servants of God,” who would survive the apocalypse as God’s chosen people.63 He 
taught that mainline SDA had become complacent, proposed himself as the rejuvenating 
spiritual leader and prophesized “angel from the east” who would assemble and protect 
the remnant of these 144,000.64 With haunting prescience to the Waco tragedy, Houteff 
59 Wessinger, How the Millennium Comes Violently, 86. 
60 Tabor and Gallagher, Why Waco?, 34. 
61 Wessinger, How the Millennium Comes Violently, 86. 
62 Tabor and Gallagher, Why Waco?, 35. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., 34. 
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also alleged that prior to the literal and this-worldly re-establishment of this Kingdom of 
David in modern-day Israel and ruled over by an “antitypical King David,” the faithful 
would be cleansed by a baptismal, purifying fire.65 
The Davidian tradition of social seclusion and self-assessed privileged status as a 
pre-apocalyptic gathering of God’s chosen was well established prior to Koresh’s arrival. 
Houteff’s SDA faction, which took the name Davidian Seventh-day Adventists, initially 
withdrew to a remote property seven miles northwest of Waco, Texas, which they named 
Mount Carmel, and later relocated to a second property northeast of town that retained 
the name. It was here the group developed a tradition of opacity through conscious and 
purposeful separation from the “worldly” influences of their surrounding community. 
The Davidians maintained SDA traditions of being distrustful of both governmental 
authority and secularism while promoting a Bible-centric lifestyle.66 The group 
celebrated neither Christmas nor Easter, maintaining its own school system and even 
operating a denominational college until financial difficulties forced its closure. Though 
residents accepted outside employment, they attempted to isolate themselves from 
external influence to the maximum extent possible. Through their unique religious 
practices, devotion to Bible study, and special diet, members maintained a regimented 
lifestyle that underscored their distinctive nature and solidified members’ social and 
emotional bonds to the community.67 
Following Houteff’s death in 1955, his wife Florence briefly became the group’s 
prophet and moved the group to its new location near Waco in 1957. After Florence’s 
false prediction that Armageddon would occur on April 22, 1959, community 
membership dwindled, Florence moved away, and Ben Roden assumed the role of 
Davidian prophet until his death in 1978. His wife Lois and their son George struggled 
for succession, with Lois eventually establishing herself as the feminine Holy Spirit or 
Shekinah, a concept of androgynous unity that would later influence Koresh’s 
65 Kenneth G. C. Newport, “‘A Baptism by Fire:’ The Branch Davidians and Apocalyptic Self-
Destruction,” Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions, 13, no. 2 (2009): 80, 
doi:10.1525/nr.2009.13.2.61. 61–94 
66 Docherty, Learning Lessons from Waco, 94. 
67 Ibid., 94–95. 
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teachings.68 Koresh would subsequently identify himself as the true seventh in a 
succession line of angels described in the Book of Revelations and as the messiah who 
would battle Babylon, thereby launching Armageddon and the establishment of God’s 
Kingdom on earth.  
After a tumultuous childhood and some initial setbacks as a young adult, Vernon 
Wayne Howell arrived at Mount Carmel in 1981 at the age of 22. Lois Roden (aged 67) 
established a romantic relationship with Vernon and began to groom him as her successor 
in lieu of her son George. Vernon subsequently married 14-year-old Rachel Jones in 
1984. Together, they traveled to Israel in January 1985, where Vernon received a 
revelation that he was associated with Cyrus, biblical king of the Persians, and with the 
metaphorical Lamb referenced in the Book of Revelations. Upon their return, Lois and 
Vernon experienced a falling-out, leading George to oust Vernon and his newly gained 
followers from Mount Carmel in June 1985.69 Lois died in November 1986, leaving her 
son to vie with Vernon over succession.  
2. Polygamist Activity at Mount Carmel 
It during this period that Vernon’s illicit activities and pursuit of numerous 
polygamist relationships began. In the spring of 1986, Vernon married the 14-year-old 
daughter of a church member and, later that year, Rachel’s 12-year-old sister. Note that 
with regards to the first marriage, under Texas law existing at the time, 14 was the legal 
age for marriage with parental consent. In 1987, Vernon married three additional women 
aged 16, 17 and 20, all of whom with he later fathered children, bringing his total number 
of wives to six.70 According to the FBI, by February 1993, the number had grown to 10, 
with an unknown number of planned additional unions.71 Though his legal wife Rachel 
initially protested, she acquiesced when it was later revealed to her in a dream that this 
68 Wessinger, How the Millennium Comes Violently, 88. 
69 Ibid., 82. 
70 Tabor and Gallagher, Why Waco?, 43. 
71 U.S. Department of Justice, Report to the Deputy Attorney General on the Events at Waco, 16. 
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was God’s will.72 The remaining Davidians’ viewed these unions as “sacred” marriages, 
which were biblically permissible due to Vernon’s status as the “Lamb,” as explained by 
a former member According to the Davidians’ interpretation of Revelations, it was, 
“considered an honor to have a baby for Christ,” and girls’ parents believed that their 
daughters would bear children for the Lord.73 In order to shield Koresh from potential 
statutory rape charges stemming from these extramarital relationships and provide legal 
legitimacy for the subsequent pregnancies, the girls were legally married to other 
Davidian men.74 In 1989, Vernon would subsequently reveal his biblically supported 
“New Light” teaching that all Davidian women, regardless of their marital status, should 
become his wives, with all other men maintaining celibacy.75 Koresh’s spiritual 
justification for this polygamy was that children of his seed would eventually establish a 
“House of David” and rule the post-apocalyptic world.76 After 1989, men and women 
lived in separate quarters at the Mount Carmel compound, practicing a strict form of 
communal life according to Koresh’s instructions.77 
As with other polygamist groups, there are two obstacles to law enforcement 
interventions into such voluntary cohabitation arrangements. First, in the absence of 
documentation substantiating a plural marriage, any polygamy investigation must prove 
that an extra-marital sexual relationship or cohabitation arrangement actually constitutes 
an illegal union. In Koresh’s case, he had only one legal wife—Rachel Jones-with the 
remainder of his wives bonded through “sacred” relationship only rather than through a 
state licensed and duly registered marriage. The fact that at least some of Koresh’s 
additional wives were legally married to other male Davidians, all of whom cohabitated 
in the Mount Carmel shared domicile, further complicated any potential investigative 
inroads into polygamous unions. Second, with regard to both involuntary polygamous 
relationships and instances of statutory rape, investigators would require a criminal 
72 Wessinger, How the Millennium Comes Violently, 82–83. 
73 Ibid., 83. 
74 Tabor and Gallagher, Why Waco?, 67. 
75 Wessinger, How the Millennium Comes Violently, 84. 
76 Bromley, “Dramatic Denouements,”31. 
77 Tabor and Gallagher, Why Waco?, 32. 
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complaint from either the victim or another family member or witness. Because “sacred” 
polygamous marriages to Koresh were at least tacitly sanctioned and supported by the 
Davidian community and freely entered into by the women involved, investigators were 
restricted to hearsay investigations from impacted former members and apostates. 
Without cooperating victims or witnesses, authorities had little means to combat 
polygamous activity at Mount Carmel. Obviously, though no explanation excuses such 
clearly illicit, licentious behavior, whether Koresh simply concocted biblical justification 
to satisfy his sexual cravings, employed it as a form of social control over his followers, 
or sincerely believed he was preordained to father a collection of future post-apocalyptic 
religious leaders will likely never be known.  
3. Official Concerns Emerge 
Despite these problematic legal hurdles, family members of Davidians, apostates, 
state agencies, and eventually federal officials were collectively disturbed by reports of 
statutory rape, polygamy, forced marriages, and abuse. Through the aforementioned lack 
of investigative initiation points, however, attempts at official intervention were fruitless. 
This inability to substantiate illicit activity that stakeholders were convinced was taking 
place intensified official frustrations, further amplifying the perceived threat and menace 
emanating from Mount Carmel.78 This simmering collective sense of concern and 
disgust, aggravated by exasperation towards apparent governmental impotence, likely 
strengthened a public/private coalition of opposition. What resulted was increased 
pressure to initiate some form of action to disrupt the status quo at Mount Carmel, 
particularly given the lack of situational awareness regarding the compound and parallel 
magnification of perceived threat. This understandably led stakeholders to seek any 
available inroad to disruption of Koresh’s activities or at least an enhanced ability to 
determine the group’s nature, activities, and intentions. 
In November 1987, Koresh and his followers had their first major legal 
altercation. George Roden, still contesting Koresh’ status as the next prophet of the 
Mount Carmel compound, exhumed the body of a long deceased Mount Carmel resident, 
78 Bromley, “Dramatic Denouements,”31. 
 45 
                                                 
challenging Vernon to a contest to see which of them could raise the dead. Following an 
attempt to file a criminal complaint regarding the unauthorized exhumation with the 
McLennan County Sheriff’s Office during which they were directed to provide 
substantiation, Vernon, accompanied by three Davidians, returned to Mount Carmel to 
collect the needed photographic evidence, likely viewing their efforts as a quasi-official 
and legally condoned public service. A gunfight ensued, and the sheriff’s duties called to 
respond to the altercation discovered Koresh and six followers, dressed in combat 
fatigues and armed with shotguns, .22-caliber rifles, and over 3,000 rounds of unspent 
ammunition, firing at Roden who was injured and taking cover behind a tree.79 Koresh 
and his cohorts were arrested and charged with attempted murder. Following a 10-day 
trial in April 1988, the jury acquitted his associates but failed to reach a verdict on 
Vernon, which led to the release of all four defendants. When Roden experienced 
additional legal troubles, Vernon and his adherents settled the $62,000 owed in back 
taxes and assumed possession of the Mount Carmel property. Roden was eventually 
placed in a psychiatric hospital after murdering a man in 1989.80 
4. The Rise of David Koresh 
In August 1990, Vernon legally changed his name to David Koresh. This action 
identified Koresh with the “Cyrus message” he had received from God in Israel in 1985. 
Koresh, Hebrew for “Cyrus,” was symbolically significant as the biblical Persian king 
Cyrus had conquered Babylon in 539 B.C., thereby permitting the Jews to return to their 
promised land. Cyrus was identified in Isaiah 45:1 as a “messiah,” or one designated to 
perform a special mission on behalf of God. Koresh further found biblical justification of 
his messianic status in Psalms 45, alleging that this scripture prophesized his polygamy 
and foretold of the eventual elevation of any children he fathered to rulers of the earth.81 
Koresh identified himself as “a” rather than “the” messiah, revealing to his adherents the 
79 U.S. Department of Treasury, Report of the Department of the Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms Investigation of Vernon Wayne Howell Also Known as David Koresh (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 19. 
80 Wessinger, How the Millennium Comes Violently, 83. 
81 Ibid., 84. 
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true path to salvation through his interpretation of the Seven Seals identified in the Book 
of Revelations.82 Through his status as the earthly incarnation of “the Lamb,” Koresh’s 
divinely inspired interpretation of the Bible led him to predict he would lead the 
Davidians to Palestine/Israel to assist the Israelis in an apocalyptic battle against a United 
Nations force led by the United States. Koresh maintained he himself would be killed, but 
the Lamb later resurrected to pass judgment and establish God’s Kingdom on earth.83 
This apocalyptic prediction would later be amplified through Koresh’s announcement 
that it would begin with an attack against the Branch Davidians in the United States 
rather than overseas.84 
Koresh and the Branch Davidian theology drew membership from a diverse cadre 
of followers who shared an intense interest in spiritual devotion and study. Federal agents 
would incorrectly estimate that 75 devout followers lived on the 77-acre Mount Carmel 
property, many of them women and children.85 In actuality, on February 28, 1993, 125 of 
Branch Davidians total membership of about 130 was present at Mount Carmel when the 
raid commenced.86 Membership consisted of 42 men, 46 women, and 43 children.87 
About half of the Branch Davidians were foreign nationals, one third of whom were 
British, recruited from over a dozen countries.88 The group was also multi-ethnic, and 
over half of the members were minorities, including 45 blacks and 25 Asians or 
Hispanics.89 Far from being a homogenous congregation of naïve, impressionable 
fanatics, Koresh’s adherents were bound by common dedication to a fervent pursuit of 
religious devotion, intense Bible study, and preparation for a coming apocalypse in their 
own time. This ethnic diversity, multi-nationality, and comparatively ardent dedication to 
82 Bromley, “Dramatic Denouements,”30. 
83 Wessinger, How the Millennium Comes Violently, 85. 
84 Bromley, “Dramatic Denouements,”31. 
85 U.S. Department of Treasury, Report of the Department of the Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms, 38. 
86 Ibid., 146. 
87 Wessinger, How the Millennium Comes Violently, 90. 
88 Tabor and Gallagher, Why Waco?, 24. 
89 Wessinger, How the Millennium Comes Violently, 90. 
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their beliefs likely further constrained the surrounding secular community’s 
understanding of the Davidian’s nature. Possibly owing to their self-imposed rural 
seclusion from outsiders, however, most of Waco’s citizens viewed this odd collection of 
religious “fanatics” with “indifferent bemusement” rather than xenophobic fear prior to 
the federal siege.90 
5. The Anti-Koresh Coalition 
Though the Davidians did not view themselves as a persecuted minority, the 
group had sustained repeated and intensifying intrusion by outside actors prior to drawing 
federal law enforcement scrutiny. Apostates and supporting anti-cult activists attempted 
to focus governmental concern and investigative interest in the community by 
highlighting and exaggerating “atrocity tales.”91 Davidian apostate Marc Breault was 
instrumental in both drawing critical attention to the Mount Carmel community and in 
defaming Koresh to be a false prophet. Breault and his wife left the Davidians in 
September 1989 and eventually moved to Australia following Koresh’s assertions that 
even the married female members of the community were in fact his wives. In addition, 
Breault viewed Koresh’s sexual relations with underage girls as morally repugnant.92 
Though his differences with Koresh are legitimate and understandable, the sustained 
efforts Breault undertook to generate a campaign against his former community and 
Koresh are indicative of both the ardor with which disaffected ex-converts can malign 
their former congregation and the success that a personal crusade by a disaffected 
apostate can have against a “cult” from which they “escaped.” 
Breault’s efforts against the Davidians included assistance to opposing parties in 
child custody matters. Breault aligned with fellow apostate Robyn Bunds in an attempt to 
convince law enforcement officials in California and Texas that Koresh was planning 
child sacrifice—an assertion made in support of Bunds’s 1990 custody battle over her 
90 Reavis, The Ashes of Waco, 279. 
91 Stuart A. Wright, Armageddon in Waco: Critical Perspectives on the Branch Davidian Conflict 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 83. 
92 Wessinger, How the Millennium Comes Violently, 96. 
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and Koresh’s child Shaun.93 Breault’s efforts also included providing affidavits from 
Australian defectors via a hired detective to authorities in La Verne, California and 
Waco, as well as federal immigration and revenue agents. In 1991, Breault warned David 
Jewell that his daughter Kiri, who lived at Mount Carmel with her mother Sherri Jewell, 
was in danger of being taken as another of Koresh’s wives. Breault’s testified at Jewell’s 
custody hearing, alleging that in addition to sexual misconduct by Koresh, life at Mount 
Carmel deprived members of human rights and included deprivation of food and water, 
unsanitary living conditions, child abuse, and mandatory physical fitness sessions. Based 
largely on Breault’s affidavit and characterization of the Davidians as a “destructive 
cult,” the court granted full custody to Kiri’s father David.94  
That same month, Breault and Jewell contacted the Texas Department of Human 
Services, alleging that the Davidians were abusing children. Koresh cooperated with 
investigator Joyce Sparks of the Texas Child Protective Services (CPS), allowing three 
social worker visits to Mount Carmel and permitting them to conduct private interviews 
with Davidian children. Sparks would later report to the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) that she was escorted through the building on arranged 
tours during these visits and suggested that, based on his apocalyptic references, Koresh 
may have violent tendencies.95 Koresh also voluntarily visited Sparks’s office to answer 
questions. Sparks, the lead investigator for the case, eventually closed the case on April 
30, 1992 citing lack of evidence of abuse.96 The office would open a second investigation 
in February 1993 based on 12-year-old Kiri Jewell’s allegations that her mother left her 
in a motel room with Koresh when she was 10. However, because Kiri refused to press 
charges, the state did not attempt to indict Koresh based on this complaint.97 Breault’s 
and other’s charges that Koresh was abusive and violently disciplined Davidian children 
apparently stemmed from isolated allegations from 1986 to 1990. Though it is unclear if 
93 Ibid. 
94 Tabor and Gallagher, Why Waco?, 86. 
95 U.S. Department of Treasury, Report of the Department of the Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms, 30. 
96 Wessinger, How the Millennium Comes Violently, 62. 
97 Ibid., 63. 
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Koresh was overly controlling, community children interviewed by social workers denied 
any allegations of misconduct. The use among the community of a wooden spoon to 
spank misbehaving children was deemed a common disciplinary practice and thus not 
indicative of abuse.98 Despite its inability to substantiate any of the abuse allegations, 
“the failure of these investigations created frustration, particularly within the CPS, over 
an inability to confirm illicit activity officials were convinced was taking place.”99 
Undeterred, in March 1992, Breault and his newfound compatriot David Jewell 
began to allege that the Davidians were contemplating a mass suicide on or around April 
18, 1992, suggesting Mount Carmel could become “another Jonestown.” This allegation 
was passed through Michigan and Texas politicians to the FBI, who likewise found no 
evidence of these allegations and closed its case. Despite the lack of evidence for either 
allegation, these reports of mass suicide and child abuse were “instrumental in gaining 
Department of Justice approval for the initial raid in February 1993 and for employing 
the ‘dynamic entry’ tactic as opposed to other alternatives.”100 Despite never coming to 
fruition—a detail never explained by the growing coalition of anti-cult activists—this 
allegation also prompted the Waco Tribune-Herald to investigate the Branch 
Davidians.101 Tangential to Breault’s anti-Koresh campaign, in 1992, professional “cult 
buster” and “deprogrammer” Rick Ross was contacted by siblings of an unnamed Branch 
Davidian to assist in dissuading their brother from relocating to Mount Carmel. Ross’s 
intervention was successful, seemingly validating his professional credentials and 
influencing both officials’ and the media’s subsequent characterizations of Koresh as the 
leader of a dangerous cult.102 
Through such advocacy, Breault and other apostates orchestrated what ultimately 
became a negative publicity campaign against the Davidians, generating both law 
enforcement interest in the alleged activities at Mount Carmel and indelibly shifting the 
98 Ibid. 
99 Bromley, “Dramatic Denouements,”31. 
100 Ibid., 32. 
101 Wessinger, How the Millennium Comes Violently, 97. 
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public image of the Davidians through negative media portrayals. In Docherty’s analysis, 
such opponents disseminate symbolic narratives through the aforementioned “atrocity 
tales” alleging acts which, when combined with circumstantial evidence by investigators, 
suggested a potential elevated threat. Docherty notes, “[by] weaving (material) evidence 
of firearms purchases together with (social) allegations of sexual improprieties and 
domestic violence, the BATF produced a (symbolic) narrative about a deviant and 
potentially a dangerous group led by a manipulative, authoritarian, and violent 
individual.”103 Because of the opaque nature of the Davidians and presumed reluctance 
by Koresh and others to resolve potential violations in an open dialogue, there was no 
viable method of corroborating the alleged atrocities beyond a forceful intervention by 
legally empowered governmental actors—in this case, the BATF. “Unsuccessful” 
interventions, such as Texas Child Protective Service’s child abuse inquiry and the FBI’s 
assessment of mass suicide claims, were either discounted as disconfirming evidence to 
the contrary or, more likely, viewed as actions thwarted by the Davidians’ conspiratorial 
guile. Likewise, because the closed Davidian community neither undertook its own 
countervailing publicity campaign nor openly addressed these allegations levied against 
the group and its leader, the opposing coalition’s narrative constituted a one-sided 
monologue that was readily accepted as objective fact in order to fill the information void 
regarding the group’s practices and intentions. 
B. FEDERAL INVESTIGATION 
The BATF investigation into Koresh’s firearms activities began in May 1992 
following a report from the McLennan County Sheriff’s Department (MCSD). The 
investigation was predicated on the discovery of and report by a United Parcel Service 
driver that a package delivered to Mount Carmel had broken open, revealing it contained 
empty hand grenade casings.104 According to reports, multiple shipments of firearms 
valued at over $10,000, inert grenade casings, and a large volume of black powder had 
been delivered to a Davidian business known as the “Mag Bag.” The Mag Bag was in 
103 Docherty, Learning Lessons from Waco, 38. 
104 Reavis, The Ashes of Waco, 33. 
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fact a metal building located a few miles from the compound property used by Mount 
Carmel residents to repair vehicles and operate a gun dealership. Based on indications 
that Davidians had also buried a school bus to use as both a firing range and bunker, were 
constructing a “barracks-type cinder-block structure,” and had assembled a stockpile of 
weapons, MCSD requested BATF to investigate.105  
BATF Special Agent (SA) Aguilera’s initial investigation revealed that the UPS 
driver had delivered, “a large quantity of powdered aluminum metal, a common 
ingredient in explosives, and 60 ammunition magazines for AR-15 rifles.”106 Koresh was 
also alleged to have received assault weapons and machinegun conversion kits, even 
though neither Koresh nor his followers were licensed as federal firearms dealers or listed 
as having registered any National Firearms Act weapons such as machineguns.107 
Although the parts kits themselves were legal, their only normal use is as replacement 
parts for previously registered, pre-1986 machineguns. However, no Mount Carmel 
residents were determined to possess any such previously registered weapons. SA 
Aguilera further established that a local gun dealer named Henry McMahon had sold 
firearms and upwards of 65 AR-15 lower receivers to Koresh some months earlier. BATF 
agents knew that by using lathes and milling machines, a skilled machinist could alter 
AR-15 lower receivers and combine these with M-16 parts kits to assemble machineguns. 
Furthermore, agents knew that there was no practical reason for exchanging most AR-15 
parts with M-16 parts other than for this purpose, as such an exchange might actually 
degrade the performance of a legal semiautomatic weapon.108 Collectively, these 
circumstances led SA Aguilera to infer that Koresh and his followers were illegally 
manufacturing machineguns from replacement part kits and producing destructive 
devices, including grenades.109 However, nowhere in his subsequent affidavit did 
Aguilera indicate that Koresh or other Davidians were illegally fabricating restricted 
105 U.S. Department of Treasury, Report of the Department of the Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms, 17. 
106 Ibid., 21. 
107 Ibid., 22–23. 
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automatic sears or physically altering semiautomatic lower receivers in violation of 
federal law.110 
1. Diverging Views of Federal Firearms Laws 
Koresh’s and the Davidians’ interest in and trafficking of semiautomatic assault 
weapons and machinegun parts kits was understandably disconcerting to local and federal 
authorities. However, Koresh’s exact purpose and intent for possessing these items is key 
to the subsequent justification and evolution of the investigation into the Branch 
Davidians, and an area in which the opaque nature of the group played a critical part in 
law enforcement’s posture towards the community. Aguilera’s case was based on 
suspicions that Koresh was illegally manufacturing machineguns from component parts 
and assembling and possessing destructive devices including grenades, explosive bombs, 
and their component materials without a license.111 These suspicions rested on the 
assumption that the Davidians were both taking technical steps to mill AR-15 lower 
receivers and assemble destructive devices from parts and materials known to be in their 
possession. Though the BATF would develop circumstantial evidence that such steps had 
been taken, its generally aggressive enforcement posture was likely heavily influenced by 
the fact that it did not and, due to the group’s closed nature, could not know if such 
organizational intent to develop these weapons did indeed exist.  
Conversely, Koresh and the Davidians involved in the group’s weapons side 
business had legitimate cause to believe they were being unduly persecuted by federal 
authorities for their involvement in an entirely legal secular firearms trade unrelated to 
their religious convictions. Koresh was reportedly both extremely knowledgeable about 
yet critical of federal firearm laws. Koresh and fellow Davidians Paul Fatta and Mike 
Schroeder openly operated a gun business from the compound. Fatta and Schroeder in 
particular frequented gun shows throughout Texas, buying and selling large quantities of 
weapons that generated thousands per year in short-term profits used to support the 
110 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform. 
111 U.S. Department of Treasury, Report of the Department of the Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol, 
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Mount Carmel commune.112 Koresh also invested in semiautomatic assault rifles hedging 
that if the government restricted such weapons, the Davidians could make a profit on 
their resale.113 Despite this business venture’s overlap with both the Mount Carmel 
property and Koresh’s responsibilities as the community’s leader, the remaining 
Davidians maintain that this strong interest in weapons was restricted to these individuals 
rather than shared by the community as a whole. Multiple members, including Koresh’s 
“right-hand man” Steve Schneider, detested guns.114 Likewise, although the Davidians 
believed strongly in self-defense—particularly in opposition to intrusion by “Babylonian” 
hegemony—they were instructed to never initiate violence until the final confrontation 
began, at which time the use of violence solely for self-defense against evil was 
permitted.115  
2. A Failure to Communicate 
The BATF’s agenda in developing a criminal case and accompanying preference 
for operational secrecy, despite Koresh’s professed willingness to openly address any 
regulatory interest in the gun business in spite of his disdain for governmental intrusion, 
created a communication logger jam between these parties. On 30 July 1992, SA 
Aguilera interviewed gun dealer Henry McMahon regarding his legal business 
partnership with Koresh. During BATF’s compliance visit, McMahon telephoned Koresh 
to advise him of BATF’s interest in the merchandise Koresh had purchased. Koresh 
stated, “If there’s a problem, tell them to come out here. If they want to see my guns, 
they’re more than welcome.”116 SA Aguilera was offered the phone to speak with Koresh 
directly but declined.117 As would later become evident, Koresh believed he had clearly 
communicated his willingness to address any BATF concerns, leading him to feel 
betrayed by the government’s decision to decline open dialogue in favor of an armed 
112 Tabor and Gallagher, Why Waco?, 64. 
113 Wessinger, How the Millennium Comes Violently, 60, 62. 
114 Tabor and Gallagher, Why Waco?, 64. 
115 Ibid., 66. 
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raid.118 Months later on February 28, while being interviewed by local KRLD radio, 
Koresh would in fact highlight the cordial relationship he had customarily enjoyed with 
McLennan County Sheriff Jack Harwell.119 This comment further indicates the betrayal 
Koresh likely perceived given his own efforts to operate in a legal and forthright manner 
vis-à-vis law enforcement. As Vic Feazell, the former district attorney assisting with the 
BATF investigation, later stated, “[I]f they’d [the BATF] called and talked to them, the 
Davidians would have given them what they wanted.”120 It would appear that the closed 
nature of the Davidians contributed to this official disinclination to embrace open 
dialogue, which led BATF investigators to dismiss such blatant conciliatory offers by the 
group. 
Rather than accept Koresh’s offer to inspect his weapons openly, BATF agents 
instituted a series of undercover fact finding operations beginning in January 1993. On 
January 11, agents masquerading as college students established an undercover residence 
directly across from the Mount Carmel property. After visiting their new neighbors, the 
Davidians apparently immediately recognized the men were undercover officers.121 On 
27 January 1993, Koresh contacted McLennan County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) to 
complain that a deliveryman that Koresh had instantly spotted as an undercover agent 
was spying on the compound.122 BATF Special Agent Robert Rodriguez, posing as 
Robert Gonzalez, made numerous visits to Mount Carmel to participate in Koresh’s Bible 
study sessions and was eventually invited to practice shooting with Koresh.123 During the 
course of the investigation, Rodriguez would himself see no illegal weapons present at 
the compound.124 Koresh would later reveal that he also had established 
Rodriguez/Gonzalez to be a BATF undercover agent, further indicating the degree to 
118 Docherty, Learning Lessons from Waco, 42. 
119 Tabor and Gallagher, Why Waco?, 11. 
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which the Davidians, over a period of months, were aware of law enforcement interest in 
their activities but were simultaneously unable to establish a dialogue with investigators.  
3. Machineguns or Semiautomatics? 
Koresh, Fatta, and Schroeder, through their firearms business, had apparently 
developed extensive knowledge of the relevant federal firearms regulations. Though they 
had acquired an large inventory of assault rifles and the parts necessary to convert them 
to automatic weapons, they were likely well aware of the exact point at which any actions 
to convert legally authorized semiautomatic carbines into machineguns would be 
impermissible without fulfilling registration and taxation requirements. Though the group 
apparently disagreed with some aspects of federal firearms regulations and held distain 
for the BATF, such a sentiment is not in and of itself an indication of criminal intent. 
Koresh and some of his adherents were gun enthusiasts and operated a weapon and 
tactical gear business to provide financial support to the community. Although the group 
did collectively possess a large number of weapons, by Texas standards, their rate of gun 
ownership was not remarkable. Of gun owners in Texas at the time, 18 percent owned 
five or more weapons, and the possession of a large number of weapons is not a 
prosecutable crime.125 In addition, Koresh strongly believed in and preached that the 
Davidians would have to defend themselves against the forces of Babylon in the coming 
Armageddon, providing an ideological motive for weapons caching and self-imposed 
firearm familiarization and training. Collectively, Koresh and the group were both highly 
motivated to assemble an arsenal, were intimately aware of the legalities involved, and 
were inherently suspicious of governmental interest in or efforts to restrict their 2nd 
Amendment right to bear legal arms as they saw fit, regardless of governmental 
appreciation for their reasoning.  
Of greatest import to BATF’s investigative authorities and jurisdictional basis for 
intervention was an array of circumstantial evidence that suggested Koresh and his 
followers had in fact taken steps to assemble automatic weapons and destructive devices, 
125 David B. Kopel and Paul H. Blackman, No More Wacos: What’s Wrong with Federal Law 
Enforcement and How to Fix It (New York: Prometheus Books, 1997), 52. 
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though such reports were primarily hearsay and conjecture. SA Aguilera interviewed a 
Mount Carmel neighbor with military experience who reported hearing nighttime 
gunshots coming from the compound that he identified as being automatic and .50-caliber 
weapons fire. During one of Rodriguez’s visits, Koresh mistakenly suggested that 
possession of a “drop-in sear” for use in converting a semi-automatic into a machinegun 
was legal so long as the possessor did not also have the weapon to be converted, though 
he did not claim to own any such sear.126 In mid-November, a deputy sheriff reported 
having heard a loud explosion and seeing a cloud of gray smoke near the compound.127 
Yet another recently departed apostate reported that community members had machined 
weapons using a lathe and milling equipment and possessed computer designs for a sub-
machinegun. This former member also reported seeing .50- and .52-caliber weapons, 
approximately 40 assault rifles, multiple pistols, and tactical shotguns at the 
compound.128 As would later be revealed in a 1996 congressional investigation into the 
federal law enforcement activities directed against the Branch Davidians, the reported 
explosion had been previously clarified as having been attributed to the group’s use of 
dynamite for construction, and the illegal .52-caliber weapon was determined to be a 
fully legal .50-caliber Barret firearm.129 
Former Branch Davidian Marc Breault reported extensively on Koresh’s interest 
in assembling machineguns, distain for gun control laws, and tendency to boast about 
how easily one could assemble automatic weapons from easily acquired and fully legal 
component parts.130 Background checks on Mount Carmel residents also revealed that 
some of the 40 foreign residents were presently without legal immigration status and 
others had been convicted or arrested for crimes that could prohibit them from possessing 
126 U.S. Department of Treasury, Report of the Department of the Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol, 
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firearms per 18 U.S.C. 922(g).131 BATF technical experts suggested the explosive 
materials Koresh possessed could be used to construct destructive devices, but they were 
unable to definitively conclude that Koresh had sufficient materials to do so.132 In 
addition, research revealed some of the Davidians’ business partners had recently 
committed violations related to automatic weapons, in two cases involving the same parts 
kits obtained by Koresh.133 
BATF had obtained hearsay evidence from apostate David Block that aside from 
Koresh, two additional Davidians were directly involved in converting semiautomatic 
AR-15 rifles into machineguns: mechanical engineer Donald Bunds and Jeff Little, both 
of whom Block alleged to have seen operating a metal lathe and milling machine to 
manufacture weapons.134 Aside from these potential co-conspirators and additional 
reports that Koresh was guarded by a phalanx of what were termed his “Mighty Men,” 
there was no evidence suggesting the remainder of the Davidians were involved in illicit 
weapon modification or production. In fact, the only indication that the bulk of the 
Davidians were even aware that Koresh possessed illegal weapons was based on reports 
that apostates had seen what appeared to be automatic assault rifles and Koresh’s 
presentation during one of his sermons of what he claimed was machinegun version of an 
AK-47 rifle.135 
C. THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF GROUP OPACITY 
Given the totality of these circumstances, BATF’s persistence in developing 
probable cause in support of a warrant search of the Davidians’ compound is reasonable. 
While conducting their crime scene search following the Mount Carmel fire, Texas 
Rangers would subsequently discover 305 firearms among the debris, including 20 fully 
automatic AK-47 rifles, at least 12 fully-automatic AR-15 rifles, and armor-piercing 
131 Ibid., 31. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid., 32. 
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135 Ibid., 123. 
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ammunition, which substantiated the legitimacy of BATF’s initial concerns.136 However, 
according to federal law, some note that even these weapons were not outright illegal, but 
rather their possession necessitated fees and lawful registration in the National Firearms 
Registration and Transfer Record.137 It is therefore less a question of the legitimacy of 
BATF’s suspicion of regulatory infractions, but rather the relative necessity of the 
agency’s investigative techniques, organizational zealotry, and unwillingness to enter 
open dialogue with Koresh that indicates prejudicial treatment of the community due to 
its closed nature. Despite the fact that BATF’s suspicions regarding Koresh’s and other’s 
conversion of semi- to fully-automatic assault rifles proved to be true, one must question 
whether a violent tactical assault on this entire opaque community was indeed a 
necessary and measured use of governmental force in this case. It rather appears likely 
that BATF decision makers hastily embraced such tactics without serious reflection due 
to their pre-existing discomfort with a group whose beliefs and nature they neither 
understood nor earnestly attempted to ascertain.  
Whereas in dealing with a routine dealer or gun owner, BATF may have simply 
conducted an inventory and inspection of controlled part kits and weapons recorded as 
being Koresh’s possession per federal firearms licensing, the agency seemed to view the 
Davidians as a subversive and impenetrable collection of religious extremists. Koresh’s 
status as the group’s spiritual leader obviously played a role in this determination, but the 
agency seemed disinclined either to deal with Koresh, Fatta, and Schroeder as individual 
potential violators or to communicate with them in an open and direct manner. The fact 
that it also did not attempt to purchase or transfer a restricted weapon to or from the 
group, to effect an arrest or seizure at the Mag Bag or other location off compound, or to 
otherwise lure Koresh away from Mount Carmel indicates the agency viewed an assault 
as the only reasonable course of action. The 1996 congressional investigation would in 
fact determine that Koresh could have been arrested away from Mount Carmel and that 
BATF “made erroneous assumptions” in determining otherwise.138 Underlying 
136 U.S. Department of Justice, Report to the Deputy Attorney General on the Events at Waco, 309. 
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organizational motives including a desire by BATF executives to increase the agency’s 
stature through a successful large-scale raid are often cited as contributing to this 
decision. This explanation notwithstanding, the combined effect of group opacity, 
atrocity tales by apostates, and governmental misunderstanding of the Davidians’ 
ideology and worldview certainly contributed to this official mentality.  
1. Probable Cause Deficiencies 
Though local Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) Bill Johnston believed there was 
sufficient evidence to justify a search warrant based on probable cause, in late November 
1992, BATF headquarters rejected SA Aguilera’s initial July report as insufficient. 
Undeterred, SA Aguilar interviewed numerous concerned family members of Davidian 
adherents, apostates, and aforementioned “anti-cult expert” Rick Ross, in order to 
develop additional circumstantial evidence in support of a warrant. Though Ross would 
be influential throughout the case and siege, he possessed no academic credentials in 
religious studies.139 Ross likewise appears to have made a career of leveraging his 
interactions with “deprogrammed” subjects, cults, and law enforcement interventions into 
paid interviews, sensational “tell all” accounts, and media appearances.  
Interestingly, the official Department of Justice report on the events at Waco 
would later downplay the “unsolicited offers” of assistance from Ross and a second anti-
cult activist named Kelli Waxman, both of whom are referred to as “self-described cult 
experts” from whom the FBI reportedly never solicited advice nor assistance. The report 
makes a point to note, “the FBI did not ‘rely’ on Ross for advice whatsoever during the 
standoff,” and, “treated the information Ross supplied as it would any other unsolicited 
information received from the public: it evaluated the credibility of the information and 
treated it accordingly.”140 Barkun notes, “the report makes no mention of whether after 
the evaluation, the Bureau found the information credible, or what, if anything, it did with 
the information after that point,” and that “[these] omissions…constitute at least 
139 Wessinger, How the Millennium Comes Violently, 60. 
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circumstantial evidence that the information was deemed credible and used.”141 
Regardless, the same can likely not be said for the impact “experts” such as Ross had by 
fulfilling an information void and providing media outlets—and thus the consumers—
with a one-sided and personal agenda-driven assessment of the Davidians, thereby 
influencing public perceptions and political will against the community.  
Aguilera cited apostates who reported that members surrendered their assets to 
Koresh, who himself controlled all aspects of life on the compound and was allowed to 
have sex with all female members of the group.142 He likewise referenced reports from 
recently departed Davidians that suggested Koresh was armed constantly, had led 
followers on live-fire shooting exercises, and was observed with what they believed to be 
machineguns and pineapple grenades.143 One former member also reported having been 
physically restrained at Mount Carmel for three months prior to her eventual departure, 
an account corroborated by her sister.144 In particular, the apostates cautioned the BATF 
that Koresh would not surrender peacefully and that any siege would lead to a mass 
suicide by the Davidians, though Koresh had indicated neither such tendencies during his 
1987 arrest and prosecution on attempted murder charges nor had Ross and Jewell’s 
previous mass suicide warning come to fruition.145 Collectively, the sensational 
information gleaned from disaffected former members and “expert” references painted a 
deeply disturbing, though subjective and unbalanced, picture of the Davidians and 
Koresh.  
Here again, the circumstantial evidence SA Aguilera used to bolster his affidavit 
was largely immaterial to the alleged firearms violations. Rather than develop hard 
evidence that weapons were in fact being illegally modified or explosive devices 
constructed without authorization, Aguilera drapes tenuous allegations of illegal behavior 
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with sensational, atrocity-tale laden imagery of a deviant religious cult led by a gun-
obsessed madman. The opaque nature of Mount Carmel lent credibility to these available 
and mutually affirming information sources, all of whose anti-Davidian agendas should 
have prompted official circumspection of their claims. Motivated to somehow leverage 
their statutory powers to intervene and preempt Koresh’s alleged morally repugnant 
activities, the BATF likely fell victim to operational assumptions and emotional bias 
toward the community. The resulting investigative momentum appears to have distracted 
decision makers’ objective assessment of the available facts, leading them to pursue and 
approve a series of operational steps that compounded this organizational commitment 
towards a decisive and dramatic disruption of a emotionally charged yet largely contrived 
collective threat from the entire Mount Carmel community.  
The Branch Davidians’ negative portrayal in the media likely further shaped these 
preconceptions and prejudices held by governmental officials, simultaneously confirming 
any beliefs held by Koresh and other Davidians regarding their persecuted status. While 
in Australia, Breault conveyed his defector’s tale to Martin King of the Australian exposé 
documentary program A Current Affair. King, in turn, arranged a visit to Mount Carmel 
under the guise of a “public relations exercise” when in fact he was there to “expose 
[Koresh] as a cruel, maniacal, child-molesting, pistol-packing religious zealot who 
brainwashed his devotees into believing he was the Messiah.”146 A year later, the Waco 
Tribune-Herald published an investigative series on David Koresh, titled “The Sinful 
Messiah.” The series, first published on February 27, 1993, immediately before the initial 
raid, offered a one-sided assessment of the Davidians and included interview material 
from Breault and Ross. Reporters failed to include alternative perspectives from either 
the Davidians or Koresh himself or to seek objective assessments from new religious 
movement scholars. Due in part to its release immediately before the raid, this negative 
account would serve as the initial source of information for media reporting on Waco.147 
The subjective and obviously agenda-driven nature of both reports was likely unapparent 
146 Tabor and Gallagher, Why Waco?, 84. 
147 Wessinger, How the Millennium Comes Violently, 98. 
 62 
                                                 
to consumers and officials alike, as was the fact that root material for both accounts were 
largely drawn from the same disenfranchised and biased sources.  
2. A Flawed Assault Plan Develops 
Despite the paucity of evidence suggestive of a community-wide criminal 
conspiracy, officials planned a tactical assault that treated all Davidians as if they were a 
criminal threat. Though planners were likely focused on the possibility (as would indeed 
be later manifested) that group members would fiercely defend the compound from 
assault, such defense of one’s imminent domain—as this compound was to over 130 
people—is well established as legally defensible regardless of whether criminal or non-
criminal actors are present or intermixed. It is in fact noteworthy that Texas has an 
especially strong legal tradition of personal protection and defense of imminent domain, 
though no such similar federal law protects defense against government officers. 
According to the Texas Penal Code, resisting search or arrest with deadly force is 
considered justified, “if, before the actor offers any resistance, the peace officer…uses or 
attempts to use greater force than necessary to make the arrest or search…”148 The 
reasonability of the Davidians’ violent defense of the compound would later be 
confirmed during the trial of 11 Davidians who survived the Mount Carmel tragedy, the 
trial at which all 11 were found not guilty of murder and conspiracy charges, and three 
defendants innocent of all charges.149 In addition, BATF agents may rightly have 
assumed that Branch Davidians, in particular Koresh’s “Mighty Men,” would be inclined 
to defend their charismatic leader. Nevertheless, by organizing an assault against a multi-
family domicile whose occupants most assuredly included innocent persons having no 
connection with the criminal charges for which a warrant was issued, law enforcement 
officials unreasonably categorized all Davidians as a mass threat. In reality, the group 
constituted a fearful and distressed set of individual actors whose defensive response to 
unsolicited violence was foreseeable, particularly given their collective eschatological 
beliefs regarding an impending apocalypse.  
148 Reavis, The Ashes of Waco, 281. 
149 Ibid., 296. 
 63 
                                                 
3. Misperceptions about Davidian Women  
Whereas federal law enforcement planers apparently overestimated the criminal 
threat posed by the Davidians as a whole, they underestimated the potential threat 
emanating from the female members of the community. The BATF tactical assault plan 
hinged on a mistaken belief that if agents could separate the male community members 
from the suspected weapons cache, they would minimize the risk of armed resistance. 
Reports suggesting Koresh occasionally issued rifles to at least five women and 
surveillance reports that a female Davidian had been observed aiming a rifle from the 
compound’s front door were excused as aberrations or summarily ignored by senior 
planners.150 Although agents did consider possible armed resistance from a female 
member known to be a former police officer, they failed to conceive a potential scenario 
in which female members defended the compound in the male members’ stead. It is 
highly likely that officials suffered cognitive bias vis-à-vis the potential for violence from 
female Davidians influenced by official perceptions of an underlying collective incidence 
of female subservience and exploitation within the group—an incorrect assumption 
aggravated by the community’s opacity. 
Both the official BATF operations plan and internal memoranda provide 
indications of this official presumption of female victimhood within the community. With 
regard to Koresh, the tactical operations plan notes, “Howell…depicts himself as Jesus 
Christ incarnate…and he also sexually appropriates all of the female cult members for 
himself exclusively, to include female children as young as thirteen.”151 This information 
is both immaterial to the legal justification for the search and unnecessary for officer 
safety and operational security purposes. In fact, such a statement may actually have been 
detrimental to leadership’s assessment of potential opposition, as use of the word 
“appropriates” suggests a lack of free will among Davidian women, suggesting they 
would be welcoming to the arrival of “liberating” forces. Docherty surmises that FBI 
negotiators also, “categorized the women in Mount Carmel as victims on the basis of the 
150 U.S. Department of Treasury, Report of the Department of the Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol, 
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negotiators’ own normative response to the unusual (in their eyes, deviant) gender 
relations within the community,” thereby assessing the women’s decision to prefer sexual 
relations with Koresh over their own husbands as inconceivable.152 Had the fact been 
presented that adult female members, by all accounts, willingly entered sexual 
relationships with Koresh, it may have altered executives’ perceptions about the attitudes 
and motives of the Davidian women, and thus their likely reaction to governmental 
intervention. The community’s opacity, combined with overreliance on reports from 
biased disaffected apostates, presumably blinded tactical planners from alternative 
analyses of the domestic circumstances at the compound.  
The official memorandum forwarded by BATF executive planners to their 
Department of the Treasury superiors announcing the upcoming raid likewise includes 
immaterial details and assumptions about female Davidians. This memorandum states,  
When a member joins the Branch Davidian, he turns over all possessions, 
including his wife and any daughters. Howell is the only male allowed to 
have sexual relations with any of the women, and in general the women 
are not allowed outside the main compound. Howell strips these people of 
all dignity and his treatment of them is atrocious across the board—from 
eating habits to sanitary depravation.153  
Here again, “women and daughters” are categorized as the chattel of male 
adherents, and the potential that female members choose to be the exclusive extramarital 
partners of Koresh is not considered. The presumption that members are treated in an 
inhumane fashion—presumably against their will—is likewise presented as fact. Though 
officials refrain from explicitly claiming that liberation of intending female absconders 
currently imprisoned at the compound is an added benefit to this raid, the inclusion of 
such details in official internal correspondence is suggestive of the operational 
assumptions of executive leadership with regard to non-male members of the Mount 
Carmel community.  
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4. “Protecting” the Children 
This official presumption that Davidian women and children were held against 
their will would continue during the subsequent FBI siege of Mount Carmel as well, in 
spite of evidence to the contrary. Docherty suggests that negotiators, motivated to protect 
and liberate what in their view were already victimized Davidian women and children, 
assumed that Koresh, “would be inclined to treat them as bargaining chips to advance his 
own ends.”154 Despite severe reservations of many of their mothers, 21 Davidian children 
were sent out of the compound during the standoff. Some parents felt such acts 
constituted releasing their children to “Babylonian” society, and many were extremely 
distraught to discover how authorities allowed the released minors to consume candy and 
junk food, misbehave, and generally deviate from their previous standards of upbringing. 
However, Koresh had insisted the children be released, as he felt he could only assume 
responsibility for his own children and that, as minors, the others could not make their 
own decisions. Aside from five juvenile girls who desired to remain at Mount Carmel and 
the children of one other member (who was dissuaded from sending her five children out 
after seeing how authorities treated those who were remanded to state custody), the only 
children who were compelled to remain in the compound were Koresh’s 12 biological 
children.155  
Though securing the release of the 21 children who did survive the siege 
demonstrated successful negotiation that preserved life, this collective reluctance of 
Davidian parents to send their children to the care of the state, despite the peril they faced 
in remaining in the compound, demonstrates both the strength of their religious 
convictions and conflicted priorities in simultaneously tending to the children’s worldly 
and spiritual well-being. The fact that certain juveniles expressed a preference to remain 
likewise indicates that children who were afforded the opportunity to leave declined of 
their own volition. Ultimately, it appears Davidian minors were captive only insofar as 
their legal guardians determined their ultimate welfare was best ensured within rather 
than outside the confines of Mount Carmel—a circumstance that was apparently not 
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integrated into negotiators composite understanding of the group and leader with whom 
they dealt.  
Perhaps the most flagrant aberration regarding official concern for the safety of 
the Davidian children who remained in the compound involved the deliberations and 
planning surrounding the final FBI assault on April 19. The FBI’s use of over 400 ferret 
rounds of CS gas against the compound seems entirely at odds with official statements 
citing imminent safety concerns for the Davidian children as justification for ending the 
siege in this manner. Given that the federal government was a signatory of the 1993 
Chemical Weapons Convention in Paris pledging not to use this gas in warfare, it would 
seem to be outright negligent that federal officials would countenance use of this 
compound against minors and pregnant mothers in a law enforcement context.156 The 
FBI assault plan, approved by Attorney General (AG) Reno on April 17, stipulated that a 
team of social workers would be present to wash any chemicals off children using 
portable showers as they exited the compound. However, the FBI officials failed to 
contact the lead social worker on April 19 when the raid began, and later stated they did 
not know if anyone was departing the compound.157 The 1996 House of Representatives 
majority report on the tragedy would later critique the FBI’s use of CS gas, noting that 
the assault plan was “fatally flawed,” and that “the FBI failed to demonstrate sufficient 
concern for the presence of young children [and] pregnant women.”158 
As with other closed communities, the reports of child abuse seemed to draw 
intense scrutiny and evoke an eagerness to intervene from even the most senior homeland 
security decision makers, at times pushing the bounds of sound legal process. For 
instance, laudable concern for the Davidian children based on unfounded reports of 
ongoing abuse during the siege would later be instrumental in persuading Attorney 
General Janet Reno to approve the fateful FBI assault plan using CS gas. In her 
comments to the press on April 19, AG Reno noted that more than any other factor, 
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reports of ongoing child abuse compelled her to embrace immediate tactical measures.159 
However, the following day, FBI director Sessions would release a clarifying statement 
noting that in fact the FBI had developed no evidence of child abuse during the 51-day 
siege.160 The official Department of Justice report on the events at Waco also noted, 
“historical evidence suggested that Koresh had engaged in child physical and sexual 
abuse over a long period of time prior to the [B]ATF shootout on February 28,” but notes, 
“this evidence was insufficient to establish probable cause to indict or proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt to convict, but it was sufficient to be relevant to the decisionmaking 
[sic] process involving the proposed tear gas plan.”161 The fact that hearsay from 
unreliable and disaffected Davidian apostates continued to be presented as justification 
for violent federal actions against the group (ironically a decision that itself endangered 
the welfare of the Davidian children) even after the April 19 tragedy indicate the laudable 
and well-intentioned but ultimately unsubstantiated concerns shared by governmental 
actors.  
In addition to the intense scrutiny allegations of child abuse involving this opaque 
community generated among law enforcement officials, the visceral nature of such claims 
also seemed to have distorted decision makers’ abilities to objectively consider refuting 
information. Prior to the final stages in the federal siege on Mount Carmel, evidence that 
contradicted the child abuse allegations or reports of intolerable conditions for Davidian 
children seems in fact to have been summarily ignored if not also suppressed by 
authorities. On March 8, barely a week after the initial BATF assault on Mount Carmel, 
Branch Davidian Steve Schneider conducted videotaped interviews of 22 members of the 
group inside Mount Carmel and presented these tapes to the FBI. These tapes showed no 
indications of child abuse or endangerment, and in fact indicated strong and caring family 
relationships by those members interviewed. The Justice report would later note,  
Each person on the video—male and female, young and old—spoke in a 
calm, assured tone of their desire to remain inside, even after the 
159 Tabor and Gallagher, Why Waco?, 19. 
160 U.S. Department of Justice, Report to the Deputy Attorney General on the Events at Waco, 226. 
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experience of the [B]ATF raid only a few days earlier…The abiding 
impression is not of a bunch of ‘lunatics,’ but rather of a group of people 
who, for whatever reason, believed so strongly in Koresh that the notion of 
leaving the squalid compound was unthinkable.162  
It is unknown why unshaken belief in disturbing and pervasive child abuse within 
the compound persisted despite such photographic evidence to the contrary or why this 
video did not at least prompt a reassessment of previously developed conclusions 
regarding the nature of the Davidian community. Prior to approving the FBI’s final 
assault plan using CS gas, AG Reno was neither presented with any portion of these 
videos showing Branch Davidian members lovingly interacting with their children, nor 
was she made aware of Koresh’s routine and innocuous contact with his own progeny, 
the images of which may indeed have been “relevant to [her] decision-making process 
involving the proposed tear gas plan.”163 Indeed, the FBI’s exclusion of such evidence 
arguably restricted AG Reno’s ability to fully assess the situation within the compound, 
denying her a visual and emotional counterweight to her own visceral concerns for the 
besieged minors. Koresh undoubtedly pursued unorthodox sexual relationships with 
young and underage girls that likely constituted statutory rape and polygamy. However, 
the breadth and depth of the collective enforcement actions taken to combat such 
potential crimes, as well as an unfounded general assumption that such behavior 
permeated the entire community, seemed entirely disproportionate to the actual situation 
at Mount Carmel—a collective error in official judgment that was almost certainly 
aggravated by the opaque nature of the Davidians and a resulting tendency, in the 
absence of situational awareness and visibility into Mount Carmel, to fear the absolute 
worst.  
5. Negotiations for “Hostage” Release 
Departures of adult members and statements made by Koresh indicate willing 
adult Davidians were also free to depart Mount Carmel, though official interpretation of 
community members’ behavior gravitated towards a hostage situation interpretative 
162 Ibid., 205. 
163 Tabor and Gallagher, Why Waco?, 19. 
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framework. In addition to the children released from the compound, 14 adults 
departed/surrendered during the siege. The FBI would later allege that individuals that 
departed Mount Carmel, “were ‘expelled’ because Koresh considered them weak or 
troublemakers.”164 Ironically, the incongruities of such assumptions and depth of this 
official incomprehension of the Davidians are contained within the same official report in 
which this assessment was presented. FBI negotiators continually pled with Koresh to 
“release” members and discounted his assertions that Davidians were free to depart. This 
official agenda of freeing additional Davidians from the compound conflicts directly with 
the expressed preferences of community members with whom they spoke, as 
approximately 50 Davidians explicitly told negotiators that they had no desire to depart 
the compound.165 It should also be noted that besieged Davidians were simultaneously 
perceived as hostages and homicide suspects in the death of four BATF agents, further 
confusing both negotiators’ release efforts and adherents’ incentives for leaving the 
compound. Perhaps the ultimate expression of group cohesion and individual desire to 
remain in Mount Carmel was demonstrated by Davidian Ruth Riddle, who was forcibly 
extracted by an FBI agent during the final stage of the siege as she attempted to retreat 
into the burning compound rather than flee to safety.166 
During the last recorded negotiation session with Koresh on April 18, 1993, FBI 
negotiator “Henry” implores Koresh to release additional members, indicating authorities 
both assumed Koresh maintained either physical or spiritual control over the entire 
community and dismissed the possibility that individual Davidians chose to remain of 
their own volition. During this exchange, Koresh states, “whoever wants to go out can go 
out,” later asking nearby Davidians “do fifty of you want to go out?” Henry responds, 
“You don’t have to ask. All you have to do is say, ‘look, I want 50 volunteers,’ and 
they’ll come out.”167 Unable to comprehend the Davidians’ worldview and its 
manifestation in the community’s behavior, the FBI appears over the course of the siege 
164 U.S. Department of Justice, Report to the Deputy Attorney General on the Events at Waco, 3. 
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to have fallen into a default “hostage negotiation” interpretative framework. The opaque 
nature of the community certainly contributed to, if not entirely caused, officials’ 
inadequate understanding of the situational landscape from the Davidians’ collective 
point of view. 
6. Tactical Challenges of Situational Awareness Deficits 
In considering options for a raid and warrant search of Mount Carmel, numerous 
issues contextualized by the Davidians’ closed nature and the lack of available situational 
awareness regarding the compound influenced BATF agents towards use of dynamic 
entry tactics. Early in the planning process, AUSA Johnston advised BATF that he would 
not authorize a siege-style operation involving the establishment of a perimeter, as this 
type of operation could allow Koresh and others to destroy evidence, which would hinder 
possibilities for a successful prosecution. BATF Little Rock Resident Agent in Charge 
(RAC) William Buford, a participant in the 1985 BATF and FBI siege of CSA fortified 
compound in Arkansas, was likewise an opponent of any siege tactics. Throughout the 
Mount Carmel planning sessions, Buford repeatedly recalled the three-day CSA siege, 
during which CSA members destroyed many of their automatic weapons and illegal 
silencers, and therewith evidence of many of their crimes.168 The specter of a mass 
suicide event presented by interviewed apostates dissuaded others from countenancing a 
potential prolonged standoff. Additional tactical considerations regarding the terrain 
surrounding the compound led BATF planners to discard siege tactics as too 
dangerous.169 Finally, reports from previous Branch Davidians indicated the group 
maintained large stores of provisions and had an independent supply of well water, 
suggesting any siege would be a prolonged affair. Members were also acclimated to 
austere living conditions, meaning a siege would not significantly disrupt the 
community’s current lifestyle.170 
168 U.S. Department of Treasury, Report of the Department of the Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms, 38. 
169 Ibid., 44. 
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Given that Koresh himself was the primary target of enforcement operations, 
BATF did consider alternative tactics to separate him from his followers or otherwise 
lure him away from the compound. However, numerous setbacks and complicating 
factors prevented an arrest of Koresh away from the compound. First, BATF surveillance 
did not observe Koresh leaving the compound. It was later determined that although plans 
were developed on this premise, agents had not definitively established whether Koresh 
ever left the compound.171 Second, an attempt to lure Koresh to a contrived meeting with 
the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services failed when social worker 
Joyce Sparks’s supervisor refused that agency’s involvement. Finally, an attempt to 
obtain a state warrant against Koresh on statutory rape charges, which would established 
the basis for a meeting with local officials in town, failed when the victim refused to 
testify.172  
BATF planners ultimately chose a dynamic entry plan that was highly contingent 
on the element of surprise and relied heavily on critical pieces of dated intelligence. The 
lack of observable sentries or armed guards, reported presence of high caliber weapons, 
and agents’ belief that Davidian men could be successfully separated from the suspected 
location of the group’s arsenal convinced planners that a dynamic raid was the course of 
action most likely to succeed.173 As mentioned above, federal decision makers failed to 
consider that female Davidians might defend the compound and could operate without 
direction from Koresh. They likewise failed to build sufficient contingency options into 
their plans or prepare for a barricade/siege fallback scenario, as well as ignored numerous 
indications that they had lost the element of surprise, upon which the success of their 
dynamic entry plan relied.  
D. THE FLAWED OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Though a comprehensive analysis of the siege and lengthy negotiations between 
federal law enforcement and the Branch Davidians is beyond the scope of this study, a 
171 Ibid., 136–137. 
172 Ibid., 64. 
173 Ibid., 53. 
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few key points related to deliberations influenced by the community’s closed nature are 
worthy of note. Prior to the February 28 raid, BATF officials systematically eschewed 
options for open dialogue with the group despite Koresh’s openness to negotiations, 
instead pursuing a tactical assault of Mount Carmel as the initial form of overt contact 
with the community. In doing so, federal stakeholders framed all future interactions with 
the Davidians in a context of inter-organizational mistrust, governmental hostility, and 
compelled concessions under duress, thereby creating barriers to the establishment of 
substantive and objective communication channels. By waiting until after a violent 
assault to establish a rapport with a closed group that was inherently distrustful of 
governmental intervention, officials severely encumbered their prospects for convincing 
the Davidians to respect legal process. The Davidians, organized as an opaque 
community of true believers, simultaneously interpreted official interventionist actions as 
the manifestation of prophesized cataclysmic events that aligned perfectly with their 
apocalyptic eschatology. The nature and sincerity of these beliefs only further diminished 
stakeholders’ prospects for a peaceful and equitable resolution under these now 
aggravated tactical circumstances.  
1. Discounting Religious Fervency 
A second cognitive deficiency on the part of federal law enforcement involved a 
failure to concede the sincerity of the group’s religious convictions and incorporate 
validation of these beliefs into their secular negotiation strategy. Throughout their 
attempts to coerce the Branch Davidians to submit to the rule of law, FBI agents failed to 
comprehend that the group would only pursue options they believed to be in accordance 
with their interpretation of biblical imperatives.174 Unlike the FBI negotiators, 
theological scholars Arnold and Tabor continued to analyze Koresh’s theology during the 
siege by reviewing his taped sermons and speaking with incarcerated Davidian 
Livingstone Fagan. Based on the Davidians’ belief that biblical prophecy related to 
topical events and could be continually reinterpreted by their prophet, they ascertained 
that from the group’s viewpoint, the outcome of the siege was not predetermined and 
174 Wessinger, How the Millennium Comes Violently, 57. 
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could be altered based on strategic dialogue with Koresh. Fagan interpreted the crisis as a 
religious test of faith in which the group’s dedication to God’s prophet was being 
determined.175 Unfortunately, at no time during its investigation or prior to the initial raid 
did BATF consult religious such religious experts about the Davidian’s beliefs or 
practices. After assuming operational control, the FBI likewise dismissed offers by 
religious scholars who attempted to voluntarily offer their services to negotiators. 
Sullivan notes, “in general, the FBI commanders and decision-makers dismissed opinions 
that religion was an important operating factor,” even ignoring the assessment of their 
own behavioral scientist Peter Smerick that tactical commanders should incorporate the 
Davidian’s religious worldview into their negotiation strategy.176  
The FBI appears to have failed to recognize that Koresh, in preaching to 
negotiators about salvation in God’s Kingdom and attempting to convert them to the 
Davidian’s faith, was in fact broadcasting the group’s “ultimate concern.” Negotiation 
aimed at resolution within the context of the Davidians’ prophetic understanding of 
current events may have allowed peaceful resolution, but the FBI rejected such 
theological discussions as not constructive. On March 15, FBI negotiators were directed 
to no longer listen to Koresh’s “Bible babble.” That same day, FBI commanders denied a 
request by Steve Schneider to let biblical scholar Dr. Arnold attempt to assist Koresh in 
finding an alternative hermeneutic showing God wanted an end to the siege.177 
The Justice Department report would later underpin this apparently prevailing 
misunderstanding among officials of the communal cohesion, resiliency, and 
psychological explanation for the Davidians’ devotion towards Koresh, suggesting: 
The key to Koresh’s hold on his followers was his ability to recite lengthy 
portions of the Bible from memory, and to “harmonize” disparate, 
seemingly unrelated scriptures by showing how they ‘tied together.’ This 
ability, combined with Koresh’s charismatic/mercurial personality and the 
175 Ibid., 92. 
176 Sullivan, “‘No Longer the Messiah,” 218–219. 
177 Wessinger, How the Millennium Comes Violently, 92–93. 
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low self-esteem of his followers, created an environment in which Koresh 
was elevated to near God-like status.178  
What religion does not involve a priesthood or clergy that has deep familiarity 
with its sacred texts and is relied upon to interpret ambiguity? Moreover, claims by the 
FBI or department to have been able to assess the collective self-esteem of over 130 
Branch Davidians while concurrently orchestrating an armed siege against their domicile 
are tenuous at best. It is more likely that officials assumed that followers were simply 
duped by a charismatic criminal rather than motivated by an arcane but well-established 
set of millenarian beliefs that had evolved over 50 years after splitting from a well-
established and recognized vein of domestic Christian Protestantism.  
It appears homeland security stakeholders’ misinterpreted the Davidians 
preoccupation with reclusive self-sufficiency as an indication of open defiance rather 
than judicious preparations for a coming end-time. Though Koresh and the Davidians 
took measures to prepare for Armageddon, their actions were entirely defensive and 
reactive in nature. The group stockpiled food, fuel, and ammunition, and fortified Mount 
Carmel structures in preparation for a prophesized siege by the forces of Babylon.179 
However, as Eugene Gallagher’s study of Koresh’s statements and sermons reveals, 
Koresh did not direct adherents to pursue independent violent action.180 Rather, Koresh 
maintained that Davidians would support God’s side in Armageddon, with God 
determining when and how violence would be initiated.181 Granted, as Koresh was 
alleged to have privileged understanding of esoteric biblical messages and spoke as 
God’s prophet to his followers, one could allege that Koresh himself had the ability to 
dictate when and how this Armageddon would occur. Nevertheless, by not validating the 
depth and sincerity of the Davidians’ beliefs, including the community’s perception that 
current events were confirming pre-apocalyptic events contained in the Bible and 
178 U.S. Department of Justice, Report to the Deputy Attorney General on the Events at Waco, 206. 
179 Wessinger, How the Millennium Comes Violently, 102. 
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prophesized by their spiritual leader, federal officials repeatedly misinterpreted the 
Davidians’ statements and actions as offensive and belligerent rather than reactive and 
defensive in nature.  
2. Analysis of Mistaken Official Assumptions 
Though BATF officials attempted to focus their efforts on developing probable 
cause evidence of federal firearm infractions, their zealous approach to many aspects of 
the investigation seemed influenced by the alternative and widely opaque nature of the 
Davidians’ views and lifestyle. One must question if the suspected infractions of 
individual group members and Koresh (i.e., BATF’s area of jurisdiction), absent the 
contextual aura of an obscure, chiliast religious sect led by an abusive, sex crazed, 
seemingly unstable megalomaniac (i.e., allegations related to “atrocity tales” from 
apostates), would have drawn such interest from the agency. Justification included in 
official reports regarding the BATF investigation seems to further argue this very point, 
noting: “While reports that Koresh was permitted to sexually and physically abuse 
children were not evidence that firearms or explosives violations were occurring, they 
showed Koresh to have set up a world of his own, where legal prohibitions were 
disregarded freely.”182 As elaborated above, from the view of BATF investigators, the 
basis of the potential firearms violations is primarily regulatory in nature and restricted to 
a handful of actors. Only when these suspected potential weapon crimes was associated 
with an opaque, seemingly fanatic group at a shared domicile did BATF’s collective 
suspicion apparently metastasize into official presumption of criminal conspiracies and a 
compelling governmental interest in intervention despite countervailing evidence and 
alternative investigative options.  
Throughout its investigation, BATF did correctly recognize that the special 
circumstances surrounding the Davidians’ status as a closed religious community created 
additional sensitivities in any governmental efforts at intervention, alleging, “[B]ATF 
would have been remiss if it had permitted considerations of religious freedom to insulate 
182 U.S. Department of Treasury, Report of the Department of the Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol, 
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the Branch Davidians from such an investigation.”183 BATF’s internal investigation 
suggests the bureau, “recognized early the delicacy of an investigation of such an 
unorthodox community” and responded appropriately by designating SA Aguilera’s case 
as “sensitive,” leading to additional scrutiny by supervisors, “of a case that was perceived 
at the outset to have the potential for raising thorny religious issues as well as difficult 
safety issues, particularly regarding the women and children living at the Compound.”184 
Though it would seem likely such a designation could well have been deemed prudent 
based simply on the size and makeup of the potentially impacted and cohabiting group, 
these statements do indicate a modicum of due diligence on the part of BATF 
investigators. 
Beyond such sensitivities, BATF statements regarding the closed nature of the 
Davidians seem to indicate the unknown and unknowable nature of the community both 
hampered and directly affected the course of the investigation. The Treasury report notes: 
Aguilera faced two significant obstacles in his investigation. First, he had 
to overcome the largely antisocial, isolated routing of Compound 
residents. As a rule, residents never spoke to outsiders about Compound 
activities and harbored deep suspicions of law enforcement personnel. 
Second, Aguilera wisely sought to keep his investigation a secret from 
Koresh and his followers in order to ensure strategic and tactical flexibility 
in case search or arrest warrants needed to be served. Aguilera sharply 
circumscribed his inquiries about Koresh to third parties, including arms 
dealers and former cult members, for fear of alerting the Branch Davidians 
that they were under scrutiny.185 
In short, the group’s opaque nature confounded investigative efforts into their 
activities and intentions while simultaneously prompting BATF to itself remain secretive 
about its scrutiny of the group. Resigned to this confidential operational mindset, 
investigators were blinded to the numerous invitations for open dialogue offered by 
Koresh and the group, both before and during the siege. Such rebuffs likely further 
confirmed Davidians’ suspicions that the actual motivations surrounding these secretive 
183 Ibid., 120. 
184 Ibid., 121. 
185 Ibid., 123. 
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governmental efforts were more akin to persecution, intrusion, or hostility toward the 
group than overt regulatory interest in potential gun infractions in a good-faith spirit of 
mutual respect and open dialogue. 
A second aspect of this justification—the extensive use of the referent ‘cult’ in 
official documents associated with the raid and subsequent investigations—deserves 
additional mention. Tabor notes a “subtly damning characterization of Koresh’s ‘cult’ is 
woven through [BATF’s] account” use of this term, “carries self-evident force in 
Aguilera’s testimony,” and that it is used 14 times in the justifying criminal affidavit 
without supporting context or qualification.186 According to general convention, the word 
“cult” carries a social stigma that negatively charges any group to whom it refers. By 
restricting their contextual perspective to that provided by apostate “cult” members who 
“escaped” the group, officials limited the aperture by which they could assess Mount 
Carmel and Koresh in objective terms. Simultaneously, the Davidians’ closed, distrustful, 
and—to the unbeliever—widely unfathomable lifestyle, religious practices, and depth of 
conviction only exacerbated any preconceptions that these officials may have regarding 
cultism and the dangers stemming therefrom.  
A comprehensive discussion of the criminal actions that took place both during 
and following the ill-fated attempted dynamic entry and siege of the Mount Carmel 
compound is likewise beyond the scope of this study. Sadly, it appears that the collective 
federal law enforcement actions manifested Koresh’s prophecies of a U.S.-led assault and 
martyrdom at the hands of Babylon, thereby seemingly corroborating his predictions for 
the onset of the apocalypse. The true sincerity of Koresh’s spiritual convictions and his 
ultimate purported divinely inspired objectives for the group will unfortunately never be 
known. The highly suspicious and, by all reasonable accounts, most likely outright 
criminal activity undertaken by certain individuals at Mount Carmel is indisputable. The 
sum total of all circumstances that led to the tragic culmination on April 19, however, 
indicate a governmental rush to intervention based on flawed assumptions and 
misinformation, an organizational inability to fathom or pursue open dialogue with 
186 Tabor and Gallagher, Why Waco?, 101. 
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Koresh and the Davidians, and a disproportionately elevated perception of the severity 
and immediacy of the threat posed by this community. 
Koresh was almost certainly committing statutory rape of underage girls as well 
as engaging in polygamous relationships. He and his associates had acquired a large 
number of assault rifles, purchased replacement parts for restricted weapons he did not 
own, and possessed the tools and technical means of converting these to illegal automatic 
weapons; it would subsequently be determined Koresh or one of his compatriots did just 
that. Additionally, he had acquired the parts and materials needed to construct a large 
number of bombs or other destructive devices. What both Texas protective service 
officials and federal law enforcement lacked in relation to these means for committing 
criminal offenses was either a criminal complaint by a victim or witness or a verifiable 
indication of criminal intent. Because Branch Davidian community members were widely 
suspected of tolerating, if not also aiding and abetting Koresh’s activities, a complaint 
from within the group was neither expected nor forthcoming. BATF undercover 
operations had been equally unsuccessful in generating a probable cause affidavit, 
leaving reasonable suspicion of criminal intent as the sole available investigative inroad. 
Given the Davidians’ closed and secretive nature, however, law enforcement was left to 
speculate regarding the existence and malevolence of this intent. 
3. Costly Errors 
The question then is not whether any criminal actions had taken place at Mount 
Carmel, but rather whether an armed federal assault directed at the entire community 
rather than targeted action directed at certain individuals was judicious and necessary. 
The collective costs for this intervention extend beyond the human losses in death and 
injuries sustained by both sides, psychological trauma, orphaned children, and shattered 
families. During the initial raid, four BATF agents were killed and 20 wounded, along 
with six Davidian fatalities and four injured. According to DOJ’s report, 75 Davidians 
died during in the April 19 fire, including 21 children under the age of 14—a figure that 
does not include two unborn fetuses who also perished.187 Following the event, BATF 
187 Newport, “‘A Baptism by Fire,’”61. 
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director Stephen Higgins resigned, along with five additional high-ranking BATF 
officials.188 Though it would attribute “ultimate responsibility” for the Mount Carmel 
tragedy on the “criminal conduct and aberrational behavior” of Koresh and the 
Davidians, a congressional report would later excoriate the BATF’s handling of the 
Branch Davidian investigation, characterizing the agency’s actions as “grossly 
incompetent.”189 
The monetary costs of the raid and standoff have not been disclosed and are 
difficult to estimate. A 1999 General Accounting Office (GAO) study estimated the costs 
of military assistance provided in the form of surveillance, reconnaissance, and transport 
services, the use of multiple helicopters, and tactical ground vehicles to total 
approximately $1 million alone.190 A minimum of 719 law enforcement officers were 
involved in the operation on scene on any given day. This included the participation of 
668 FBI personnel in the operations at Mount Carmel, whose operational footprint 
averaged 217 agents and 41 support personnel on hand per day. Personnel from BATF, 
U.S. Customs Service, Waco Police Department, McLennan County Sheriff’s Office, 
Texas Rangers, Texas Department of Public Safety Patrol, U.S. Army, and Texas 
National Guard also took part.191 Simply based on the manpower dedicated to 
establishing a secure perimeter and supporting negotiation and security needs, 
expenditures could easily be estimated in the millions of dollars.  
A not insignificant body of literature also exists regarding alleged governmental 
malfeasance, tolerated acts of retribution against and hostility towards the Davidians, 
purposeful disregard for long established negotiation tactics, intra- and inter-agency 
disputes, and post-disaster attempts at covering up official misconduct. In particular, 
conspiracy theorists and anti-government actors continue to place blame for the Mount 
Carmel conflagration on federal agencies that they allege initiated the fire to avenge the 
death of the four BATF agents because of the Davidians’ refusal to respect their 
188 Tabor and Gallagher, Why Waco?, 3. 
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authority, or both. The Justice report in particular attempts to counter such assertions, 
asserting in response to suggestions that the tactical vehicles used to insert CS gas into 
the compound also initiated the fire that “there is conclusive evidence that the Branch 
Davidians started the fire. Nevertheless, our findings may not convince those who believe 
what they want to believe. We are confident, however, that our findings represent the 
truth.”192 The authors’ usage of such defensive semantics and restriction of investigators 
analysis to only those baseless allegations of a surreptitious vehicle-borne incendiary 
attack that had surfaced prior to the report’s publication rather than a full and factual 
account of all known potential explanations for the fire’s initiation would later provide 
additional conspiratorial fodder. Following 1999 revelations that the Department of 
Justice withheld evidence that the FBI had utilized incendiary projectiles at the Mount 
Carmel compound on the day of the fire, Branch Davidian survivors and family members 
filed a wrongful death lawsuit, which, although it exonerated the government of all 
wrongdoing, “was based on a constricted array of evidence and bewildering procedural 
rulings.”193 The collective resulting intangible costs in loss of public confidence in the 
government, future reluctance by similar groups to cooperate with federal law 
enforcement, and international indignation at U.S. domestic treatment of a religious 
minority are likewise inestimable.  
4. Viable Alternative Outcomes 
The question then remains: would the development of a legally tenuous 
investigation and subsequent armed standoff permeated with the inability of an obscure 
religious sect and maligned federal force to effectively negotiate under duress have 
occurred if the Branch Davidians had not been an opaque community? Though this may 
never be determined, there are at least indications that an alternative course was available 
to homeland security practitioners. During negotiations, the Davidians were reluctant to 
believe anything federal agents told them, despite FBI efforts to differentiate itself from 
192 Ibid., 307. 
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Light of New Government Disclosures,” Nova Religio 7, no. 2 (2003): 102–103, 
doi:10.1525/nr.2003.7.2.101. 101–110  
 81 
                                                 
BATF. However, members of the community, including Koresh, expressed their respect 
for McLennan County Sheriff Jack Harwell, leading the FBI on March 13 to approve an 
unconventional face-to-face meeting between the sheriff, accompanied by a FBI agent, 
and two Davidians, including Steve Schneider. Despite success in establishing a rapport 
with Schneider and making what the FBI described as “significant inroads,” a second 
meeting failed to materialize, presumably due to Koresh’s lack of confidence in 
Schneider.194 The Davidians reportedly also trusted the Texas Rangers, and although the 
Rangers offered their assistance, the FBI declined their participation in the 
negotiations.195  
The intense psychological pressures of negotiations under riflescopes’ view rather 
than selection of inappropriate interlocutors may have doomed this outreach effort. 
However, the FBI should be applauded for its attempt to leverage Koresh’s familiarity 
with and trust of Sheriff Harwell towards conflict resolution. As discussed in subsequent 
chapters, the office of sheriff, as the only elected law enforcement position with whom 
most communities interact, may enjoy a privileged cloak of official legitimacy among 
closed groups such as the Davidians. It is unfortunate that federal negotiation and 
outreach efforts were not pursued in conjunction with Sheriff Harwell prior to the initial 
raid, as such efforts may have engendered a constructive dialogue, allowing de-escalation 
of suspicion and fear on both sides. Findings from the 1996 congressional investigation 
of the Waco tragedy, which include a recommendation that “Federal law enforcement 
agencies should be open to the assistance that State and local law enforcement agencies 
may be able to provide” would seem to buttress the utility of increased exploitation of 
such non-federal assets.196 
Additional recommendations from the congressional investigation are also 
applicable to opaque communities in general. Of the 17 recommendations contained in 
the report’s executive summary, two appear to be applicable to most if not all cases in 
194 U.S. Department of Justice, Report to the Deputy Attorney General on the Events at Waco, 133–
134. 
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which situational awareness regarding a community is not easily obtainable or a group’s 
ideology is arcane or unapproachable from conventional frames of reference.197 The 
report recommends, “Federal law enforcement agencies should take steps to foster greater 
understanding of the target under investigation,” noting that, “had the BATF and FBI 
been better informed about the religious philosophy of the Davidians and the Davidians’ 
likely response to the government’s actions against them, these agencies could have made 
better choices in planning to deal with the Branch Davidians.”198 It also suggests 
agencies should “revise policies and training to increase the willingness of their agents to 
consider the advice of outside experts,” suggesting steps should be taken to change a 
corporate culture that eschews assistance from non-law enforcement contributors.199 
Beyond these primary areas for improvement, the report notes that authorities should, 
“obtain fresh and unbiased information when relying on that information to arrest or 
search the premises of the subjects of investigations,” and generally, “should make every 
effort to obtain continuous and substantial intelligence.”200 Collectively, these 
recommendations could be applied beyond federal law enforcement to all homeland 
security stakeholder agencies with regard to their interactions with closed communities.  
Expounding on the first recommendation, the report notes: 
The subcommittees found troublesome the fact that many of the [B]ATF 
and FBI officials involved in this matter seemed uninterested in 
understanding the Davidians’ goals and belief system. The views of these 
officials ranged from assumptions that the Branch Davidian were rational 
people likely to respond to authorities as would most citizens to a belief 
that the Davidians were a ‘cult’ which could not be dealt with in any way 
other than by force. Seldom did these officials seem interested in actually 
trying to understand this group of people and their motivations. This 
attitude was shortsighted and contributed to several of the mistakes that 
the government officials made at different points from February 28 
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Barkun suggests that lessons of previous encounters should have prevented such 
shortsightedness, noting,  
Had those in policymaking positions correctly learned the lessons of CSA 
and Randy Weaver, and not been in thrall to the unsupported allegations 
of the anti-’cult’ movement, they would have recognized the true nature of 
the problem before them: an armed, millenarian group, sincerely (if 
misguidedly) religious, in the sense of total commitment to a concept of 
ultimate things, and living in daily expectation of the end of history.202  
Sullivan underscores such suggestions, noting, “The risk is that, in trivializing religion as 
a motivation, government officials diminished their capacity to understand the motives 
and actions of citizens.”203  
In addition to accepting one of Koresh’s or the Davidians’ overtures to dialogue 
or seeking the development of additional sources of information or recruitment of 
confidential informants from within Mount Carmel, federal investigators and other 
homeland security stakeholders could have pursued a number of alternative sources of 
situational awareness information regarding the compound prior to a dynamic entry 
warrant search and arrest operation. As a domicile for over 130 individuals, Mount 
Carmel was certainly subject to numerous housing, health, and safety municipal code and 
zoning ordinances, as well as building code and equalization/taxation regulatory 
processes. Officials could have leveraged use of compliance inspection visits or other 
ruses to obtain current intelligence on the group, as well as to ascertain the welfare of 
women and minors. Reports of significant construction projects at the property would 
certainly have provided a viable premise under which to have sought code inspections or 
other visit by local officials. Given the large population of foreign nationals at the 
compound—many of whom were determined to be in the U.S. without legal status—
BATF and others could have also leveraged the legacy Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) to obtain access to any alien overstays, schedule adjustment of status 
interviews with members, or likewise conduct health and welfare visits to the compound 
under the premise of an immigration inspection or compliance visit.  
202 Barkun, “Millenarian Groups and Law Enforcement Agencies,” 92. 
203 Sullivan, “‘No Longer the Messiah,” 220. 
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Though such intrusions may well have telegraphed officials’ increased interest in 
the Branch Davidians’ activities, they may have done so in a transparent, legally 
defensible, and comparative unthreatening manner. Given that the forays into 
surreptitious intelligence gathering into the closed compound (the undercover house, 
BATF agent posing as a delivery man, and Rodriguez posing as a potential convert) were 
quickly unmasked by Koresh and the others, they likely both increased the groups’ 
anxiety regarding “Babylonian” surveillance and preoperational planning and confirmed 
suspicions that officials were disinterested in peaceful conflict avoidance. In turn, this 
confirmed the Davidians’ apocalyptic narratives, bolstered perceptions of Koresh’s 
powers of prophecy, and validated suspicions that officials rejected attempts at open 
dialogue in favor of deceit, denial, and violent suppression. Any potential loss of 
operational security or element of surprise that the aforementioned alternative forthright 
methods of compelling official interaction with the group and obtaining situation 
awareness of the Davidians’ organizational nature and intentions may have engendered 
can certainly be viewed as possibly causing far fewer secondary negative conclusions by 
the object of interest.  
Ultimately, though perhaps not the sole causative aspect, the Davidians’ opaque 
nature and its impact on officials’ ability to effectively fulfill the aforementioned 
recommendations must certainly be viewed as the most significant contributing factor to 
the tragedy. In the lead-up to the BATF raid, an increasingly concerned local populace, a 
coalition of unreliable yet maligned apostates, various media outlets, the State of Texas, 
and the federal law enforcement community fused, creating an echo chamber perceived 
threat, fear, and enforcement urgency. Participant agencies and actors grew increasingly 
frustrated with the dearth of viable intervention inroads to the Davidians, leading them to 
seek additional partners. The accompanying lack of situational awareness regarding what 
may or may not have been occurring at Mount Carmel, combined with suspicious 
indicators of criminal activity, atrocity tales, and unconventional yet fervent religious 
beliefs and practices centered around a domineering and conspiratorial self-processed 
modern-day prophet, proved to be an potent elixir to well-intending stakeholder agencies 
and decision makers.  
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Without the benefit of open channels of dialogue through which to resolve both 
inter-organizational misunderstanding and worrisome potential legal infractions, the 
trajectory of the Mount Carmel tragedy was set. In the absence of alternative open 
sources of information regarding the Davidians’ capabilities and intent, homeland 
security agencies were left to expect and prepare for the worst, leading to a seemingly 
intractable clash of perceptions, ultimate priorities, and world views. And though the 
Justice report suggests that “nothing would have changed the outcome [at Waco] because 
the people who remained had no intention of leaving,” such a statement is tantamount to 
an official self-acquittal given that a constructive and educated dialogue between 
homeland security officials and this closed community was essentially never established.  
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V. MOVE 
“The tragedy was more than an accident, it was a revelation of what we can become if the 
trappings and procedures of our lives overpower the purposes and potential of our 
humanity.” 
–Commissioner Charles W. Bowser, Esq. 
Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission 
March 6, 1986 
 
A. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
Alternatively viewed as either an anti-establishment alternative lifestyle or new 
religion amalgamation of counterculture ideologies, the “American Christian Movement 
for Life” or MOVE existed as an urban opaque community in Philadelphia from 
approximately 1972 through the mid-1980s. MOVE and it’s alter-ego Vincent Leaphart, 
aka “John Africa,” embraced an unapologetically provocative, often conspiratorial, and 
brazenly proselytistic “back to nature” anarchist ideology that placed the group 
continually at odds with both its neighboring community and governmental actors. 
Though the group did interact with both the surrounding community and local media to 
espouse its beliefs and air grievances, the group maintained a communal structure within 
what would become barricaded properties to which outsiders and government officials 
were vehemently denied access. Community and municipal agency frustration with 
MOVE escalated during its approximately 12 years of existence, culminating in a 
desperate and deadly police assault on a barricaded MOVE row house in May 1985. 
After the smoke cleared, 11 members of MOVE—five of them children—had died, 253 
citizens of Philadelphia were without homes, and 61 houses had burned.204  
As part of its unifying ideology as an opaque community, MOVE neither 
espoused non-violence as a preferred form of social protest nor were its members entirely 
law abiding. Many MOVE adherents were charged with numerous, primarily 
misdemeanor crimes during its existence, though specific members of the group were 
204 John Anderson and Hilary Hevenor, Burning down the House: MOVE and the Tragedy of 
Philadelphia (New York: Norton, 1987), xiv. 
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prosecuted for felonious possession of weapons and destructive devices. Criminal 
violations stemmed mostly from members’ unabashed defense of the group’s beliefs and 
disrespect for governmental authority. During an earlier 1978 police raid on a previous 
MOVE property, suspected shots were fired by MOVE, multiple officers were injured, 
and one policeman was killed under unclear circumstances. Despite this precedent, the 
scope of the 1985 raid, tactical stance, and level of force employed by the Philadelphia 
Police Department appeared vastly disproportionate to the composite threat assessment 
derived from the collective circumstances and law enforcement intelligence available to 
city executives. Of the four felony charges and seven specific crimes for which targeted 
MOVE members were being sought in 1985, the single charge that would seem to justify 
such a massive show of force, possession of explosives—proved baseless. The suspected 
illegal weapons cache at the MOVE residence for which a search warrant was issued was 
likewise never found.205  
After providing a historical background and contextual perspective to the situation 
surrounding MOVE in the lead up to the 1985 raid, this chapter will analyze a number of 
the motivations and assumptions that prompted Philadelphia’s homeland security 
community and political establishment to collectively acquiesce that a violent 
intervention into this opaque community was their only reasonable option. In particular, 
the city’s tendencies to overestimate the threat emanating from MOVE due to its opacity, 
to conjure tenuous legal justifications for intervention while ignoring available 
enforcement inroads and to unnecessarily endanger minors and the surrounding public 
without discernable cause will be explored. Through this examination, the guiding 
framework of collective assumptions and logical biases adopted by Philadelphia’s 
homeland security establishment and directly influenced by the closed nature of the 
MOVE community will emerge.  
1. The Making of John Africa 
The origin of MOVE and its foundational ideology can be traced to an unlikely 
relationship that developed between two men in the Powelton Village neighborhood of 
205 Margot Harry, Attention, MOVE! This Is America! (Chicago: Banner Press, 1987), 36. 
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Philadelphia in the early 1970s: Vincent Leaphart and Donald Glassey. Leaphart, born 
1931 in West Philadelphia, was one of 10 children raised Baptist by a southern immigrant 
handyman and his wife. Illiterate, Leaphart was a high school dropout who, following a 
brief stint in the army and failed and childless marriage in the 1960s, was himself 
working as a handyman and dog walker when he moved to Powelton around 1971.206 
Leaphart’s ideology borrowed in part from ideas regarding the “principles of natural law” 
and vegetarianism espoused by the Kingdom of Yahweh, a Phoenix-based apocalyptic 
sect of followed by his ex-wife.207  
Glassey, the product of a white middle-class upbringing and a recent social work 
master’s degree recipient from nearby University of Pennsylvania, developed a 
relationship with Leaphart. Leaphart’s dictated ideas were captured and organized by 
Glassey in a 300-page “naturalistic” philosophy called The Book of Guidelines, The Book, 
or later, The Teachings of John Africa.208 An early indication of Leaphart’s/John Africa’s 
controversial ideology regarding pests and vermin occurred in winter 1973. The landlord 
of Leaphart’s community housing-owned apartment at 3207 Pearl Street initiated eviction 
proceedings when Leaphart refused to fumigate, arguing that roaches—like people—
were God’s children.209  
It was following this disagreement that Leaphart moved his “family” of 30+ dogs 
and cats to a crumbling mansion, purchased by Donald Glassey and located at 307–309 
North Thirty-third Street in the Powelton Village area of West Philadelphia. There he 
founded the “American Christian Movement for Life” or “Christian Life Movement”—
the name would later be shortened to “MOVE.” According to Glassey, as early as 1972, 
Leaphart took the name “John Africa” to pay homage to “the continent where all life 
began” rather than as a sign of racial solidarity.210 The name would later become 
eponymous with MOVE ideology itself, transcending the direct connection to Leaphart 
206 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 1–2. 
207 Michael Boyette and Randi Boyette, “Let It Burn!:” The Philadelphia Tragedy (Chicago: 
Contemporary Books, 1989), 34. 
208 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 3. 
209 Ibid., 4. 
210 Ibid.. 
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and creating a mythic foundational persona.211 MOVE further obscured its own 
organizational beginnings by refusing to confirm that Leaphart and John Africa were one 
and the same.212 Through adoption of the “Africa” surname, MOVE members 
demonstrated commitment to the philosophical teachings, made a reciprocal gesture of 
group identification, and clearly separated themselves as a distinct and cohesive 
community. MOVE drew an assortment of mostly black adherents from a range of 
socioeconomic backgrounds. Early members included Leaphart’s sisters and their 
children, as well as Delbert Orr, a former Black Panther who had served four years as the 
captain of defense and chief of security for the Panther’s in Chicago and northern 
Illinois.213 
2. MOVE ideology 
MOVE eschewed birth control, encouraged prolific childbearing among female 
members, and elevated children born within MOVE to a unique status. MOVE women 
were expected to deliver their children through natural childbirth accompanied by 
unconventional post-natal practices. Physicians neither monitored pregnancies nor 
attended births, and mothers adopted alternative delivery practices such as biting through 
and eating umbilical cords and licking babies clean of amniotic residue.214 Upon birth, 
MOVE children, unlike MOVE adults, were viewed as pure humans, uncorrupted by the 
“addictions” of the “system lifestyle.”215 Babies did not wear diapers and were allowed 
to freely defecate along with MOVE’s various pets.216 They were fed a purely vegetarian 
diet consisting solely of raw fruits and vegetables and clothed sparingly. Neighbors 
reported seeing MOVE children eating out of garbage cans, some becoming so concerned 
they invited the children into their own homes to provide them with food.217 MOVE 
211 Ibid., 5. 
212 Boyette and Boyette, “Let It Burn!,” 3. 
213 Ibid., 38. 
214 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 9. 
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216 Robin Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction: The City of Philadelphia versus MOVE 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 14. 
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disputed any suggestions of abuse, claiming the children were sufficiently clothed, 
provided a nourishing diet of natural foods, and exhibited less sickness than other 
children in the neighborhood.218  
The lifestyle adopted by MOVE followers delineated them from their surrounding 
community and created touch points for both interpersonal and organizational hostility. 
MOVE members grew their hair out to the fullest length possible in the dreadlock style, 
refused to use soap to bathe, and all wore denim jeans, jackets, and men’s heavy boots. 
Adherents were strict vegetarians and believed strongly in the medicinal qualities of 
garlic consumption. Community support tasks such as child care and grocery shopping, 
along with accompanying titles, such as “Minister of Information” and “Full Naturalist 
Minister” were doled out in communistic fashion.219 Member erected a stage in front of 
the Powelton Villiage house and set up bullhorns from which to deliver frequent, 
amplified, obscenity-filled readings and lectures from The Teachings of John Africa. 
Neighbors who complained were chastised and singled out for denunciation.220  
B. MOVE VERSUS PHILADELPHIA 
MOVE’s belligerent and confrontational posture towards the “system” extended 
to governmental entities as well, which MOVE naturally viewed as personifications of 
the corruptive influence surrounding their enlightened community. Already by 1973, 
encounters between MOVE members and Philadelphia Police had become a common 
occurrence. During a seven-month period from 1973–74, 40 separate MOVE members 
were arrested 150 times—albeit primarily for misdemeanor crimes such as loitering, 
obscenity, or unlawful demonstration—fined a combined $15,000, and given multi-year 
prison sentences. MOVE members were encouraged by the organization to be 
disrespectful to the bench and confrontational in court.221 However, it is noteworthy that 
during the early history of MOVE and in particular prior to the August 1978 raid, MOVE 
218 Ibid. 
219 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 10. 
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221 Ibid., 11. 
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was often characterized as a non-violent organization. Officer Cresci of the Philadelphia 
Police Department’s Civil Affairs Unit later asserted that between 1973 and 76, members 
of MOVE, “other that being vocal,” displayed not even potential violent tendencies.222  
1. The “Problem Neighbor” 
MOVE’s communal residential practices under comparatively unhygienic 
conditions created the first and perhaps most enduring source of contention with city 
homeland security stakeholders. By May 1975, Philadelphia citizens living near MOVE’s 
Powelton Village property had endured over three years of MOVE members keeping 
unvaccinated dogs, strewing garbage and attracting vermin and insects, operating an 
illegal car wash in front of their property, and verbally assaulting neighbors using their 
loudspeakers. Following repeated complaints by neighbors, Philadelphia health and code 
inspectors visited, but were not allowed access to, the MOVE property. MOVE 
eventually adopted a tactic of claiming members would take suicidal action if inspections 
occurred. John Africa’s wife, Alberta Wicker Africa, once stated to reporters, “We will 
not let these inspectors come in and contaminate our environment. If they violate the 
sanctity of our home, we will cycle our children before we let them take the children 
away.”223  
2. Battle Lines are Drawn 
The city did at this point make an attempt to compel MOVE to end its disruptive 
behavior, but it quickly acquiesced when MOVE resisted judicial influence. Beginning in 
September 1975, a Philadelphia solicitor’s office suit charging Glassey with housing, 
health, zoning, fire, and safety code violations, moved through the courts for 11 months. 
This culminated in a July 1976 ruling by the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania upholding a lower court’s order for an inspection of the property. MOVE 
members responded by initiating construction of an eight-foot tall stockade fence. 
Meanwhile, altercations between MOVE and homeland security stakeholders increased in 
222 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 29. 
223 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 15. 
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frequency and severity. On Sunday, March 28 1976, the relationship between MOVE and 
Philadelphia Police degraded following a disturbance call to the Thirty-third Street house. 
A melee ensued after MOVE members, some of whom had been released from prison 
that morning, threw bricks at responding officers. Six officers were injured and six 
MOVE members were arrested for charges including aggravated assault, resisting arrest, 
riot, and reckless endangerment. MOVE alleged that the three-week old son of two 
MOVE members was crushed to death while being carried by his mother when police 
trampled her under unclear circumstances during the response.  
This proved to be a watershed event in the degradation of the city’s relationship 
with MOVE. After initially burying the undocumented child, Life Africa, themselves, 
MOVE members returned the body to the house to display to two city councilmen and a 
local clergy member as evidence of police brutality.224 Because there was neither an 
autopsy conducted to determine the time or cause of death nor even a positive 
identification of the body, police denied the death occurred; others suggest the infant died 
earlier of natural causes and that MOVE exploited the death for additional publicity.225 
On November 9, 1976, Rhonda Africa delivered a boy who died minutes after birth. 
MOVE would allege that the boy’s death was due to Rhonda’s having been beaten by 
police four days earlier when she was arrested while protesting in front of a court where 
other MOVE members were being sentenced. A previous April 1975 miscarriage by 
Alberta Africa was likewise reassessed resulting from police brutality.226 The 
combination of unattended births, rejection of prenatal care, and frequent arrests of 
pregnant MOVE members created an environment of risky pregnancies and childbirths 
under opaque circumstances. However, MOVE was convinced that official actions were 
responsible for any tragedy, leading to a calcification of anti-establishment ideology and 
seemingly manifested belief that the police was determined to kill MOVE children. 
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3. Civic Disobedience Becomes Armed Resistance 
By September 1976, Philadelphia Police were receiving reports that John Africa 
had abandoned social change through peaceful means and that members were undergoing 
training and stockpiling weapons and ammunition in anticipation of a showdown with 
police.227 On May 20, 1977, after MOVE members received mistaken reports that 
sheriff’s deputies were coming to evict members from the Thirty-third Street 
“headquarters,” approximately six MOVE members wearing military-style clothing and 
carrying a variety of small arms and blunt weapons maintained a visible presence in front 
of their barricaded house. After directing amplified harangues at upwards of 200 
responding police and SWAT team members for nine hours, during which one MOVE 
member stated, “the only way they [the police] will come in our headquarters is over our 
dead bodies,” the confrontation ended as police withdrew and MOVE members returned 
to the house.228 MOVE would later allege the action was defensive, not offensive in 
nature, and that the brandished weapons were inoperable and simply displayed as a 
“deterrent.”229 Some days later, however, armed MOVE members would fan out into the 
neighborhood and take position on street corners. It is unknown if Leaphart directed this 
action to foment confrontation or simply gauge the police response to such elevated 
tactics. Police arrested one member and seized his weapon.230 
4. Deferral and Defense 
During a press conference on May 23, the Monday following MOVE’s pledge of 
self-defense, Philadelphia Mayor Frank Rizzo stated that he would not tolerate any 
violence by MOVE, but that in the meantime, he could offer little assistance to MOVE’s 
neighbors, stating, “we’re going to sit and wait it out.”231 The mayor also stated he could 
only send in inspectors from the city’s Licenses and Inspections Department (L&I) with 
police protection but added, “and I’m not sending in police for L&I violations.” City 
227 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 14. 
228 Ibid., 16. 
229 Boyette and Boyette, “Let It Burn!,” 67. 
230 Ibid., 69. 
231 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 18. 
 94 
                                                 
Managing Director Levinson added that the city would not shut of water to compound, 
noting MOVE, “would interpret that as an act of war,” and “the way they would respond 
to an act of war would be to kill their own babies.”232  
Such comments expressed by city executives in the immediate aftermath of the 
first significant altercation between the city and MOVE reveal key underlying 
governmental motivations and perceptions. First, in suggesting he would not utilize 
police to support inspections and enforcement of what were by all indications glaring 
L&I building and health code violations—even given a state supreme court’s affirmation 
of the inspection order to do so—Mayor Rizzo reveals he does not view these 
departments as complementary agents of municipal influence. Though Mayor Rizzo 
perhaps suspected that police escorts of L&I inspectors could have resulted in an 
escalation of MOVE’s posture and violent rhetoric, his choice of words clearly indicate 
the mayor, himself the former Philadelphia Police Commissioner, did not view the 
deployment of officers in a support role to L&I as a judicious use of his law enforcement 
assets. Moreover, his statement seems to reflect a stance that police and L&I activities 
were separate and discreet municipal enforcement functions. By apparently not 
recognizing the police-supported enforcement of L&I infractions as a viable coercive 
tactic and inroad to compelling MOVE to cease its aggravating behavior, Rizzo and the 
city failed to capitalize on a series of clear, legally justifiable, and easily enforceable 
infractions. In doing so, the city both emboldened MOVE through tacit toleration of its 
clearly improper behavior and limited the city’s own future arsenal of legally supportable 
tactical options.  
Additional self-imposed operational limitations were reflected in the comments 
made by Director Levinson. By rejecting the standard tactic of shutting off the Powelton 
property’s water due to a clear contractual violation (i.e., MOVE’s failure to settle its 
utility bill) based on a presumption that MOVE would interpret this as an “act of war” 
illuminates city executives’ enlightened understanding of the MOVE oppositional 
mindset as a besieged organization. However, his apparent belief that MOVE members 
232 Ibid., 19. 
 95 
                                                 
would indeed murder their own children based solely on a disruption of their water 
supply suggests both that the city interpreted MOVE statements literally and assumed 
that even incremental governmental efforts to counter MOVE’s provocations would 
result in drastic and violent response. Though such caution and restraint on the part of 
city officials in the interest of MOVE children is laudable, it likely also indicates city 
officials lent perhaps excessive credence to MOVE threats, allowing their 
disproportionate and likely unfounded concern for child welfare to be exploited by 
MOVE.  
Conversely, repeated skepticism regarding MOVE members’ explicit threats 
towards city officials, politicians, and adjacent neighbors later indicated this concern was 
selectively rather than universally applied. Seven years later in summer 1984, Director 
Brooks would attend a meeting at the FBI Philadelphia office to discuss the possibility of 
federal enforcement of explicit, amplified threats made by MOVE against both city 
officials and the president. Federal officials interpreted such comments as falling within 
MOVE’s 1st Amendment rights to free speech. With specific reference to MOVE’s 
“threat” against the president, this was likely due to case law differences between the 
“‘objective” versus “subjective” interpretations of the relevant statute 18 U.S.C. 
871(a)(1970), according to which most prosecutions have been burdened to prove that a 
reasonable person would need to conclude that the utterance, within the context it was 
issued, constituted a bona fide threat. It would seem that in contrast to city officials, 
federal agencies assessed MOVE’s threats as not sufficiently serious, likely based on 
their awareness that MOVE had frequently issued similar such threats but never acted 
upon them.233 
5. Threat Escalation  
Despite city executives’ apparent overestimation of the actual threat posed by 
MOVE, never had such action taken place in Philadelphia, nor nationally since the Black 
Panthers had stood on the steps of California government buildings in Sacramento 
233 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 108. 
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carrying shotguns 10 years prior.234 A gauntlet had been thrown, as MOVE was now 
openly defying the sovereignty of both the Philadelphia police and the city.  
6. The Siege of MOVE 
Police responded by sandbagging windows of houses across from the MOVE 
property and setting up an access-controlled perimeter in the surrounding streets, greatly 
impacting the surrounding community. Groups both supporting and decrying MOVE 
emerged, and the compound became a symbolic epicenter for anti-establishment 
resistance. A group of concerned citizens, principally composed of landlords with real 
estate interests in the Powelton area, formed the Powelton Emergency Rights Committee 
(PERC) to petition the city to enforce health and housing code violations against MOVE. 
Others would defy the blockage to deliver food and other items to MOVE in symbolic 
support of the group.235  
7. A Federal Informant 
Following the 20 May event, weapons violations and a federal firearms charge 
were levied against MOVE members. A gun taken by deputies from one of the MOVE 
members who had assumed an armed position in the street near the Powelton residence 
was traced through a stolen driver’s license to Donald Glassey. This made his concurrent 
purchase of two shotguns and 200 rounds of ammunition a federal offense, leading the 
BATF to arrest him on June 3.236 Following their investigation, police charged 11 
MOVE members with Pennsylvania weapons code violations.237 Facing a $25,000 bail 
and five-year federal sentence, Glassey cooperated with investigators in exchange for a 
reduced sentence and witness protection and became a police informant on MOVE.  
Glassey reported John Africa was directing MOVE’s actions remotely from 
Chester, Pennsylvania and had become unstable. He further reported MOVE had hidden a 
large arsenal at an unknown location. Federal agents encouraged Glassey to assist them in 
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building a conspiracy case, leading him to convince a fellow MOVE member named Witt 
that Leaphart’s turn towards violence was mistaken and to persuade Witt to assist with 
the recovery and disposal of the arsenal.238 On July 21, 1977, agents conducted 
surveillance on Glassey and Witt as they collected weapons and bomb making materials 
at numerous MOVE locations, eventually arresting them and seizing eight high-powered 
rifles, two shotguns, a handgun, and 100 rounds of ammunition.239 Agents also recovered 
a homemade time bomb, two timer mechanisms with batteries, radio controlled 
electronics, sulfuric and nitric acids, toluene, ammonium hydroxide, chemistry 
equipment, 15 pounds of gunpowder, and sufficient parts to construct numerous 
destructive devices. Military manuals, a copy of The Silencers, Snipers, and Assassins 
Handbook, and chemistry guides were also recovered, and Witt was arrested.240 
Subsequent to this seizure, federal arrest warrants were levied against Vincent 
Leaphart/John Africa and his close adherent Alphonso Robbins aka “Mo” Africa, both of 
whom absconded. Leaphart would continue to direct MOVE from hiding.241 Through the 
next week, Glassey would attempt to draw another co-conspirator named Greg into a 
sting sale of C-4 explosives. Though he eluded ATF efforts, Greg alleged to Glassey that 
MOVE’s ulterior motive was a government extortion plot utilizing the explosives as a 
threat.242 Absconding MOVE member Jeanne Africa also alleged that in June 1977, 
Leaphart and Beowolf Africa were in possession of what appeared to be two pipe bombs, 
which she disposed of on their behalf.243 In 1984, Witt would be found dead floating in 
the Schuylkill River. Though officially ruled a suicide, Leaphart’s sister Louise alleged 
MOVE was responsible.244 
Although this enforcement effort would seem to indicate an amplification of the 
threat stream emanating from MOVE, a few contextual observations are worth noting. 
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Assuming the MOVE members in actual possession of the seized weapons were not 
federally prohibited from possessing a firearm and had fulfilled all state and local 
registration and regulatory mandates, none of the firearms seized were themselves illegal 
or controlled.245 Aside from the single assembled device, the remaining manuals, 
chemicals, and materials—though unsettling and highly suspicious given the collective 
set of circumstances—were likewise legal in unassembled form. More importantly, the 
existence and location of all seized items were apparently known to and accessible by 
Mr. Glassey, who himself had obtained the originally seized firearms through fraudulent 
means. It was therefore plausible that despite his assertions that MOVE and, more 
specifically, Leaphart had directed him to assemble this weapons cache on the group’s 
behalf, Glassey himself may have assembled and constructed this arsenal at his own 
initiative or as part of a limited rather than organizationally contrived conspiratorial 
effort. Given his motivation to satisfy the enforcement goals of federal law enforcement 
and fulfill his plea bargain obligations, Glassey may have felt compelled during the 
summer of 1977 to vaunt MOVE’s alleged arsenal and inflate perceptions regarding the 
group’s violent capabilities. Though a criminal conspiracy is presumed, the fact that other 
MOVE members were not themselves found to possess exclusive access to the seized 
weapons or destructive devices at least makes feasible the possibility that Glassey, rather 
than the organization, was solely responsible for assembling and maintaining this cache. 
Four years later, one other MOVE member would admit involvement, but Leaphart’s 
involvement role in ordering the assembly of a weapons cache would never be proven.  
Already at this point in Philadelphia’s response to MOVE, the city was beginning 
to incur costs incommensurate with both the size and threat posed by the community. The 
Philadelphia Daily News estimated that police surveillance of the MOVE compound 
following the May 20 altercation cost the city $1.25 million, most of it for police 
overtime pay.246 In addition, the Philadelphia Inquirer conducted a study that determined 
between 1975 and 78, there had been over 250 trials involving MOVE members, many 
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27 Code of Federal Regulations Part 178. The right to bear arms is otherwise protected by the 2nd 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  
246 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 20. 
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protracted due to MOVE’s belligerent tactics, which had delayed the timely resolution of 
2,000 unrelated cases, costing taxpayers at least $250,000.247  
8. A Broken Truce 
The city responded on March 1, 1978 by obtaining permission to blockade the 
MOVE compound at 309 North Thirty-Third Street based on unpaid utility bills and 
blockage of access to L&I inspectors. Construction of a four-block blockage began 
following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the order, which finally 
included shutting off gas and water to the residence. MOVE, having stockpiled 
provisions, dug in and a stalemate ensued for the next 52 days. Finally, on May 3, the city 
reached a 10-point compromise: MOVE would turn over any remaining weapons and 
police would be allowed to search the compound. It would also allow police to arrest any 
members with outstanding warrants.248 In return, 18 incarcerated members of MOVE 
would be released on their own recognizance, and MOVE would have 90 days to vacate 
the property by August 1, 1978, at which point all outstanding charges would be dropped 
from the released members.249 The agreement was initially successful: police seized 
numerous weapons from the house, all of them inoperable, and fingerprinted and 
photographed all those residing at the house.250 
Unfortunately, this first truly conciliatory agreement between the city and MOVE 
would not last. Attempts to find an alternative, preferably rural domicile for MOVE were 
unsuccessful; MOVE rejected an alternative property in north Philadelphia as unsuitable. 
When members failed to appear in court following the 90-day deadline, arrest warrants 
for 21 members were signed stipulating the police would have 10 days to secure the 
arrests.251 MOVE ignored the order, contesting both municipal and judicial authority, and 
continued its provocative rhetoric alleging officially sanctioned racism, harassment, and 
prejudice. MOVE’s non-compliance evolved into a confrontation on 8 August 1978, as 
247 Ibid., 23. 
248 Boyette and Boyette, “Let It Burn!,” 84. 
249 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 24. 
250 Boyette and Boyette, “Let It Burn!,” 85. 
251 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 25. 
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officers congregated at the compound to enforce warrants in an operation that had been 
planned from mid-July.252  
9. Assault on Powelton Village 
Beginning at approximately 4:30 a.m., a force of policemen and firefighters, 
which would eventually number 300, assembled near the compound. Because police 
presumed all weapons had been removed when the truce was finalized and as police had 
not permitted anyone to enter the property since, officers believed there would be no 
armed resistance.253 MOVE activated its loudspeakers, and member Chuckie Africa 
stated, “You’re trying to kill breastfeeding mothers and breastfeeding children. We’re not 
backing down. If you want us out, you’ll have to bring us out dead,” and, “tell the world 
[Mayor] Rizzo killed black babies for a health violation.”254 At 6:04 a.m., police gave 
MOVE two minutes to vacate their domicile. MOVE retreated to the basement, ignoring 
repeated additional deadlines. A gun was briefly spotted from a basement window. 
Firemen then began spraying water into the basement, and because the windows were 
only three feet from the basement floor, it was assumed no occupants would be in danger 
of drowning.255 At approximately 8:15 a.m., shots were fired and two policemen fell to 
the ground. One of those shot, Officer James Ramp, would later succumb to his wounds. 
After gunfire subsided, firemen continued to blast water into the house for another half 
hour, filling the basement. Finally, at approximately 8:35 a.m., MOVE children emerged, 
followed by adults carrying infants.256 
10. Trial and Convictions 
All told, five policemen and four firemen sustained gunshot wounds, including 
the fatality, and six additional officers and firefighters had received other injuries. One 
MOVE member was shot in the arm. Eleven MOVE members were arrested and charged 
252 Ibid., 28. 
253 Boyette and Boyette, “Let It Burn!,” 91. 
254 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 30. 
255 Boyette and Boyette, “Let It Burn!,” 95. 
256 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 35. 
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with murder. Police found two .45 caliber pistols, two 12-gauge shotguns, a Mauser, and 
six carbines in the in the house.257 None of the defendants’ fingerprints were found on 
any of the weapons, nor were any defendants charged with illegal possession of 
weapons.258 Though police originally claimed that MOVE had a cache of automatic 
weapons in the basement, no corroborating evidence could be presented, nor could police 
prove that any MOVE members displayed weapons while surrendering.259 After 
searching the property and with previously obtained judicial authorization in hand, police 
bulldozed the feces polluted, vermin-infested compound the same day.260 However, the 
District Attorney’s Office had known nothing of the planned demolition and was 
outraged its evidence had just been destroyed.261 Papers lauded the restraint shown by 
police. Nine MOVE members abandoned their right to a jury trial and acted as their own 
counsel in a judge trial. The raucous trial, during which multiple MOVE members were 
repeatedly ejected and on one occasion instigated a courtroom brawl, was shifted to a 
defense by backup counsel. On May 8, 1980, based primarily on circumstantial evidence 
and proof that the .232-caliber Ruger Mini-14 used to kill Officer Ramp had been linked 
to a MOVE member and found at the scene, all 11 were eventually found guilty as 
charged and issued sentences ranging from 30 to 100 years in prison.262 MOVE claimed 
that Ramp was a victim of “friendly fire,” that the murder weapon was planted to frame 
the group, and that the house was demolished to destroy the exonerating evidence.263 A 
concurrent police brutality assault trial against three policemen accused of beating 
Delbert Africa during the raid was summarily dismissed by the judge, adding to MOVE’s 
outrage.264 
257 Boyette and Boyette, “Let It Burn!,” 99. 
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C. POST-POWELTON 
Numerous aspects of the 8 August police raid shed light on the diverging 
interpretative frameworks held by each party, likely exacerbated by the lack of an 
effective communication mechanism between the city and MOVE. Though MOVE 
clearly defied the stipulations of the truce ending the police blockade by not relocating to 
a new property, this was the only portion of the truce that was violated. MOVE had 
allowed police to search the Powelton property to confirm that MOVE neither maintained 
a weapons cache nor possessed other contraband. Though subsequent to this search 
MOVE could have (and apparently did) obtain weapons during the 90-day grace period, 
there was no discernible suspicion the group was seeking violent altercation. By not 
providing subsidized relocation assistance, the city was also de facto requiring destitute 
MOVE members, themselves shunned by the rest of the community and unlikely to find 
willing landlords, to opt for homelessness rather than remain entrenched. In addition, the 
massive show of force in a cramped inner-city venue could itself have both terrified 
ensconced MOVE members frightened for their children’s safety and caused tactically 
avoidable crossfire hazards. There is likewise no indication police attempted to arrest 
sought MOVE members individually away from the compound, which may have 
prevented the barricaded subject scenario. It seems more likely that police were 
simultaneously outraged at MOVE’s defiance and default on the city’s generously 
negotiated terms and convinced that actual violent tendencies accompanied MOVE’s 
rhetoric and showmanship.  
1. MOVE Moves 
The mystery of Vincent Leaphart/John Africa’s whereabouts was resolved on 
May 13, 1981. Unbeknownst to Philadelphia authorities, in spring 1977, MOVE 
members including Leaphart had acquired seven low-value properties in Rochester, New 
York and continued to live according to MOVE’s ascetic ideology under assumed names. 
Evidence suggests Leaphart had directed MOVE’s core in Philadelphia from here, 
including his imposition of a plan for armed resistance if police attempted to storm the 
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Powelton residence by force.265 ATF agents eventually tracked Leaphart to this location, 
arresting him on bomb making and eight other members on various separate charges. 
Again, no weapons were found at any of the MOVE properties.266 During Leaphart’s 
trial, convicted MOVE member Samuel Sanders testified that he had constructed bombs 
found during the 1978 ATF sting at Leaphart’s direction and planted bomb threat at a 
Philadelphia motel in 1977.267 Glassey likewise testified that though originally non-
violent, Leaphart had ordered the group to arm itself in September 1976 in anticipation of 
a confrontation with police. In October that year, Glassey and other MOVE members 
allegedly placed timing devices and delivered bomb threats in hotels nationwide—
reportedly as well as in London—in furtherance of an extortion attempted conceived by 
Leaphart and grounded on the appearance that MOVE controlled a vast underground 
structure.268 He further stated that Leaphart assembled a meeting shortly before the 1977 
“guns on the porch day” to announce a police confrontation was imminent. Refuting 
evidence was presented that suggested the bombs were entirely an ATF entrapment and 
that the bomb making conspiracy was limited to Glassey, Sanders, and two other MOVE 
members. On July 22, 1981, after five and a half days of deliberations, the jury found 
Leaphart innocent on all counts.269 
Following his acquittal, Leaphart again went underground. With the Powelton 
Village property demolished and Rochester properties effectively disabled, the remaining 
MOVE members sought a new domicile. The new MOVE headquarters was 6221 Osage 
Avenue, a three-story row house located in a middle-class West Philadelphia 
neighborhood occupied by Leaphart’s sister Louise and her son Frank Jr. Since 1980–81, 
children of several of the members convicted of the 1978 standoff had been harbored at 
the residence.270 It now became the de facto home for a fluctuating number of MOVE 
265 Ibid., 81. 
266 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 50. 
267 Ibid., 51. 
268 Ibid.; Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 31. 
269 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 53–54; Boyette and Boyette, “Let It Burn!,” 
113. 
270 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 55–56. 
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adherents and children of around a dozen. Just as in Powelton Village, MOVE’s 
disruptive lifestyle habits began to impact adjacent neighbors, and beginning in fall 1983, 
a series of altercations between MOVE members and their neighbors led to violent 
assaults. In the fall of 1983, MOVE began its last campaign of defiance, demanding 1) 
the unconditional release of all imprisoned MOVE members, and 2) a cessation of all 
harassment of MOVE by the city.271 In December 1983, MOVE again installed a 
loudspeaker system and reinstituted its obscenity-filled tirades calling for the release of 
all incarcerated MOVE members. During the summer and fall of 1984, amplified 
harangues were conducted for six to eight hours daily.272 After enduring harassment and 
her being victim to a series of beatings by Frank, directed from afar by Leaphart, Louise 
James abandoned 6221 Osage to the group in October 1983.273 
2. Mayor Goode’s Appeasement Campaign 
On April 13, 1984, a city Water Department employee was dispatched to 6221 
Osage to turn off the water for nonpayment of utilities. A policeman on scene advised 
that this was a MOVE house, but refused to provide back up to allow the employee to 
safely approach the residence. Despite the lessons learned at the Powelton property, this 
would be the last attempt to disconnect water to the 6221 Osage residence by the city.274 
After a MOVE member was spotted on the roof with a shotgun on May 3, police were 
dispatched and a stalemate ensued for an hour and a half, ending when the gunman 
retreated to the house. Note that this display occurred while another MOVE member was 
being interviewed in front of the house by a TV news crew, suggesting the display was 
designed to garner press attention to the movement.275 At a press conference, newly 
elected Mayor Goode stated, “We do not want to do anything that will cause an 
271 Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission, The Findings, Conclusions, 19. 
272 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 33. 
273 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 58–59. 
274 Ibid., 59. 
275 Harry, Attention, MOVE! This Is America!, 31. 
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unnecessary confrontation…I prefer to have dirt and some smell than to have 
bloodshed.”276 
Beginning in mid-May, MOVE initiated weekend-long, 24-hour loudspeaker 
harangues, disturbing neighbors and nearly provoking a melee. During a May 28 meeting 
with Mayor Goode, outraged Osage Avenue residents demanded action by the city, 
asking Goode what could be done about MOVE. Mayor Goode responded, “[his] only 
concern is the MOVE kids,” and that he would, during the coming days, research the 
legal basis for city action, noting he did not want to, “in an unprepared manner, end up 
with a confrontation on that street that would cause the loss of lives, that would have 
innocent people, perhaps, injured or lose their lives and property damaged 
unnecessarily.”277 
During a May 30, 1984 meeting between city officials, Assistant U.S. Attorney 
(AUSA) Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., and FBI and U.S. Secret Service officials at his office, 
Mayor Goode proposed that MOVE was perhaps a federal problem. The AUSA found no 
grounds for a federal response, noting that the threats did not constitute federal violations 
and that though there existed a federal warrant for John Africa’s arrest, his presence at the 
Osage residence was unconfirmed. AUSA Dennis went a step further, promising Goode 
that his office would be monitoring any confrontation between the city and MOVE to 
ensure the group’s civil rights were not violated.278  
The Goode administration then approached Philadelphia District Attorney Rendell 
for a legal opinion on intervention. He responded on June 22 that an arrest warrant 
already existed for Frank James Africa and urged Mayor Goode that prompt action, 
coordinated across the city departments, would be preferable to a delayed response. 
Included in the memo was the assessment that, “unfortunately the most sustainable 
charges are misdemeanors,” and “if convicted…most MOVE members would not be 
given substantial jail sentences.”279 In grand jury testimony three years later, Goode 
276 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 59. 
277 Ibid., 61. 
278 Boyette and Boyette, “Let It Burn!,” 129. 
279 Harry, Attention, MOVE! This Is America!, 30–31. 
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would concede that the reason the city did not then have signed warrants to effect arrests 
was because Goode himself had made no efforts to seek them.280 Meanwhile, 
Philadelphia Police Department (PD) had already warned state parole agents against 
attempting to serve the warrant at 6221 Osage; agents were instructed to only attempt 
arrest “on the street” and the warrant was never executed.281 A Philadelphia PD captain 
went so far as to say that if parole attempted an arrest, the PD would not provide 
assistance.282  
Interestingly, these actions and statements by both the District Attorney’s (DA) 
Office and the mayor indicated a generalized reluctance to pursue legal action in summer 
1984. DA Rendell would later speak of a “subjunctive mood...with regards to the 
warrant,” noting the “memo did not ripen into arrest warrants” at that time.283 Mayor 
Goode indicated the decision at hand was not whether legal basis existed, but whether 
confrontation with MOVE, “over 1 or 2 warrants and…what they [the district attorney’s 
office] regard[ed] as misdemeanors.”284 He noted this might simply provoke MOVE and 
fail to solve the neighborhood’s problems.285 This could be seen as an official desire for a 
“silver bullet” solution to MOVE, combined with a strong reluctance to confront the 
group with anything less than a legal panacea; combined, this constituted an unlikely pipe 
dream that created self-imposed tactical constraints. This reluctance was mirrored in 
statements made by Rendell regarding a May 7, 1985 meeting at which the decision was 
made to prepare warrants for the MOVE “Mother’s Day” operation; Rendell would later 
recall, “There was almost a dread in that room so thick you could have cut it with a 
knife.”286  
280 Boyette and Boyette, “Let It Burn!,” 131. 
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As the summer bore on, the city’s reluctance to take action against MOVE 
calcified. During a July 4 meeting with impacted constituents, Mayor Goode advised the 
city would provide alternative recreation facilities and psychological counseling to 
neighborhood children who were forced to hear MOVE harangues and were intimidated 
by the property. Osage Avenue residents were incredulous.287 This once-a-week 
counseling, initiated the next month, was the only official assistance provided to the 
impacted neighbors until the city finally raided the property.288 Police officials advised 
utility workers to avoid four separate MOVE domiciles unless there was an emergency, 
and city L&I workers were cautioned from attempting inspections at the 6221 Osage 
property without executive management approval.289 In an apparent repeat of the 1978 
actions taken by the Rizzo administration, no city department wanted to take unilateral 
action against MOVE for fear of altercation or reprisal, while the administration itself 
failed to orchestrate unified efforts through wholly available means. As a homeland 
security challenge, MOVE had become a localized problem, encapsulated within a closed 
compound, which officials preferred to monitor, excuse, and try best to ignore rather than 
seek a new trajectory to the city’s relationship with this group.  
Anticipating further antagonistic action in symbolic support of their incarcerated 
brethren, Philadelphia officials prepared for the six-year anniversary of the 1978 raid. On 
August 6, 1984, over 300 police and firefighters gathered near the 6221 Osage property 
to prepare for any retaliatory action by MOVE. Anticipating potential violence following 
the sighting of an armed member on the roof, Philadelphia police had already conceived a 
plan to breach the rooftop using fire hoses and entry explosives and insert tear gas into 
the residence as a contingency, but MOVE restricted its activities to continued verbal 
tirades.290 The next morning, confronted by the frightened next-door neighbor who had 
287 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 69. 
288 Boyette and Boyette, “Let It Burn!,” 142. 
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been threatened by MOVE the previous evening, Philadelphia Managing Director Brooks 
stated in reference to the MOVE situation, “only an act of God could change this.”291 
3. The Osage Avenue Fortress 
Beginning in October 1984, police officially confirmed reports that MOVE was 
fortifying the 6221 Osage property with a wooden emplacement on its roof. MOVE 
members openly brought tree trunks, pipes, and steel sheets into the residence throughout 
the fall and winter. Though Managing Director Brooks reportedly did not believe 
MOVE’s fortifications constituted, “a criminal act for which you can attack,” Police 
Commissioner Sambor viewed a failure to act as dangerous, noting that he had arrest 
warrants for two confirmed residents of the property. On April 29, 1985, threats to kill 
the mayor emanated from MOVE’s loudspeakers, and neighbors reported seeing armed 
men on the rooftop position. According to one press article, there were 12 MOVE adults 
and children living at the property at this time, along with 15–30 dogs and cats.292  
On April 30, Osage Avenue neighbors hosted their first and only news 
conference, appealing to Pennsylvania Governor Thornburgh to intercede and offer the 
protection the city was apparently unable or unwilling to provide.293 The challenge pitted 
opposing parties against one another, as Thornburgh, a popular Republican, was being 
invited into a Democratic mayor’s backyard. MOVE responded with amplified threats 
against Goode, the police, and the neighbors and their children, including claims that they 
had wired adjoining properties with explosives that MOVE would detonate if attacked.294 
As complaints from residents grew, accompanied by political liabilities, official 
frustration with MOVE intensified. City Press Secretary Karen Warrington reported the 
city was unable to respond, “unless the MOVE persons break a law.”295 Mayor Goode 
contended he could determine no  
291 Ibid., 77. 
292 Ibid., 79–80. 
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violations on which we can make arrests…I don’t have anything to hope 
for at this point…I’ve said that I cannot, in order to protect the rights of a 
group of people, violate the rights of a single person to do that. And my 
big concern is that I don’t have a legal basis at this point to remove the 
problem from the neighborhood.296  
When asked if he would act against MOVE if able, Goode replied, “the answer is yes. Do 
I wish I had a way? The answer is yes. Do I at this point? The answer is no.”297 In a 
subsequent radio interview, Goode simply stated, “there is no legal basis for arresting 
MOVE members.”298  
4. A Decision to Act 
By May 2, 1985, Goode had concluded that violent conflict between MOVE and 
its neighbors was likely, and he instructed District Attorney Rendell to determine the 
necessary legal justifications for official action against MOVE. Editorials lambasted the 
mayoral inaction and called for official intervention.299 During the previous days, MOVE 
had completed its fortified rooftop bunker, pushing it forward to give the group an 
unrestricted line of fire over the entire street.300 On May 8, Philadelphia Councilwoman 
Joan Specter railed against MOVE’s $1,500+ in unpaid utility bills stating, “It is 
outrageous that this city is being held hostage by MOVE, but it is even more outrageous 
that city residents are unwittingly subsidizing those terrorists.”301 The label was not 
entirely exaggerated, as in 1982, among other offenses, MOVE member Carlos Africa 
was convicted of making terroristic threats.302 Again, Mayor Goode seemed unable to 
identify an enforcement inroad, stating,  
The issue is whether or not the people who live in that house can continue 
to remain there…Yes, we can turn the water off. Yes, we can probably 
296 Ibid., 81, 83. 
297 Ibid., 83.  
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turn off electricity, but that’s not going to solve the problem the neighbors 
are faced with out there.303  
He added publicly on May 10, “one ought [not] to engage in violent confrontation over a 
code violation.”304  
Though police attention was not being dedicated to support of L&I inspectors, 
warrant services, or—apparently—investigations into threats of violence and assault and 
battery complaints, significant efforts to monitor MOVE were undertaken. For the two 
years prior to the May 13 raid, the Civil Affairs Unit and Major Investigations Division, 
the Philadelphia Police Department’s intelligence organ, kept the 6221 Osage Avenue 
property under continual surveillance. During later MOVE Commission hearings, the 
police would report that they had kept record of the number of MOVE meetings held 
dating back to 1973, protocols of the group’s demonstrations, and assessments of 
MOVE’s capabilities. Officers reported that through assistance from MOVE’s neighbors, 
they were aware of MOVE’s daily movements at Osage Ave.305 However, the MOVE 
Commission would also determine that these intelligence gathering efforts were 
uncoordinated and insufficient, and that, “the police did nothing to establish the means 
for the systematic collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence information 
regarding MOVE and its members.”306 Though the city’s inability to deal with MOVE 
was therefore obviously not due to a lack of willingness to dedicate resources to the 
problem, it likewise failed to fully exploit and share the situational awareness information 
it did possess for tactical and contingency planning efforts. 
At a May 3 meeting of city executives, current options were discussed. 
Speculative police surveillance was presented that indicated explosives stolen from 
Chester, Pennsylvania might have been brought to the Osage Ave. property and that 
MOVE members might have placed these in tunnels dug under the residence—tunnels 
303 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 88. 
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305 Harry, Attention, MOVE! This Is America!, 26. 
306 Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission, The Findings, Conclusions, 31. 
 111 
                                                 
that planners believed MOVE members might also use to escape the property.307 Both 
Rendell and Goode later noted that the Chester County reports and associated speculation 
dominated the talks.308 Such conspiratorial allegations were not unprecedented and had 
in fact previously been circulated by MOVE itself to inflate the group’s image and bolster 
its alleged capabilities. For instance, during a January 25, 1983 meeting with ATF 
officials to demand federal attention to the plight of its incarcerated compatriots, MOVE 
members alleged the existence of a MOVE underground offshoot called “M-1.” MOVE 
claimed that although the mainline community was non-violent, M-1 was not under 
MOVE organizational control and could be expected to “take actions” if MOVE was 
threatened or release demands were not met.309 On May 5, the District Attorney’s office 
interviewed 19 Osage Avenue neighbors in support of search and arrest warrants. Though 
there was sworn testimony that MOVE had stockpiled weapons, no evidence of 
explosives was presented except for allegations that MOVE boasted of possession and 
intention to use them.310 Finally, on May 7, Mayor Goode held a meeting and authorized 
Commissioner Sambor to plan and execute an enforcement operation.  
On May 11, Judge Lynne M. Abraham signed the arrest warrants for four MOVE 
members known to reside at the 6221 Osage Ave. residence: Frank James Africa, Conrad 
Hampton Africa, Ramona Johnson Africa, and Theresa Brooks Africa. The four were 
charged with seven crimes, four of which were felonies, including criminal conspiracy, 
riot, improper influence in official matters, and possession of explosives. The judge also 
prepared a separate warrant authorizing police to search for the suspected cache of illegal 
weapons and explosives.311 Together, these documents provided the legal basis for the 
operation at the MOVE Osage Ave. compound. Previously, on May 9, Commissioner 
Sambor had approved police plans to obtain additional firepower from a local gun shop, 
307 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 35; Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission, 
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including three Browning Automatic Rifles, a M-60 machine gun, and a 20mm antitank 
gun.312 
5. MOVE Children Fall Through the Cracks 
Through the continual police surveillance, authorities knew that MOVE took the 
children daily to nearby Cobbs Creek Park to play and exercise, leaving and returning at 
the same time. Mayor Goode later claimed that he instructed police to remove MOVE 
children from the property as soon as possible, though Commissioner Sambor recalled 
that he received no orders to recover minors until May 10 when he received legal 
authority to do so.313 Due to problems with the dispatch of this order, on May 11, the 
civil affairs officer assigned to oversee the Osage property allowed at least two MOVE 
children past a police barricade, from which point on MOVE detected the pending 
confrontation and confined the children to the house.314 Philadelphia’s human services 
commissioner, Irene Pernsley, would testify before the commission that she was not 
advised of the issue with the MOVE children until May 9, when Commissioner Sambor 
called to direct her agency to place the MOVE children in protective custody until after 
the operation. Pernsley noted, however, that her agency had no authority to secure the 
children, asking, “On what basis it was being proposed that the children be picked up, 
inasmuch as we only operate on the basis of reports and allegations of neglect and abuse 
of children.”315 Unbelievably, as she would later report to the commission, during her 
entire tenure, Pernsley had received not one single report alleging abuse or neglect of the 
MOVE children at 6221 Osage. On May 9, the city solicitor’s office instructed the police 
to take the children into protective custody at the earliest opportunity. However, the 
solicitor’s office did not attempt to secure the enabling legal authority until the morning 
of 13 May, at which time it was too late to do so.316  
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Admittedly, there were indications that members of MOVE, in fulfilling the 
group’s extreme anti-establishment doctrinal beliefs, were perhaps employing child 
rearing techniques that were detrimental to early child development, if not outright 
neglectful. The story of Oyewolffe Ward, aka “Birdie” Africa, personifies this 
phenomenon. In January 1979, Birdie’s estranged father, Andino Ward, sought to regain 
custody from the boy’s mother Rhonda, herself a stalwart MOVE adherent. Rhonda had 
relocated with Birdie to a separate domicile referred to as “The Seed of Wisdom” in 
Richmond, Virginia, where two MOVE women cared for over a dozen children. 
Neighbors claimed the children bore distended bellies, slept on pallets, and were often 
seen sucking the yolks out of raw eggs.317 Richmond welfare officials obtained a court 
order to view the children’s birth certificates and compel a doctor’s examination, which 
led the women to barricade the house for the next nine months. The women were 
eventually arrested and the children briefly moved to foster homes before the women 
returned them to Philadelphia. A Virginia judge would later give custody of the children 
to the state, though they were never returned.318 Rhonda, extradited to Philadelphia from 
Richmond in August 1978 for charges related to the June 1977 public display of weapons 
event, though facing incarceration, refused to reveal the location of their son.319 At 
seven, Birdie was illiterate and could not even read a watch; the only word he could spell: 
MOVE.320 Andino abandoned his attempts at gaining legal custody after MOVE 
members stated they would “cycle” Birdie before relinquishing him to the courts: the 
group claimed they would never give up a MOVE child to “the System.”321 
D. THE FLAWED OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Philadelphia officials exhibited numerous indicators that their collective 
operational frameworks regarding MOVE were unnecessarily restrictive and strategically 
myopic. In particular, decision making regarding child removal options and actions, 
317 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 42. 
318 Boyette and Boyette, “Let It Burn!,” 114–115. 
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320 Ibid., 28, 39. 
321 Ibid., 39. 
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estimations regarding threats emanating from MOVE, tactical options available to law 
enforcement, and the severity ascribed to MOVE’s unsubstantiated rhetoric indicate 
flaws in officials’ stance toward the community.    
1. Child Custody Confusion 
Though such visibly unsettling childcare practices, apparent nurturing 
deficiencies, and tacit threats by MOVE members were undoubtedly unconventional and 
austere, these practices had not, during the history of MOVE, been found to be abusive or 
illegal by governmental agencies. Official concern for these children’s wellbeing was 
understandable and justified given their environs within the various MOVE compounds, 
frequent incarceration of their parents, and potential uncertainties regarding incidence of 
unattended births or legal custody of the various minors.  
Curiously, although a concern for MOVE children was one of the issues cited as 
having prompted official intervention into the community, it does not appear that 
Philadelphia officials were diligent in obtaining the legal basis for child removal and/or 
protective actions, up to and including the period immediately preceding dynamic entry 
operation into the Osage Avenue property. This negligence is contrasted by police 
deliberations undertaken by former commissioner O’Neil prior to the 1978 Powelton 
assault, who testified that he based tactical plans “on a premise that the children were 
hostages.”322 
The fact that the city’s human services director was not engaged by city 
executives to determine the status of child protective efforts until days before a major 
police intervention reveal this well-meaning but pragmatically and legally tenuous 
official interest, particularly given the mayor’s aforementioned claim on 28 May that 
MOVE children were his “only concern.” Mayor Goode’s recollection that he instructed 
Commissioner Sambor to secure the minor occupants of the Osage residence on 7 May 
likewise reflect either misunderstanding of existing legal process or complete failure to 
consider a holistic solution to the perceived MOVE threat. The MOVE Commission 
would later also fault city officials with not taking action against MOVE’s blatant 
322 Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission, The Findings, Conclusions, 17. 
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disregard for truancy laws by not requiring MOVE children to attend school.323 
Inattention to the available opportunities for ensuring child protection—including the 
apparently well-known option of securing the children on their way back from a nearby 
park prior to the police siege of 6221 Osage—reinforce this lack of official due diligence.  
2. The Overinflated Threat 
Collectively, these deliberations indicate a degree of desperation that existed 
within the ranks of Philadelphia’s executive leadership at this juncture with regard to the 
available legal justification for enforcement actions against MOVE. The juxtaposition of 
alleged conspiratorial behavior by MOVE that drew intense executive attention as 
compared to well-established and exigent violations that did not is, however, revealing. 
First, any attempts at connecting reports of stolen explosives with MOVE, ostensibly 
corroborated by unsubstantiated assertions by MOVE’s neighbors that the group was 
stockpiling weapons, were speculative at best. The fact that the mayor’s inner leadership 
circle dedicated significant attention to discussion of such unconfirmed suspicions 
regarding MOVE suggest that the city was prone to worst-case scenario cognitive bias 
with regard to the group. Both police and the Department of Water would later testify that 
sewers had been inspected prior to May 13 for escape tunnels and none were found.324 
The previous lack of weapon violations committed by other MOVE members, the failure 
to discover the alleged arsenal at the Powelton property during the 1978 raid, and the lack 
of hard evidence presented during Leaphart’s 1981 trial regarding explosives conspiracies 
would seem to suggest that despite its bravado, MOVE was not interested or capable of 
pursing military demolition tactics. Why such refuting evidence was not given greater 
credence during such late-stage deliberations is unknown.  
3. Tactical Myopia 
Both at this late stage in planning and repeatedly during earlier press conferences, 
Mayor Goode seemed blind to alternative enforcement inroads that were readily available 
323 Harry, Attention, MOVE! This Is America!, 32. 
324 Ibid., 134. 
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to his administration. Well prior to this juncture, two MOVE members residing at 6221 
Osage had current, outstanding arrest warrants that could have been acted on by 
Philadelphia Police. Why police at a minimum did not pursue plans to arrest both 
subjects away from the residence and thus remove two known agitators from the Osage 
compound prior to the assault is unknown. The city had already telegraphed its intentions 
to MOVE through previous large-scale deployments, and, by this stage, fears of further 
agitating the group seemed moot. In addition, the city has tacitly tolerated MOVE’s non-
payment of financial obligations, eschewing both its options to discontinue utility service 
and to fully pursue MOVE through civil or administrative means.  
Just as former Mayor Rizzo and Director Levinson self-imposed operational 
limitations by neglecting to utilize police to augment L&I inspections, Mayor Goode’s 
administration seemed blind to the potential use of alternative means of enforcement and 
creation of legal precedent for official intervention. The MOVE Commission would later 
criticize this policy of inaction, noting in reference to the mayor’s dismissal of the 
MOVE problem as solely a “police matter” that “the Commissioners of Licenses & 
Inspections, Human Services, Water and Health each adopted, without questions this 
‘hands off’ attitude. Not a single city commissioner ever questions the Mayor or the 
Managing Director about the rationale for this policy.”325 In doing so, the city found 
itself in a situation of perceived amplified threat in which it was politically and 
operationally compelled to act but had not yet constructed a legal foundation for 
intervention through enforcement of incremental, albeit “superficial” infractions that—
had they been pursued—may have resulted in clear judicial substantiation for 
prosecutorial efforts.  
Outside of these enforcement inroads available to, but not pursued by, city 
officials was the possibility for civil torts against MOVE by both the city and the 
surrounding neighborhood. In February and March 1985, approximately 30 of MOVE’s 
neighbors had organized themselves into “The United Residents of the 6200 Block of 
Osage Avenue” in an effort to protest MOVE’s presence and compel action by city 
325 Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission, The Findings, Conclusions, 23. 
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officials.326 The United Residents offered to locate an alternative domicile for MOVE 
outside Philadelphia, “where they can live as they wish,” but did not seek civil action. 
Though 15 neighbors did meet with an attorney on the morning of 11 May and agreed to 
file a civil suit seeking to compel the city to fully enforce the laws against MOVE, such 
action was obviously too late to prevent the tragic raid two days later.327 Had the city 
itself pursued MOVE in civil court, it may have obtained compensatory rulings that 
might have progressed into asset forfeiture proceedings or alternative injunctions, 
creating legally firm grounds on which to intervene into the organization itself rather than 
individual members. Here again, it seems both governmental and private parties were 
blind to such legally accessible options for reigning in MOVE’s intimidating and 
disruptive behavior, thereby allowing the conflict to escalate to a point where neither 
MOVE nor the city felt that any resolution except through open confrontation was 
possible.  
By this point in the ongoing organizational dispute between MOVE and the City 
of Philadelphia, city officials seemed conditioned to both view MOVE as a larger-than-
life threat and one with which an all-encompassing and absolute “final solution” rather 
than a limited and progressively more intrusive confrontation was inevitable. Though 
MOVE’s rhetoric was confrontational and laden with threats of violence and despite the 
fact that previous enforcement action had established weapons acquisition efforts by 
individual members, city officials categorically ignored legally supported, incremental 
enforcement opportunities. This strategy was tantamount to appeasement of MOVE’s 
transgressions, a course of action that likely emboldened MOVE into further 
antagonizing the government and its surround community in support of efforts to secure 
judicial redress for its incarcerated membership. Furthermore, by allowing the perennial, 
simmering confrontation to escalate to the point where MOVE had effectively barricaded 
itself in preparation for large scale governmental enforcement action, the city created a 
self-fulfilling prophesy by necessitating a significant use of police force and firepower in 
support of any enforcement actions taken against the group.  
326 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 79. 
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4. Taking MOVE at Their Word 
In the absence of reliable information obtained from a cooperating member of 
MOVE or a well-placed confidential informant within the community, police and city 
officials’ ability to assess the threat posed by MOVE was informed only by their 
observations and MOVE’s rhetoric. With regard to the latter, MOVE’s rhetoric was 
prolific, obscenity-filled, and broadcast loudly via its public address system at both the 
Powelton and Osage Avenue properties. MOVE would later claim it employed, 
“strategized profanity to expose the profane circumstances of the system’s injustice.”328 
Because they had no visibility on MOVE’s capabilities or true intentions, outside of the 
threats delivered in expletive-laden tirades that included threats of death and violence to 
named city officials, police and politicians took the group at its word. MOVE had first 
been labeled “terroristic” in 1978, when members were charged with “terroristic 
threats”—interestingly, a misdemeanor crime at that time.329 On the 20 May 1977 “guns 
on the porch” day, MOVE released a statement to police claiming police should not 
attempt to enter the Powelton compound  
unless you want an international incident. We are prepared to hit 
reservoirs, empty hotels and apartment houses, close factories and tie up 
traffic in major cities of Europe…We are not a bunch of frustrated, 
middle-class college students, irrational radicals or confused terrorists. We 
are a deeply religious organization totally committed to the principle of 
our belief as taught to us by our founder, John Africa. We are not looking 
for trouble. We are just looking to be left alone.330  
When later asked by the MOVE Commission what type of group he believed MOVE to 
be, Commissioner Sambor stated, “In a word, a terrorist organization.”331 
Admittedly, the verbal and written threats from MOVE were disconcerting; on 
April 29, 1985, MOVE members threatened neighbors over its public address system and 
328 Concerned Citizens in Support of MOVE, 20 Years on the MOVE (Philadelphia: Concerned 
Citizens in Support of MOVE, 1992), 6. 
329 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 27. 
330 Ibid., 30. 
331 Ibid., 42. 
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threatened to kill the mayor.332 Following the neighbors’ first and only news conference 
in which they plead for official assistance, MOVE claimed they had wired adjoining 
properties with explosives, which they threatened to detonate if attacked.333 Later that 
same day, while placing a listening device in the property adjacent to the Osage Avenue 
residence, police were given a note stating MOVE would kill policemen if they attempted 
to utilize explosives on the MOVE property.334 Though such explicit threats from MOVE 
had to be taken seriously, the apparent plausibility assigned to these threats by police and 
city officials seems disproportionate to the obvious operational capability of the group. 
The city’s previous, repeated enforcement actions that failed to find weapons caches or 
illegal possession of firearms by MOVE members seemed to be ignored in the face of 
these threats, a condition only amplified by MOVE’s closed, unfathomable nature.  
It is unknown if the city and police indeed felt intimidated by MOVE members or 
by the potential political fallout of intervention into a quasi-religious group whose 
membership was primarily composed of minorities. More likely, officials had collectively 
determined that MOVE’s actions were indeed protected by the 1st Amendment and that 
official response to MOVE provocations was hamstrung due to the potential that any 
actions could be deemed prejudicial or an infringement of members civil rights. It should 
be recalled that in 1977 under Mayor Rizzo, the Philadelphia Police Department had been 
subject to a Department of Justice investigation into civil rights abuses, as well as state 
legislative hearings into the same.335 Following the Powelton Village raid, U.S. Attorney 
General Bell himself traveled to Philadelphia to meet with the Black Public Officials 
Association, a group formed after the August 8 shooting. After the meeting, Bell formed 
a federal task force to examine evidence of police brutality in Philadelphia.336 The 
caution advised by AUSA Dennis in 1984 likely also resonated in Mayor Goode’s and 
332 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 79. 
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Director Brooks’ ears, as they feared having their own administration subjected to the 
same scrutiny that had plagued Rizzo’s last term.  
5. The Osage Avenue Assault and Its After Effects 
At 5:35 a.m. on Monday, May 13, Commissioner Sambor issued the following 
curiously expansive ultimatum via bullhorn: “Attention MOVE! This is America! You 
have to abide by the laws of the United States.”337 According to the police log, MOVE 
responded: “We ain’t got a motherfucking thing to lose, come and get us. Remember we 
killed Ramp. Is your insurance paid up, your wives will cash them in after today, 
motherfuckers.”338 Though he announced police had arrest warrants for four of the 
residents that compelled their peaceful surrender, Commissioner Sambor failed to 
announce that he also had a search warrant for the 6221 Osage Ave. residence.339 Fifteen 
minutes later, police fired and threw tear gas canisters at the front and rear of the MOVE 
property, fire hoses began to spray the roof, attempting to dislodge the rooftop wooden 
bunkers, and police bomb squad officers entered an adjacent house to begin breaching 
operations using high explosives. Shots were reportedly fired from the MOVE house, 
prompting police to return fire, eventually expending 10,000 rounds of ammunition into 
the house during the next 90 minutes.340 It was determined that MOVE had constructed a 
fortified pillbox within the residence, from which members repelled attempts to enter the 
residence. Shortly after 4 p.m., further attempts to negotiate with MOVE and secure safe 
release of the children met with silence.341 
6. Let it Burn 
Despite these multiple breaching attempts, insertion of tear gas, and extensive 
exchange of gunfire, MOVE members could not be expelled from their fortified 
residence. The fire department had been unable to fully dislodge the wooden rooftop 
337 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 42. 
338 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 112. 
339 Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission, The Findings, Conclusions, 53. 
340 Ibid., 17. 
341 Anderson and Hevenor, Burning down the House, 139. 
 121 
                                                 
bunker, endangering any attempts to approach the residence. The Philadelphia Police 
bomb squad finally devised a plan to drop a satchel bomb—containing what would later 
be contested as a mix of either commercial or military grade explosives—onto the top of 
the rooftop bunker from a hovering police helicopter. At 5:27 p.m., the head of the bomb 
squad did just that.342 Although it was reportedly not the police’s intention, this 
explosive, though unsuccessful in dislodging the bunker, did breach the roof and ignite a 
fire, possibly due to gasoline canisters known to have been stored on the roof by MOVE. 
Ignoring orders from the mayor to instruct the fire department to extinguish the blaze, 
Commissioner Sambor, with the fire commissioner’s concurrence, made a tactical 
decision to attempt to control the fire long enough to allow it to destroy the rooftop 
bunker.343 According to police logs, by 6:26 p.m., the entire 6221 Osage property was 
engulfed by flames. The conflagration continued to spread, now out of firefighters’ 
control, to adjoining houses. By the next day, 61 homes had been destroyed, leaving 253 
Philadelphians homeless.344 
The aftermath of the 13 May operation was financially and politically disastrous 
for Mayor Goode’s administration. Instead of the expected arsenal of illegal weapons, 
investigators sifting through the rubble eventually discovered only two pistols, a shotgun, 
and a .22-caliber rifle.345 The MOVE Commission would later suggest that the bodies of 
the five MOVE children found in the ruins appeared to be unjustified homicides and 
recommended their deaths be investigated by a grand jury. Investigators found metal 
fragments in the body of one child that were consistent with 00 buckshot pellets.346 In 
August 1985, the city signed a $6.74 million construction contract to replace the houses 
accidentally destroyed in the fire.347 By the time most families had returned to their new 
homes by Christmas that year, the cost was at $9.1 million.348 In November 1986, the 
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Philadelphia Comptroller’s Office announced that the May 13 event had cost the city 
$17,737,664, with most of the funds drawn from the city’s redevelopment authority.349 
By May 1988, 40 civil suits related to the event had been filed against the city.350 A trial 
against the lone surviving adult member of MOVE present at the Osage property 
concluded on February 9, 1986 with a conviction on counts of criminal conspiracy and 
riot; surprisingly, prosecutors were unable to secure convictions on 10 additional counts, 
including aggravated assault on police officers, the most serious charges levied.351  
7. The Commission and a Search for Answers 
The Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission, formed by Mayor Goode to 
act as a “board of inquiry” into the May 13 tragedy, released its final report, titled The 
Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations of the Philadelphia Special Investigation 
Commission, in March 1986. Though the commission concluded that MOVE had 
developed into “an authoritarian, violence-threatening cult” by the early 1980s, it 
criticized the mayor’s policy as “one of appeasement, non-confrontational, and 
avoidance.”352 Furthermore, the report found Commissioner Sambor’s and Director 
Brooks’ conduct “grossly negligent,” as it did the mayor’s decisions not to suspend the 
operation until MOVE children could be removed from the property, to not actively 
participate in all aspects of the enforcement operation, and to allow explosives to be 
utilized against an occupied dwelling.353 Brooks resigned just 10 days after the fire on 
May 23; Sambor resigned exactly six months later on November 13.354 Though the 
mayor survived reelection in 1987, the negative public opinion led to District Attorney’s 
Rendell’s lost bid for reelection in 1985 and subsequent unsuccessful bid for the 
Democratic nomination for mayor in 1987.  
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Philadelphia homeland security officials and political leadership were 
understandably frustrated with MOVE. The city had to dedicate massive resources to 
responding to organizationally supported misdemeanor criminal activity and code and 
inspectional violation litigation that had required elevation on multiple occasions to the 
state Supreme Court. Additionally, politicians and city executives had sustained over a 
decade of perennial criticism from impacted constituents in the surrounding community 
and the media highlighting the city’s impotence in dealing with an alternative-lifestyle, 
obnoxious, often times criminal collection of a few dozen urban revolutionaries with 
filthy lifestyle habits, ostensibly neglected children, and a collection of near feral pets. 
MOVE had defaulted on previous generous terms offered by the city to relocate, defied 
authority, and demonstrated a tendency to violently defend its imminent domain. 
The potential for political repercussions against city officials for enforcement of 
municipal code against MOVE also limited executives’ perceived options. Apprehension 
among city officials to fully enforce existing laws and codes, presumably for fear of 
exposing themselves to claims of civil rights abuses, racism, or other forms of 
organizational prejudice created an environment of selective enforcement of the law. The 
MOVE Commission’s findings specifically highlighted this practice, noting in finding 
number 4, “the managing director and the city’s department heads failed to take any 
effective action on their own and, in fact, ordered their subordinates to refrain from 
taking action to deal meaningfully with the problem on Osage Avenue.”355 The 
commission also noted, “avoidance of the problem was so pervasive that city officials did 
not even discuss the issue among themselves.”356 It is likely this subsequently 
emboldened MOVE members to institutionalize and elevate their confrontational stance 
towards neighbors and governmental officials, as illustrated in finding number 8: “The 
city’s policy of appeasement conceded to the residents of 6221 Osage Ave. the continued 
right to exist above the law.”357 The policy likely also created confusion and indignation 
among members of MOVE in those instances when legal boundaries were enforced, as 
355 Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission, The Findings, Conclusions, 16. 
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such police action was then interpreted as arbitrary, prejudicial, inconsistent, and heavy 
handed.  
MOVE’s pattern of violent rhetoric, defensive posture, and disregard for 
governmental authority gave the city reasons to believe MOVE could be violent, but its 
assessment of this threat seemed deeply biased towards the sensational. The “guns on the 
porch” 1977 event, Powelton shootings, and ATF sting established a menacing pattern of 
armed resistance by MOVE, buttressed by the group’s hate-filled harangues, explicit 
threats, and assaults against neighbors. However, the group had never taken offensive 
action or perpetrated armed crimes of violence, nor had any previous suspicions of arms 
caches, automatic weapons, or explosives proven true. Despite significant intelligence 
gathering efforts, near constant observation of MOVE properties, and repeated law 
enforcement contact with MOVE members, the city seemed inclined to believe this 
closed group retained an ability to acquire explosives and weapons caches without being 
detected. Arguably, the garden variety gangs, narcotics dealers, and armed robbers that 
pose a perennial criminal threats to a large city such a Philadelphia were better armed and 
showed greater violent tendencies than MOVE, yet the city presumably did not feel such 
a significant show of force and employment of assault tactics was necessary to effect 
warrant searches and felony arrests on this class of miscreants. It seems more likely that it 
was the closed nature of MOVE buttressed by the city’s tendency to take the MOVE’s 
bombastic stated intentions at its word that led three administrations to overestimate the 
group’s true threat.  
8. Potential Alternative Outcomes 
How could the city have avoided the MOVE confrontations and resulting 
tragedy? From MOVE’s perspective, by allowing MOVE’s disruptive, unhygienic, and 
potentially dangerous activity to expand unabated, the city communicated it either tacitly 
condoned this behavior or conceded officials political impotence or lack of will to 
counter it, likely predicated by MOVE’s “in your face” defiance. As MOVE Commission 
member Charles Bowser noted, “Every member of city government and state government 
who was asked to respond to this profound situation immediately attempted to define the 
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problems in terms that would permit the application of mundane solutions with which 
they were most familiar.”358 Instead of enforcing minor infractions and clearly 
delineating the boundaries between MOVE’s anti-establishment, 1st Amendment 
protected beliefs and its wholly secular, legally enforceable obligations to refrain from 
imposing the manifestation of this ideology on the surrounding community, Philadelphia 
officials found themselves trapped by exigent needs to enforce more serious infractions 
through intervention. Lacking situational intelligence on this opaque community, officials 
were compelled to adopt dynamic entry and other tactics employing governmental force 
in these situations, resulting in seemingly intractable and assault-style confrontations.359  
The manifestations of Mayor Goode’s administration’s policy of appeasement and 
conflict avoidance are likewise well documented in the MOVE Commission’s findings. 
Most disturbingly,  
The construction of the rooftop bunker in October, 1984, was 
unchallenged by the Department of Licenses & Inspections, despite the 
obvious violation of city building codes. By permitting the fortification of 
the rooftop, the city granted to the occupants of 6221 Osage Ave. a critical 
tactical advantage over the 6200 block of Osage Avenue and over the 
police.360  
Other areas of selective non-enforcement of laws and regulations included 
allowing MOVE to blockade the alleyway behind the 6200 block of Osage Avenue 
without challenge from L&I or the Streets Department, to allow unpaid water, gas, and 
electric bills to accumulate without disrupting service or directing police to escort meter 
readers and revenue collectors, allowing MOVE children to “[remain] out of school in 
flagrant violation of truancy laws,” and permitting the Health Department to ignore 
repeated complaints by neighbors regarding open garbage, rats, insects, and feral animals 
at the property.361 All of these violations, had they been promptly investigated and 
enforced, would have facilitated access to the MOVE property, allowing officials to 
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gather situational awareness regarding the inhabitants and conditions inside. Timely and 
consistent enforcement would likewise have provided the city with the legal means to 
counter MOVE’s continued disruptive behavior and, had they not complied, remove 
MOVE from their fortified property prior to its completion. The Commission’s 
recommendation number 33, “Streamlining of Administrative Response to Crisis 
Situations” presents a viable albeit nebulous proposal for such enforcement efforts: “The 
building and zoning codes, health, truancy, and similar regulations should be carefully 
reviewed and modified, as appropriate, to permit, through the use of citations and court 
powers, effective enforcement without endangering City personnel.”362 
The city also failed to provide an official audience to MOVE’s unwavering 
petitions for release of those members incarcerated following the 1978 raid, unreasonable 
as the groups demands may have been. The MOVE Commission characterized this policy 
as flawed, noting in finding number 5: “The city administration discounted negotiation as 
a method of resolving the problem. Any attempted negotiations were haphazard and 
uncoordinated.”363 It furthermore notes that based on MOVE’s 1985 decision to make 
release of all of its members from jail the sole basis for negotiation, “because the 
situation was believed to be inherently volatile, with no hope of acceptable compromise, 
it was thought that active negotiation would accelerate rather than postpone an ultimate 
confrontation.”364 This lack of constructive, direct communication between the city and 
MOVE, at least through ad hoc channels, had not always been the case. A Philadelphia 
police officer noted, “In the early seventies you could talk to a number of MOVE people. 
Over the period of times, especially after ‘78, they became very militant and would not 
discuss anything with you.”365 Had the city actively engaged MOVE’s demands and 
provided an outlet for the groups legal frustrations, it may have alleviated some of 
MOVE’s perceptions of official indifference to the group’s plight. Though officials 
apparently assessed such meetings as futile at best or additional opportunities to draw and 
362 Ibid., 65. 
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exacerbate MOVE’s ire at worst, it would at a minimum have allowed the city to directly 
and repeatedly convey its expectations to the group, demonstrated official concern for 
MOVE’s grievances, and constituted a means of communicating with MOVE’s leaders 
outside of duress situations. Use of a dedicated official translator, trained in crisis 
management, versed in MOVE’s worldview, and familiar with the community’s cast of 
characters, could have provided the empathetic sounding board that Philadelphia, in 
MOVE’s estimation, was failing to provide. 
Admittedly, MOVE had defaulted on its truce with the city to end the 1978 
blockade, eventually leading to the Powelton assault. City officials may have interpreted 
this event as proof that MOVE could not be taken at its word and that any future 
conciliatory actions and concessions by the city would only result in further MOVE 
provocations. MOVE’s steadfast insistence that those members “falsely” convicted of the 
murder of Officer Ramp be released or retried was also likely seen as an illegitimate 
grievance and one that lay outside the city’s sphere of influence, and hence an impossible 
negotiation piece. However, by both ignoring MOVE’s request for negotiation and 
dialogue and tolerating the group’s provocations and illicit behavior over three 
administrations, the city likely only allowed the community’s outrage to boil, leading it to 
further isolate, and eventually to barricade itself from a situation MOVE increasingly saw 
as intractable and potentially apocalyptic.  
Due directly to the amplification of the perceived threat by both sides, inability to 
establish effective communication during these periods of duress, and unwillingness to 
compromise their respective unilateral world views, two significant and numerous minor 
stand offs had occurred. As evidenced by the 1978 Powelton event, it was not due to the 
underlying offenses for which MOVE members were being sought but rather directly due 
to the violent confrontational nature of the now inexorable governmental intervention 
under less than ideal tactical circumstances, that resulted in MOVE members being 
charged with serious felonies and capital crimes. Consequently, MOVE likely interpreted 
what was in its view antagonistic police behavior as the true catalyst for MOVE members 
to be forced into a corner and then severely punished for acting in self-defense, 
perpetuating the cycle of perceived victimhood. Ultimately, the purported violent threat 
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from MOVE seemed to develop in response to, rather than independent of, perceived 
overbearing police tactics. Only by establishing a constructive dialogue with MOVE, 
including communicating MOVE’s legal responsibilities and enforcing infractions in a 
graduated manner, could Philadelphia potentially have avoided allowing this opaque 
community from having destroyed 11 lives, 66 houses, and a city administration’s 
reputation with its entire constituency.  
Bowser distilled the issue concisely in his opinion within the Philadelphia Special 
Investigation Commission:  
The primary issue to be examined is not the radicalism of the residents of 
6221 Osage Avenue, but rather it is our ability to respond appropriately to 
radicalism without perpetrating a more extreme radicalism. The question 
which remains with me is not, ‘What is MOVE’ it is ‘What are we?’366 
 
366 Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission, The Findings, Conclusions, 62. 
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VI. FUNDAMENTALIST LATTER DAY SAINTS 
“Oh America! What has Texas done to the public servants? We, as 
Americans, have always put our trust in the police officers. They are there 
to protect and assist the safety of our homes and our communities. My 
little 4-year-old granddaughter was witness to an accident with a 4-
wheeler ATV. The accident was investigated by a police officer, as is the 
routine for accidents. My granddaughter was terrified and ran and hid. 
When the officer was finished taking pictures and interviewing all 
concerned, her little heart and mind were so relieved that she said, ‘A 
police officer came to our house, and he didn’t even steal us!’” 
–Heide Barlow, Former resident of YFZ 
Ranch, Eldorado, Texas 
 
A. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (FLDS) is a 
controversial minority sect of the mainline Mormon Church comprising a number of 
diaspora scattered throughout the western United States, Canada, and Mexico. Though 
not all affiliated with the church, informal surveys estimate that approximately 38,000 
people residing primarily throughout the Rocky Mountain region consider themselves to 
be Fundamentalist Mormons.367 As it exists today, the FLDS church numbers 
approximately 10,000 members who congregate in enclaves and opaque communes, 
primarily located in Utah, Arizona, Texas, Idaho, Colorado, South Dakota, and British 
Columbia, Canada.368 The border-straddling municipalities of Hildale, Utah and 
Colorado City, Arizona—commonly referred to as “Short Creek”—comprise the largest 
discreet FLDS diaspora. Throughout its almost 125-year history, the FLDS has been 
repeatedly subjected to investigations and state scrutiny due primarily to its continued 
support and practice of polygamy, which adherents view as a core tenet of their religious 
faith. Though the group has thus far never resorted to violent resistance of governmental 
367 Utah Attorney General’s Office, Arizona Attorney General’s Office, and Family Support Center, 
The Primer—A Guidebook for Law Enforcement and Human Services Agencies Who Offer Assistance to 
Fundamentalist Mormon Families, 2011, http://attorneygeneral.utah.gov/cmsdocuments/The_Primer.pdf, 7. 
368 Ibid., 18.   
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intervention, FLDS communities have grown increasingly withdrawn and secretive, 
particularly since the incarceration of the groups’ spiritual leader and self-professed 
prophet in 2006. The current strained relationships between FLDS enclaves, their 
surrounding communities, and homeland security stakeholder entities have resulted in a 
stalemate of mutual mistrust, suspicion, and hostility. 
Homeland security stakeholders have repeatedly found themselves challenged to 
deal with alleged criminal behavior perpetrated by FLDS members. These difficulties are 
attributable to the social impenetrability of most FLDS enclaves and reluctance by both 
suspected victims and potential cooperating absconders to cooperate with law 
enforcement entities. Official efforts at maintaining contact with and situational 
awareness of FLDS communities are further constrained by legal sensitivities of 
monitoring what are essentially simultaneously large-scale communes of interwoven 
families and minority religious groups. Frustration with endemic and pervasive suspected 
illegal behavior by FLDS members has led to three massive and indiscriminate raids 
against FLDS communities in three states over the last 100 years, most recently in 2008 
in Eldorado, Texas. While the enforcement aspirations of these interventions were 
admirable and well intentioned, the closed nature of FLDS enclaves appears to have 
resulted in series of repeated false assumptions by officials, tactical missteps, and 
instances of governmental persecution of entire communities rather than enforcement 
actions targeting individual suspected criminal actors. While having largely failed to 
curtail the FLDS’ illicit behavior, liberate presumed intending absconders, or penetrate 
the community’s opacity, these interventions have instead resulted in significant 
economic, political, and social costs for the agencies and jurisdictions involved.  
After providing a historical background to the FLDS and Yearning for Zion 
(YFZ) Ranch in Eldorado, Texas, this chapter will explore whether the arcane and closed 
nature of the FLDS has contributed to a flawed interpretative framework among 
homeland security stakeholders in whose jurisdictions the FLDS communities reside. In 
particular, a tendency to seek grounds for official intervention into the group, prompted 
by the lack of situational awareness of FLDS activities and intentions and suspected illicit 
behavior that offends the prevailing social conscience, will be explored through 
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examination of the 2008 YFZ Ranch raid. Though FLDS, unlike the other opaque 
community case studies analyzed, has neither resorted to violent resistance nor ceased to 
exist, it too has proven itself to be a perennial homeland security challenge whose 
solution may involve adoption among homeland security stakeholders of an alternative 
interactional framework to prevent continued repetition of past interventional missteps.  
1. Roots of Succession  
As a splinter sect of the mainstream Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
(LDS), more commonly referred to as the Mormon Church, what would become the 
FLDS traces its origin to a contested succession initiated in 1890 by its founder Lorin C. 
Woolley. FLDS members believe that plural marriage consisting of a patriarch with 
multiple wives and many children, a practice they refer to as “the Principle,” is a central 
prerequisite for God’s faithful to enter the Celestial Kingdom.369 Joseph Smith, founder 
of the LDS church, had provided religious justification supporting plural marriage 
following an 1843 divine revelation. However, the 1862 Morrill Anti-Bigamy and 1882 
Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Acts had essentially outlawed the practice, and, despite its 
having been tolerated by the mainline church, LDS president Wilford Woodruff revised 
the official ecclesiastical view on plural marriage and outlawed the practice in 1890. Note 
that this prohibition had followed almost 38 years during which the Utah Territory 
attempted to gain statehood in vain, largely due to congressional ire at Mormons’ failure 
to make polygamy a punishable crime. After Utah conceded to congressional demands to 
ban polygamy in the state constitution per the 1894 Enabling Act, Utah gained statehood 
in 1896. The church reinforced the secular prohibition with a “Second Manifesto” in 
1904 by threatening all adherents who continued to practice bigamy with 
excommunication. 
This apparently secularly influenced reinterpretation of what many LDS members 
viewed as a core tenet of their faith as espoused by LDS’s founding prophet Smith did 
369 Martha Bradley Evans, “The Past as Prologue: A Comparison of the Short Creek and Eldorado 
Polygamy Raids,” in Saints under Siege: The Texas State Raid on the Fundamentalist Latter Day Saints, 
ed. Stuart A. Wright and James T. Richardson (New York and London: New York University Press, 2011), 
28. 25–50. 
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not go uncontested, leading ultimately to a succession crisis. FLDS founder Woolley 
alleged that in 1886, then LDS president John Taylor experienced a “Divine Revelation” 
that preempted the “official” prohibition by Taylor’s successor Woodruff. According to 
Woolley, the spirit of Prophet Joseph Smith visited then President Taylor, himself having 
gone into hiding from federal authorities in January 1885 to avoid polygamy charges (he 
would die while still in hiding two years later). After receiving Smith’s message, Taylor 
instructed the nine men present with him, including Woolley and his son, to continue the 
practice of polygamy, referred to as the “Principle.” Furthermore, he allegedly conferred 
“priesthood” status on five of the men, allowing them to perform plural “celestial” 
marriages and ordain others to do the same. It is the legitimacy of this privileged 
priesthood authority, revoked from LDS mainline adherents with the official prohibition 
in 1890, which constitutes the primary division point between LDS and the FLDS sect.370  
The FLDS, now facing excommunication from the mainline Mormon Church and 
forced to choose between continuation of a practice it believed was essential to achieve 
eternal salvation and adherence with state, federal, and contested ecclesiastical 
prohibitions against the same, found itself a persecuted minority. Polygamist adherents 
had already begun during the 1880s to flee federal arrest and prosecution by relocating to 
rural enclaves in Utah, Arizona, Idaho, and Nevada. Following increased LDS 
enforcement of the ban during the 1910s, bigamists first settled in Short Creek, and the 
enclave grew into a refuge location for fundamentalists through the 1920s. After 
becoming head of the Priesthood Council in 1935, John Y Barlow encouraged his 
followers to converge at Short Creek, drawing approximately 40 polygamist families; that 
same year, LDS excommunicated three FLDS members living there.371  
2. A Legacy of Official ‘Persecution’  
Short Creek would experience two anti-polygamy raids targeting FLDS members 
during the twentieth century. During the 1944 “Boyden Raid,” federal and state officials 
370 “World Religions & Spirituality Project VCU,” Virginia Commonwealth University, 2011, 
accessed May 18, 2014, http://www.has.vcu.edu/wrs/profiles/FLDS1.htm 
371 Ibid. 
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arrested 50 men and women in both Arizona and Utah, charging them with conspiracy, 
Mann Act (transporting women over state lines for immoral purposes), and Lindberg Act 
(kidnapping) violations. After serving a portion of their sentences in Utah state prison, 15 
men would sign a loyalty oath, which led to their early release.372 On July 26, 1953, 
Arizona Governor Howard Pyle led a massive and highly publicized raid against Short 
Creek, announcing via radio his intention to, “protect the lives and future of 263 
children,” and to battle, “insurrection within [Arizona’s] own borders…[and]a 
community dedicated to the production of white slaves who are without hope of escaping 
this degrading slavery from the moment of their birth.”373 In order to gather evidence of 
polygamist activity and intelligence on the community prior to the raid, in April 1951, 
Governor Pyle hired a Los Angeles detective agency to masquerade as a film company 
searching for locations. Brandishing movie equipment, the Burns Detective Agency 
photographed every man, woman, and child in Short Creek, gathering evidence of illegal 
tapping of state electrical power, tax fraud, and health and safety issues Pyle 
characterized as “subhuman conditions” that were “unfit for animals let alone human 
beings.”374 Armed with warrants charging 36 men and 86 women with rape, statutory 
rape, carnal knowledge, polygamous living, cohabitation, bigamy, adultery, and 
misappropriation of school funds, over 100 state officials descended on Short Creek and 
set up a magistrate’s court in the town’s schoolhouse and comprehensively visited each 
residence to collect evidence of polygamy.375 Despite the entire Short Creek community 
having been forewarned of the pending raid, FLDS members offered no resistance, 
preferring to gather in prayer at schoolhouse.376 
Ultimately, officials served warrants on 122 adults, with the men transferred to 
jail in nearby Kingman and the women forcibly relocated to Phoenix.377 After processing 
372 Ibid. 
373 Evans, “The Past as Prologue,” 26. 
374 Ibid., 26–27. 
375 “World Religions & Spirituality Project VCU,” Virginia Commonwealth University. 
376 Evans, “The Past as Prologue,” 29–30. 
377 “Raid on a Polygamist Town: Arizona, 1953,” LIFE Magazine, accessed September 1, 2013, 
http://life.time.com/history/raid-on-a-polygamist-town-1953/#ixzz2dekpxkUl 
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all of the Short Creek children through juvenile court, Arizona made 153 minors of 
polygamist families wards of the court, relocating them to foster homes in Mesa and 
elsewhere. Following resolution of their cases during the next two years, all of the 
impacted mothers returned to Short Creek except one minor who herself also returned 
once she was legally old enough to do so.378 After spending some pre-trial time in jail, all 
of those men convicted of bigamy would be released on probation.379 In addition to the 
failure by prosecutors to obtain convictions on the more serious charges, the raid would 
result in serious political fallout for Governor Pyle. In describing the raid some weeks 
later, LIFE magazine would criticize the massive show of force, commenting, “it was like 
hunting rabbits with an elephant gun.”380 Many attribute the governor’s failure to win 
reelection on the unpopularity of the raid, which received significant media and public 
reaction as being overly intrusive into private affairs.381 
Although the Pyle raid, perhaps more than the Boyden raid, attempted to target 
specific polygamist crimes against known actors, Arizona lawmen and prosecutors 
arrived at Short Creek, “equipped with extra John and Jane Doe warrants to provide for 
the unexpected.”382 Presumably, officials surmised large portions of the entire 
community were either themselves engaged or complicit in bigamist crimes. This 
circumstance was exacerbated by the sheer operational challenges of deposing large 
numbers of potential victim witnesses, all having interlaced familial ties throughout the 
small community, and some of whom might simultaneously be potential co-conspirators 
and/or motivated to conceal pertinent data due to the threat of judicial removal of family 
members. The result was an enforcement action that, by its very nature, was necessarily 
prejudicial against an entire community rather than directed against specific known 
criminal actors and events. The lack of enforcement “success” of both raids in terms of 
prosecutions and abatement of polygamist behavior, combined with the sociological 
378 “World Religions & Spirituality Project VCU,” Virginia Commonwealth University. 
379 “Raid on a Polygamist Town: Arizona, 1953,” LIFE Magazine. 
380 Ibid. 
381 Ross, “Legal Constraints on Child-Saving,” 389.   
382 “Raid on a Polygamist Town: Arizona, 1953,” LIFE Magazine. 
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impact of seemingly unwarranted official intrusion into individual FLDS nuclear 
families, would solidify the community’s distrust of governmental intentions. As a result, 
the FLDS grew increasingly secretive, closing itself off from outside intrusion and 
preparing future generations to view any cooperation with government agents a having 
the potential to result in the forcible disintegration of family unity.  
3. Schism Redux 
Until 1981, leadership of what would become the FLDS was passed down 
through membership to the Priesthood Council, with the senior member of the group 
acting as its leader. That year, a schism developed stemming from diverging 
interpretations of priesthood leadership, control over members’ property, and social 
practices of the group. Church control over the group’s communal assets is, in particular, 
a potentially controversial topic. In 1942, adherents living in Short Creek had established 
the United Effort Plan (UEP)—a trust created to facilitate the group’s belief in 
communally held and administered property. This trust permeates essentially every 
aspect of church members’ financial life. Members’ homes belong to the trust, they work 
in trust-owned businesses, their wages support it, and their food and consumables are 
purchased by it. Church leadership makes all decisions regarding the use of trust funds 
according to religious principles.383 While one camp advocated following the council 
tradition, a progressive counter movement, led by Leroy Johnson beginning in 1984, 
advocated a “one man doctrine,” according to which a single church president would rule 
until Christ’s second coming. This revision would set the stage for an unprecedented 
consolidation of religious, financial, and social power over FLDS adherents within a 
single person. Rulon T. Jeffs assumed control over the group in 1986, excommunicated 
dissenting members, and formally established the FLDS.384  
Rulon’s son Warren Jeffs succeeded his father upon Rulon’s death in 2002 
following a stroke. As his father had 16 years earlier, Warren claimed by virtue of a 
383 Lindsay Whitehurst, “Utah Takeover of FLDS Property Trust Ruled Unconstitutional,” The Salt 
Lake Tribune, February 24, 2011. 
384 “World Religions & Spirituality Project VCU,” Virginia Commonwealth University. 
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revelation to be the next FLDS prophet. However, FLDS insiders reportedly believed 
Warren had exploited his father’s weakened state to depose the then bishop of the 
Bountiful, British Colombia diaspora, a potential rival for the FLDS presidency.385 Note 
that this distillation of ecclesiastical power, first through the dissolution of the Priesthood 
Council and establishment of “one man” doctrine, reinforced via claims of prophetic 
revelation, and finally bolstered through marginalization of potential internal sources of 
opposition, had effectively transformed the FLDS into an autocratic theocracy. By 
claiming to have both personal revelation of God’s will and total dominion over the 
group’s means of salvation through unique priesthood abilities to ordain celestial 
marriages, Jeffs effectively holds full control over all aspects of members’ religious and 
domestic affairs. Jeffs’s is alleged to hold god-like control over his followers, with some 
alleging adherents would be willing to commit violence at his command.386 His 
capricious behavior and, on occasion, apocalyptic prophesies, coupled with his adherents 
perennial distrust of governmental intervention, have exacerbated an already strained 
environment for the development of community policing and homeland security agency 
interface with the group.  
4. FLDS Seeks a New Zion 
Having now realized that their forefathers’ establishment of a remote yet still 
public enclave such as Short Creek was a flawed means of avoiding religious persecution, 
the FLDS have apparently subsequently explored the establishment of private compounds 
as a means of escaping scrutiny. Note that aside from privacy concerns, two ideological 
aspects to FLDS religious belief contribute adherents’ selection of ideal domiciles. 
According to FLDS eschatology referred to as the Enoch narrative, God’s chosen will 
achieve salvation through the rapture once they establish a utopian community on earth 
(Zion), in which all members act in strict accordance with God’s wishes as revealed by 
their prophet. LDS founding Prophet Joseph Smith professed this vision of Zion building 
as a paradigm for the Mormon faithful, tracing references to biblical scripture from the 
385 Ken MacQueen, “The Battle for Bountiful,” Maclean’s 117, no. 50 (2004): 1. 
386 Ibid., 1. 
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seventh chapter of the Book of Moses and transposing God’s covenant with Enoch into a 
geographic or place-based millenarian dogma.387 As realization of this goal requires all 
those present within the targeted geographic location to both believe in and adhere to 
FLDS theology, establishment of such a community within a public municipality such as 
Short Creek is necessarily problematic. Jeffs specifically referenced alleged defilement of 
Colorado City as justification for the move to Eldorado, stating, “It was no longer a place 
for his people where the spirit of God could dwell.”388 To varying degrees, FLDS 
leadership had rationalized their false predictions of the impending rapture of Short Creek 
in 1984, 1999, and 2005 on the behavior of the community, with Jeffs explicitly blaming 
members’ lack of faith and perseverance for the failure of his 2005 prophesy. This 
understandably led to disillusionment and disappointment, providing motivation for 
FLDS members to renew their dedication to their prophet’s instructions and adherence to 
religious dictates. A “contamination” of Short Creek by unbelievers and the uncontrolled 
presence of adulterating foreign influences could likewise be seen as causes for these 
unfulfilled predictions. Consequently, this situation also promotes a motivation among 
adherents to relocate to pristine domicile locations wholly controlled by the church. 
Second, FLDS adherents reportedly believe that girls should marry while in their 
early teens, as females are taught to believe that becoming a wife and bearing children is 
the highest goal.389 In 2001, the age at which someone could marry with parental consent 
in Utah was increased from 14 to 16, though both Utah and Arizona prohibit sexual 
activity involving unmarried minors under 18.390 The FLDS relocation to jurisdictions 
such as Texas, which, at that time, allowed marriage with parental consent to girls as 
young as 14, allowed FLDS members to legally marry at least one minor. From the FLDS 
point of view, though this circumstance would not affect other “celestial” marriages, it is 
at least conceivable that relocation to such a “favorable” venue would legitimate 
pregnancies among girls who might otherwise be targeted by law enforcement as 
387 Evans, “The Past as Prologue,”43–44. 
388 Ibid., 44. 
389 Utah Attorney General’s Office, Arizona Attorney General’s Office, and Family Support Center, 
The Primer, 19. 
390 Ibid., 34. 
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potential statutory rape victims. It is unknown if or to what extent such legal 
circumstances contributed to FLDS leadership’s decision to select Eldorado as a location 
for its largest new compound. 
B. YEARNING FOR ZION RANCH 
In November 2003, David Allred, president of YFZ Land, LLC and FLDS leader 
Warren Jeffs’s son-in-law, purchased several parcels of property in Schleicher County, 
Texas. Shortly after this purchase, FLDS workers began construction on three 10,000 
square foot dormitories and a cement plant. Allred initially alleged the 1,691-acre former 
ranch north of Eldorado was to be used as a “corporate hunting retreat,” although actual 
construction undertaken clearly indicated that multi-family dwellings were the intended 
use for structures built.391 Other improvements including a clinic, cheese plant, limestone 
quarry, commissary, grain silo, and wastewater treatment facility would follow, 
establishing the ranch as a self-sufficient community. Significant security investments 
were also made, including construction of 10-foot high spiked walls with watchtowers, 
installation of infrared night-vision entrance surveillance cameras, and the stationing of 
sentries.392 Most prominently displayed was a massive white marble temple, surrounded 
its own inner fence, which included a nearby annex.  
It would appear that what would eventually be named the “Yearning for Zion” 
Ranch was conceived as a utopian compound for the most loyal FLDS adherents. The 
ranch was named after the song “Yearn for Zion,” penned by Jeffs himself.393 Jeffs 
reportedly invited selected adherents to Eldorado from enclaves in Short Creek, 
Bountiful, and elsewhere. In 2004, the FLDS lawyer Rod Parker of Salt Lake City noted 
the group had not provided a specific rationale for the establishment of the YFZ Ranch, 
speculating that church leadership likely sought more privacy, freedom, and control over 
391 CBS News and AP, “From Hunting Ground to Polygamist Ranch,” CBS News, April 18, 2008, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/from-hunting-ground-to-polygamist-ranch/  
392 Ibid. 




                                                 
outside influence.394 Given the FLDS’s focus on establishment of a discreet, 
geographically bounded enclave as a prerequisite for the biblical rapture of God’s chosen, 
it is likely that the YFZ Ranch was envisioned as a means of controlling physical access 
to a location unsullied by secular desecration and intrusion by non-believers. The 
“failure” of previously predicted raptures by church leadership could understandably be 
interpreted among the FLDS as evidence of the need for such a community. The spiritual 
motivation to both provide support to the ranch’s financing and construction, as well as 
fealty towards Jeffs to ensure one’s inclusion among the compound’s inhabitants, would 
also be understandably intense among FLDS adherents.  
1. The FLDS Stigma 
Prior to their arrival in Eldorado, an aura of potentially illegal activity surrounded 
numerous FLDS communities and enclaves, most notably the twin cities that comprise 
Short Creek. In addition to the perennial and well-founded claims of polygamy, anti-cult 
activists, absconders, and other FLDS opponents frequently reported that church 
leadership trafficked young, potentially juvenile female members to be assigned as plural 
“celestial” brides.395 Girls as young as 12 were reportedly often married to much older 
men whom they may or may not know and moved between Short Creek and other 
enclaves, across state lines, and, in the case of the Bountiful, British Columbia 
community, across national borders.396 Such activity coincided with FLDS core beliefs 
regarding the “Principle” and, in particular, with Jeffs’s autocratic style and management 
of his priesthood duties. According to FLDS doctrine, as the prophet, Jeffs can remove a 
child, wife, or even an adult male and reassign them to another family. In some FLDS 
communities, children sharing a common father are reportedly voluntarily rotated among 
that husband’s wives to prevent the formation of close bonds between mother and 
child.397 
394 MacQueen, “The Battle for Bountiful,” 2. 
395 “FLDS No Longer Says Texas Property Will Be a Hunting Retreat.” 
396 Andrea Moore-Emmett. “Behind the Cloak of Polygamy,” Ms 18, no. 3 (2008, summer): 46–49. 
397 Ibid. 
 141 
                                                 
In addition to crimes related to polygamy itself, prosecutors in both Utah and 
Arizona had investigated numerous allegations of incest, child abuse, tax and welfare 
fraud, and involuntary marriages between young girls and adult males.398 Whether 
attributable to incest or overlapping and interwoven familial ties, evidence does suggest 
that FLDS communities are impacted by chromosomal defect diseases and do draw 
significant amounts of public assistance. The FLDS twin communities at Short Creek 
exhibit the highest global prevalence of fumarase deficiency, a rare genetic disorder that 
causes mental retardation, nervous system disorders, and epileptic seizures.399 FLDS 
critics note that this is not viewed as necessarily worrisome among FLDS adherents, who 
believe the public assistance granted families of disabled children coincides with FLDS 
ideology in support of “bleeding the beast.” This refers to purposeful draining of federal 
resources in support of FLDS and the eventual collapse of the government followed by 
the ascendency of the prophet. In 2002, according to figures compiled by the Salt Lake 
Tribune, the approximately 6,000 residents of the neighboring communities comprising 
Short Creek received $8 million in public assistance, and 66 percent of Hildale, Utah 
residents received Medicaid assistance, ten-times higher when compared to a Utah-wide 
average of 6.5 percent.400 In addition, as “celestial” wives of adherents with whom they 
cohabit do not take their husband’s surnames, they are often eligible for government 
assistance as single mothers.401 The potential for both inundation of local social services 
and fraudulent assistance claims given such a high incidence of disability benefits would 
understandably be worrisome for any potentially impacted community or state.  
2. Insurgency Fears 
In addition to these domestic crimes, FLDS communities had developed a 
reputation for infiltration and control of municipal institutions by members whose 
398 “FLDS No Longer Says Texas Property Will Be a Hunting Retreat.” 
399 Brooke Adams, “Physician Finds Rare Disease in FLDS Kids; Genetic Disorder: About 20 Cases 
Have Been Discovered in 15 Years in Two Polygamous Towns; Rare Disorder Not Evident at Birth,” The 
Salt Lake Tribune, February 11, 2006. 
400 Moore-Emmett, “Behind the Cloak of Polygamy.” 
401 Utah Attorney General’s Office, Arizona Attorney General’s Office, and Family Support Center, 
The Primer, 18. 
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primarily loyalty was to the church. These concerns had historical precedence in FLDS’ 
official influence in Short Creek, where non-members are alleged to have little political 
say. It is well known that for many years, FLDS member have occupied governmental 
positions in the twin municipalities there and are widely alleged to control the city 
council, police departments, and elected positions.402 The Utah and Arizona divisions of 
Peace Officers Standards and Training decertified the Colorado City police chief and 
multiple police officers for bigamy violations and improper handling of a child sex abuse 
case. Other infractions included officers’ refusal to cooperate with state law-enforcement 
efforts, including refusing to testify at a grand jury proceeding.403 Since 2003, Arizona 
has decertified six officers employed by the Colorado City Marshal’s Office; a seventh 
officer resigned after having been decertified by Utah officials. A Hildale judge was also 
removed by the Utah Supreme Court for violating the bigamy law.404 Collectively, such 
actions indicate a concerted and invasive effort by church members to place secular order 
and rule of law second to church doctrine and priorities. Understandably, such events 
stigmatized any newly established FLDS enclaves, particular in sparsely populated rural 
areas whose residents could conceive they might be purposely targeted for a FLDS 
takeover of civil government.  
3. Schleicher County Engages 
Schleicher County Sheriff David Doran became aware of the group’s religious 
fundamentalism in March 2004, when local paper The Eldorado Success broke news of 
the ranch’s true purpose in an article titled, “Corporate Retreat or Prophet’s Refuge?” 
While researching the compound, the Success’s editors had received a call from anti-
polygamy activist and former FLDS member Flora Jessop, who provided the initial 
background information on suspected activities and intentions of the property’s owners, 
402 Ibid. 
403 U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Arizona, “Civil Complaint—United States vs. Town of 
Colorado City, Arizona) City of Hildale, Utah; Twin City Power) and Twin City Water Authority, Inc,” 
June 21, 2012, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/coloradocitycomp.pdf, 8. 
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albeit in a negative light.405 Jessop would also reach out to Sheriff Doran to express her 
concerns regarding the property. Despite obvious parallels to the Branch Davidian 
movement, Sheriff Doran initially rejected a comparison to the Mount Carmel compound, 
noting, “The dynamics of this are totally different than Waco.”406 Presciently, Doran 
likewise stressed that there was no legal cause for law enforcement intervention at that 
time, noting, “I take this very seriously, but at the same time, we have to understand that 
the people working out there and those who may soon be living out there have rights, 
too.”407 
Sheriff Doran’s uncharacteristically cautious and circumspective posture towards 
the FLDS community just months after its establishment in Schleicher County was both 
laudable for its tolerance and legally judicious given the available known circumstances 
at the compound. Members of the surrounding community, understandably curious about 
their strange new neighbors, quickly grew suspicious. Rumors developed suggesting the 
group may attempt to indoctrinate locals or endeavor to act as a voting bloc to hijack 
local political offices—as they had in Short Creek—through their overwhelming 
numerical superiority.408 Unfounded claims circulated suggesting child graves in Short 
Creek’s cemeteries indicated the group committed infanticide. Salacious media reports 
that Jeffs had installed a high-temperature incinerator at the YFZ Ranch to dispose of 
bodies also swirled, gaining traction in the absence of refutations by the group.409 Given 
such concerns, Doran’s official reluctance to immediately placate public concerns 
regarding a controversial and impervious group, particularly one that obtained a sizeable 
parcel under false pretense, was likely politically contentious for this elected official. 
Indeed his immediate contention that, barring evidence of criminal predicate, the civil 
rights of the FLDS members were also sacrosanct could well have been misinterpreted as 
405 CBS News and AP, “From Hunting Ground to Polygamist Ranch.” 
406 MacQueen, “The Battle for Bountiful,”2. 
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official sympathy towards the group rather than objective pursuit of evenhanded 
treatment under the law. 
Despite its being a political gamble, Sheriff Doran’s measured and non-
confrontational approach towards the inhabitants of the YFZ Ranch did initially prove 
fruitful in establishing a dialogue with the community. In May 2004, Sheriff Doran 
invited Washington County, Utah Sheriff Kirk Smith and Undersheriff Pete Kuhlmann to 
Eldorado. At his request, these officials, whose jurisdiction includes the Hildale, Utah 
portion of Short Creek, met with and provided information on their experiences with 
knowledge of the FLDS to 22 community leaders during a two-hour question-and-answer 
session. During this visit, YFZ Ranch spokesman David Allred and other FLDS 
leadership also agreed to a meeting with officials. Allred conceded that his initial 
statement regarding intended use of the ranch was a failed attempt at avoiding public 
scrutiny and that the group intended to construct no more than five buildings for 200 
residents, all of whom would be the “closest followers of Warren Jeffs.”410 Likely based 
primarily on such attempts at inviting open dialogue with local FLDS leadership, Doran 
gradually established a rapport with FLDS leadership, becoming one of the few non-
members allowed on the property before the 2008 raid.411  
Despite these early successes, attempts by law enforcement to establish dialogue 
with the group remained strained by the FLDS’ opacity, eschewal of governmental 
contact, and organizationally enforced secrecy. One member with whom Doran 
established a relationship was excommunicated and his wives reassigned to other men.412 
Such official opprobrium from the church’s senior most leadership sent a piercing 
message to other potential sources and confidants from within the community. Upon 
excommunication, the wives and children are told that their husband/father no longer 
holds the “priesthood” status, and thus cannot exalt them in heaven. As such, dependents 
often embrace reassignment to other families rather than themselves face 
410 “FLDS No Longer Says Texas Property Will Be a Hunting Retreat.” 
411 CBS News and AP, “From Hunting Ground to Polygamist Ranch.” 
412 MacQueen, “The Battle for Bountiful,”2. 
 145 
                                                 
excommunication by remaining loyal to their patriarch.413 Excommunicated members are 
also evicted from their church-owned domiciles and lose their employment at FLDS-
affiliated businesses, all of which belong to the church administered UEP trust. Such 
punishment not only jettisons those who collaborate with law enforcement from their 
family and social setting and expropriates their collectively administered property and 
means of welfare. According to FLDS doctrine, this punishment effectively strips a 
member’s chances at achieving eternal salvation. Due to the intertwined nature of most 
FLDS families, even upon excommunication, departing former members may be 
unwilling to provide information on the community due to the threat of reprisal activity 
against relatives who remain in the church. Accordingly, given the hierarchical nature of 
the FLDS enclaves, in which the local bishop reigns according to a modified “one man 
rule” doctrine, it appears that successful interface with the FLDS leadership is the only 
organizationally tolerated means of interacting with the community, obtaining 
information, and resolving any inter-community disputes.  
In addition to its benefits in establish dialogue and rapport with the closed group, 
such early, proactive attempts at dissuading public fear regarding the group is a 
paradigmatic, modified community policing response to a closed community such as the 
YFZ Ranch. Incorporating best practice advice from other homeland security officials 
who themselves had longstanding experience with the FLDS community likely greatly 
enhanced Eldorado stakeholders’ knowledge of and abilities to effectively interpret FLDS 
behavior, preventing misinterpretation of the group’s intentions or conduct. By directly 
addressing the concerns of the surrounding community, Sheriff Doran likewise utilized 
information to assuage public fear and distrust colored with cultural bias and the innate 
“threat of the unknown.” Though these initial efforts were likely highly effective, the 
concerns and separate agendas of regional and state actors would ultimately expand the 
focus on FLDS activities outside Eldorado and Schleicher County, perhaps primarily due 
to the exploits of the church’s leader and prophet Warren Jeffs.  
413 Utah Attorney General’s Office, Arizona Attorney General’s Office, and Family Support Center, 
The Primer, 18. 
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4. The Warren Jeffs Problem 
In 2002, Utah prosecutors charged Hildale police officer Rodney Holm with 
counts of bigamy and unlawful sex with a 16-year-old girl, to whom he had been 
“spiritually” married in 1998. The indictment followed Jeffs’s refusal to heed 
admonitions by Arizona and Utah officials demanding a cessation of celestial marriages 
involving minors, a practice whose frequency had increased significantly since Jeffs’ 
assumption of the FLDS presidency. Subsequently in 2004, Arizona charged Jeffs with 
one count of sexual conduct with a minor and one related conspiracy charge. In April 
2006, Utah prosecutors levied two first-degree felony counts of rape, alleging Jeffs acted 
as an accomplice by marrying a teenager to an adult adherent. These charges were 
followed by federal charges in both states alleging flight to avoid prosecution. Arizona 
Attorney General Terry Goddard justified these stating that in order to bring “rule of law” 
to FLDS, authorities needed to, “focus on Jeffs and the ‘messianic’ power he exerts.”414  
For the next year, Jeffs would evade justice, drawing national attention and 
accompanying negative publicity for the FLDS. In May 2006, the FBI placed Jeffs on its 
Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list, increasing the reward for information leading to his 
capture and conviction from $60,000 to $100,000. Jeffs was also featured on a segment 
of the television show “America’s Most Wanted,” where he was portrayed as a tyrannical 
pedophile.415 During this time, Jeffs traveled between church-owned safe houses in 
numerous states, exploiting his dominion over the FLDS congregation members and 
access to tithed funds to evade arrest and provide support to both him and his wives, later 
shown by Texas prosecutors to number 78.416 Finally, in August 2006, Jeffs, one of his 
wives, and his brother Isaac were arrested while traveling on an interstate just north of 
414 Brooke Adams, “Warren Jeffs: A Wanted Man,” The Salt Lake Tribune, May 10, 2006. 
415 Nate Carlisle, “Polygamist Makes FBI Top-Ten List,” The Salt Lake Tribune, May 7, 2006. 
416 Brooke Adams, “On the Lam with Warren Jeffs,” The Salt Lake Tribune, April 29, 2007; Lindsay 
Whitehurst, “Warren Jeffs Gets Life in Prison for Sex with Underage Girls,” The Salt Lake Tribune, August 
11, 2011. 
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Las Vegas. In his possession, Jeffs carried various disguises, 14 cellular phones, multiple 
credit cards, various electronic devices, and almost $68,000 cash in $100 bills.417  
Following Jeffs’ extradition to face charges in Utah, a series of dramatic legal 
theatrics both in- and outside the courtroom ensued, drawing additional negative publicity 
to the sect. In September 2007, a Utah jury found Warren Jeffs guilty of charges alleging 
he was as an accessory to the rape of a 14-year-old girl. Jeffs was subsequently sentenced 
to two terms of five years to life in prison and was incarcerated in Utah state penitentiary. 
Three years later, in July 2010, the Utah Supreme Court reversed this conviction citing 
improper jury instructions. Meanwhile, in July 2008, based on evidence collected during 
the YFZ Ranch raid, a Texas grand jury indicts Jeffs of sexual assault, aggravated sexual 
assault, and bigamy. These charges stem from records indicating that in July 2006, Jeffs 
married a 12-year-old girl at the ranch and fathered a child with another underage female 
in 2005.418 Utah subsequently approved Jeffs’s extradition to Texas to be tried on these 
charges while reserving the right to retry Jeffs at a later date.419 In August 2011, a jury in 
San Angelo, Texas convicted Jeffs on two counts of child sexual assault against a 12 
year-old girl and a 15 year-old girl. Among his 78 known wives, prosecutors showed that 
Jeffs had “spiritually” joined 12 girls while they were 16 and another 12 who were 15 or 
younger to other FLDS men. He has been sentenced to life plus 20-years’ incarceration 
but continues to lead the FLDS from prison.420 
Jeffs’s ascent to power, theocratic rule over the private lives of FLDS members, 
licentious and criminal behavior, and flight from justice drew intense, primarily negative 
public scrutiny to the religion. By posturing as alter ego of the church, Jeffs stigmatized 
the FLDS with his series of personal failures, leading many to assume that community 
members at once universally condoned his behavior and likely pursued it themselves. 
However, absent from much reporting on FLDS was the fact that while he continued to 
417 “Polygamist Sect Leader Warren Jeffs Arrested in Las Vegas,” The Salt Lake Tribune, August 29, 
2006, First Story; Local. 
418 Brooke Adams, “Supreme Court: Jeffs Gets New Trial,” The Salt Lake Tribune, July 27, 2010. 
419 Utah Attorney General’s Office, Arizona Attorney General’s Office, and Family Support Center, 
The Primer, 18. 
420 Whitehurst, “Warren Jeffs Gets Life in Prison for Sex with Underage Girls.” 
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leverage his perceived status and power as prophet, Jeffs was in fact steadily 
marginalizing himself within the church. His support for the establishment of enclaves in 
Eldorado, as well as in Mancos, Colorado and Pringle, South Dakota, were in fact based 
on Jeffs’s displeasure with and lack of control over the entirety of the Short Creek 
diaspora.421 Jeffs’s successful exploitation of and control over adherents through his 
perceived ecclesiastical powers to control individual members’ expectations for salvation 
is likewise fairly inconceivable to the non-believer, possibly leading many to assume 
those who supported his evasion of justice must be acting voluntarily. Accordingly, it is 
understandable that an impacted adjacent community might view any and all FLDS as 
Jeffs’s willing co-conspirators in the deviant pursuit of institutionalized polygamist 
pedophilia thinly veiled as extreme religious devotion to nineteenth century Apocrypha. 
5. Political Pressures Mount 
Following the establishment of the YFZ Ranch and concurrent with Jeffs’ descent 
into criminality, the surrounding Eldorado community’s simmering grievances and 
frustrations drew attention from local politicians. In June 2005, just over a year after the 
Eldorado Success identified FLDS as the group inhabiting the YFZ Ranch property, 
Governor Rick Perry signed into law legislation introduced by Texas State 
Representative Harvey Hilderbran proposing two revisions to the Texas Code of Criminal 
Procedure. These amendments, which became law in September of that year as part of 
Senate Bill 6, included increasing the legal age of consent for marriage from 14 to 16 and 
elevated crimes of bigamy and polygamy from misdemeanors to felonies. Statements 
related to this legislation by Hilderbran, whose district included Schleicher County, 
indicated they were conceived with FLDS specifically in mind.422 Though this predated 
the FLDS raid by three years, these efforts clearly indicate the existence of political 
pressure on Texas politicians to react to the FLDS presence. They likewise portend the 
emergence among governmental stakeholders of a perceived threat sufficient to 
421 Adams, “Warren Jeffs: A Wanted Man.” 
422 James T. Richardson and Tamatha L. Schreinert, “Political and Legislative Context of the FLDS 
Raid in Texas,” in Saints under Siege: The Texas State Raid on the Fundamentalist Latter Day Saints, ed. 
Stuart A. Wright and James T. Richardson (New York and London: New York University Press, 2011), 
225–226. 221–241. 
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specifically prompt amendments to the criminal code to bolster law enforcement’s 
abilities to intercede in presumed FLDS activities. While earlier introducing an even 
further reaching bill targeting the group, Hilderbran had stated, “I want to keep Eldorado, 
Schleicher County, and all of Texas from becoming like Colorado City, Arizona and 
Hildale, Utah, where this cult came from.”423 
Though it is difficult to assess the political climate and community’s level of 
dissatisfaction of or hostility towards the FLDS between summer 2005 and April 2008, 
there are indications that this political pressure to eliminate the group’s presence 
remained intense. Following the discovery of the ranch’s connection to FLDS, 
newspapers in Arizona, Utah, and Texas reported almost weekly on the threat emanating 
from the group and its prophet. In combination with residents’ very limited personal 
contact with their new neighbors, fears emerged that YFZ could develop into a situation 
similar to Waco 15 years earlier. As noted by Lalasz and Gonzalez,  
Because the FLDS members continued to keep to themselves, these fears, 
combined with rumors about the illegal activities taking place behind the 
compound walls, promoted and abetted by anti-FLDS activists, led the 
general public, politicians, and law enforcement officers to adopt a 
socially constructed and exaggerated level of fear toward the FLDS 
community at the YFZ Ranch.  
Subsequently, the perceived level of danger emanating from the group grew 
disproportionate to the actual level of threat, increasing hostility towards the 
community.424  
The YFZ Ranch RaidAfter years of festering in this environment of suspicion and 
hostility unchallenged by an official FLDS counter narrative, a criminal complaint by an 
alleged YFZ Ranch inhabitant generated a seminal moment between the church and the 
state. According to the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) affidavit, on March 29, 
2008, the employees of the New Bridge Family Shelter in San Angelo, Texas received a 
423 Ibid., 226. 
424 Camille B. Lalasz and Carlene Gonzales, “Large-Scale FLDS Raids: The Dangers and Appeal of 
Crime Control Theater,” in Saints under Siege: The Texas State Raid on the Fundamentalist Latter Day 
Saints, ed. Stuart A. Wright and James T. Richardson (New York and London: New York University Press, 
2011), 184–185.  
 150 
                                                 
call on their domestic violence crisis hotline from a female caller alleging to be on the 
YFZ Ranch.425 The caller alleged she was 16 years old, had been at the ranch since she 
was 13, was pregnant, and had an eight-month old infant. She alleged her 49 year old 
husband, Dale Barlow, was physically and sexually abusive, and she reported that guards 
at the ranch prevented her from escaping. Based on the caller’s stated age and age of her 
alleged child, Texas DPS reasoned that Barlow must have committed statutory rape. 
Considering the gestational period, even had she been 15 at conception, the caller would 
have been ineligible to marry under the revised Texas law.426 Specifically, the caller 
stated that Barlow had chocked and hit her, beating her so severely on one occasion that 
she had been taken to the local hospital for treatment. The caller, who identified herself 
as Sarah Jessop, requested assistance to escape the ranch and seek protection from her 
abusive spouse.427 
6. A Questionable Criminal Complaint 
Inasmuch as this tragic and disturbing allegation demanded prompt investigation 
and response by law enforcement, it likewise required corroboration to determine its 
veracity. The Texas Rangers quickly assumed the case for investigation. Given that the 
complaint involved an alleged domestic crime, albeit one that reportedly employed 
violence, this immediate elevation of the case from a local to a state enforcement agency 
could be indicative of an intense willingness to pursue enforcement actions against the 
group. In the course of providing assistance in an attempt to positively identify and locate 
the alleged perpetrator, Sheriff Doran did discover a Dale Evans Barlow (born November 
5, 1957) who had been convicted in Arizona in 2005 for committing sexual conduct with 
a minor, remained under probation, and had not registered as a sex offender in Schleicher 
County. Doran further identified a negative match but potential relative of the alleged 
425 Wright and Richardson, “Introduction,”1. 
426 Leslie Brooks Long, “Affidavit for Search and Arrest Warrant No. M-08-001-S,” State of Texas 
County of Schleicher, April 3, 2008, http://www.eldoradoflds.us/FLDS-Court/FLDSaffidavit.pdf 
427 Wright and Richardson, “Introduction,”1. 
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perpetrator in Dr. Lloyd H. Barlow who resided and practiced medicine at a clinic on the 
YFZ Ranch.428  
Additional investigative findings raised suspicions regarding the veracity of the 
caller’s story. According to court documents filed later, case agent Ranger Leslie Brooks 
Long contacted Mohave County, Arizona Sheriff Alan Pashano to obtain information on 
the potential matching Dale Barlow identity. Sheriff Pashano notified Sheriff Doran that 
the identified Arizona resident Dale Barlow had not departed Mohave County since 2007 
and had never traveled to the YFZ Ranch. Rancher Long then instructed a sheriff’s 
deputy to contact the local clinic to verify whether a 16-year-old female had indeed been 
treated there for broken ribs and further abuse. The Schleicher County medical center 
could find no record of having administered such treatment. It was later determined that 
even Jessop’s identification of Barlow’s first name had been prompted in a leading 
manner by a volunteer at the Newbridge Family Shelter where the abuse call was 
received. This volunteer had coaxed Jessop into confirming a name from a list of Barlows 
identified through Internet queries was indeed her alleged husband.429 
In the normal course of a reported case of domestic violence received via a third 
party, law enforcement may have dismissed such a complaint due to lack of verifiable 
corroborating details. A similar call received by authorities in Arizona the same week 
from a caller alleging to be a 16-year-old sexual abuse victim in Colorado City was 
dismissed when officials could not positively identify the caller. In fact, the same caller 
alleging to be Sarah Jessop contacted a domestic abuse shelter in Snohomish, 
Washington 35 times between March 22 and April 4, 2008, conversing with a volunteer 
for a total of 17.6 hours.430 Jessop conveyed a similar story of abuse to Snohomish 
County officials, alternatively claiming Barlow had moved her to Washington and that 
she had been reassigned to a new family at the YFZ Ranch. A brief investigation using 
Jessop’s unblocked number traced the call to Colorado, indicating deception. Similar to 
428 Long, “Affidavit for Search and Arrest Warrant No. M-08-001-S.” 
429 Wright and Richardson, “Introduction,” 4. 
430 Ibid., 5. 
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Arizona, because they were unable to verify the calls or positively identify the caller, 
Washington authorities dismissed the reports as well.431 
It would later be determined that in actuality, Sarah Jessop was a mentally 
disturbed Colorado Springs woman named Rozita Swinton. In February 2008, Colorado 
police arrested Swinton for making similar false claims alleging domestic abuse against 
fictitious female minors. It was later determined that Swinton had been linked to 10 
incidents of false allegations made to abuse hotlines and law enforcement agencies 
nationwide since 2006.432 Though authorities had been duped in some instances into 
investigating Swinton’s fantastic claims, in the Eldorado case, Texas authorities seemed 
especially determined to assume the legitimacy of the facts presented, despite the 
aforementioned evidence to the contrary. This rush to invalidate or ignore indications that 
Swinton’s calls were a hoax was perhaps best captured in the Rangers’ arrest warrant 
affidavit, in which none of the disconfirming evidence was presented to signing Judge 
Barbara Walther.433 Indications that the speed and complexity of the law enforcement 
action are evidence of an “off the shelf” plan to raid the YFZ Ranch and allegations that 
“the government was poised and ready for a trigger that would justify the intervention,” 
likewise suggest that Texas officials were eager to employ the questionable abuse 
complaint as a potentially flawed yet expedient and available means to breach the FLDS 
veil of secrecy.434 
7. Texas Serves a Warrant 
On April 3, 2008, Texas DPS and Texas Department of Family and Protective 
Services (DFPS), assisted by numerous county and local departments, served the warrant 
to the YFZ Ranch. FLDS members informed authorities that neither a Dale Barlow nor a 
Sarah Jessop resided at the property. As the Swinton call had not yet been determined to 
be a hoax, investigators likely immediately suspected that the community was concealing 
431 Ibid., 5–6. 
432 Ibid., 2–3. 
433 Ibid., 4–5. 
434 Evans, “The Past as Prologue,” 27; Richardson and Schreinert, “Political and Legislative Context 
of the FLDS Raid in Texas,” 224. 
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their whereabouts or identity, and thus initiated a house-to-house search for Sarah. Upon 
questioning female adherents and minors, authorities immediately encountered 
circumstances that would upend their inquiries into the initial abuse complaint and 
dramatically alter the focus and conduct of their investigation. Interviewers quickly 
identified several underage girls who reported having been “spiritually united” with adult 
males, explaining that “the Prophet” determined when and who a girl should marry, 
regardless of her age. As questioning progressed, women and children throughout the 
compound frequently reported they could not answer questions about girls’ ages or the 
nature of family relationships. Officials determined that children were being moved 
between locations to prevent investigators from interviewing them. Some minors reported 
they did not know their birthdates or had been instructed by their parents not to answer 
investigators’ questions.435 
Following their initial search of the property on April 4—6, investigators sought 
an additional warrant to expand the search based on observations made while on the 
property. In additional to discovering multiple safes, vaults, and computers at both the 
temple and an adjacent temple annex, police observed numerous apparently underage 
females who had children, were visibly pregnant, or both. In addition, the affidavit cites 
DFPS personnel interviews with multiple FLDS female minors and their aforementioned 
reports of “spiritual” marriages. Furthermore, the affidavit noted that according to a 
confidential informant and former FLDS member who had reliably reported to Sheriff 
Doran on over 20 occasions over the past several years, adult males were known to 
engage in polygamy with females under the age of 16. It further stated that within the 
YFZ Ranch temple there was allegedly a bed where adult males engaged in sexual 
activity with female minors.436 
8. A Case Metastasizes  
What had begun as the investigation into a domestic complaint in a closed 
compound inhabited by a fundamentalist Mormon sect would evolve into, “the largest 
435 Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Eldorado Investigation, 3. 
436 Long, “Affidavit for Search and Arrest Warrant No. M-08-002-S.”  
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state custodial detention in the U.S. history.”437 By the first evening, DFPS investigators 
had removed 18 girls after determining they may be victims of underage sexual abuse. As 
officials conducted additional interviews, they came across supplemental evidence of 
underage pregnancies, weddings between adolescent females and adult males, and 
polygamy. Following a Child Protective Services (CPS) determination that removing all 
439 FLDS children was the best option due to a determination of immediate danger, the 
San Angelo District Court granted the state temporary custody of all the YFZ Ranch 
children three days later. DFPS removed a total of 463 children and accompanying adult 
women from the ranch, placing them first in mass provisional shelters before moving 
them to the San Angelo Coliseum complex.438 CPS would eventually determine that 12 
girls were victims of sexual abuse and neglect as they had been married between the ages 
of 12 to 15, meaning 25 percent of the pubescent girls at the ranch were in an underage 
marriage. Authorities further determined that 262 other children were subject to neglect 
because parents had failed to remove these children from situations in which, “they 
would be exposed to sexual abuse committed against another child within their families 
or households.”439 Of 146 FLDS families investigated at the ranch, 62 percent were 
found to have abuse or neglect of one or more children.440 
a. The Identity Crisis 
Unable to positively link FLDS children with their biological parents and faced 
with hundreds of potential victim witnesses, many of whom were uncooperative at best 
and purposely deceptive at worst, authorities were compelled to embrace comprehensive, 
intrusive, and unorthodox investigative techniques. To corroborate the veracity of family 
structures reported during interviews, on April 18, the District Court issued investigators 
orders to collect DNA from all the FLDS children for paternity and maternity testing.441 
After the court order compelling the collection of DNA, FLDS families became more 
437 Wright and Richardson, “Introduction,”1. 
438 Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Eldorado Investigation, 6–7. 
439 Ibid., 3. 
440 Ibid., 4. 
441 Ibid., 8. 
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forthcoming regarding parental and familial circumstances of the residents.442 However, 
such mass sampling was likely perceived by children to be both intrusive and indicative 
of criminality among their parents and other adults in the community. Such massive 
detention, separation, and evidentiary processes must have seemed Orwellian to FLDS 
families who had little regular contact with those outside the compound. The fact that 
adherents had long been taught that “gentiles” were a corrupting influence whose 
presence on the compound might thwart their religious aspirations at creating a utopian 
enclave of true believers in preparation for salvation through rapture could only have 
increased their distress, distrust of, and opposition to official protective and investigatory 
efforts.  
b. A Desecrated Temple 
A second controversial action taken by law enforcement during the raid involved 
the search of the FLDS temple and adjacent annex. Following observations made during 
the initial search, officers included language in the supplemental search warrant to 
examine, “multiple locked safes, locked desk drawers, locked vaults, as well as multiple 
computers and beds.”443 Community members grew distraught when law enforcement 
attempted to enter the giant limestone temple erected on the property, and local FLDS 
leader Merrill Jessop refused to unlock the temple doors and allow the building to be 
searched. Dozens of male adherents reportedly knelt in prayer around the building’s 
perimeter and wept as a tactical team finally breached the temples doors. Inside, officers 
indeed discovered beds suspected of being used in marriage ceremonies, as alleged in 
their second affidavit.444 In the adjacent annex, police discovered a trove of church 
records, including key evidence that would later be used to convict Warren Jeffs of 
sexual assault. Officers’ entry into the temple and annex were thus necessary to collect 
crucial evidence, but simultaneously viewed as a desecration of the community’s holiest 
442 Ibid., 13. 
443 Long, “Affidavit for Search and Arrest Warrant No. M-08-002-S.” 
444 Brooke Adams and Christopher Smart, “Week-Long Raid at FLDS Ranch Leaves Texas 
Authorities with Few Answers,” The Salt Lake Tribune, April 11, 2008. 
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site on the property, making is unusable as a place of worship.445 Obviously, the 
intermingling of evidence of criminal activity concealed among church records inside a 
sacred area presents an unfortunate tactical situation for law enforcement, and one that 
pits secular homeland security legal concerns against spiritual concerns of an opaque 
group. 
9. Enforcement Success? 
Consequent to this search and parallel to the investigation into abuse and neglect 
of FLDS children, the YFZ Ranch intervention did reveal additional evidence of criminal 
activity by church members and leadership. Based on evidence collected during the raid, 
a Texas grand jury indicted 12 male residents of the ranch, including Jeffs, charging them 
with sexual assault of a child, aggravated sexual assault, bigamy, evidence tampering, 
and failure to report abuse.446 Included among items discovered on the compound was an 
audio recording of Jeffs sexually assaulting a 12-year-old “spiritual bride” and essentially 
all of the evidence used to secure his aforementioned conviction in San Angelo.447 
Whether this evidence could have been obtained without reliance on probable cause 
derived from a false report of domestic abuse and subsequent mass removal is unknown.  
Collectively these convictions and resolved crimes do further vindicate 
authorities’ intervention into the opaque community residing at the YFZ Ranch under 
suspicion based on false pretense. However, because recovery of the substantiating 
evidence was not the premise for the search, this tangential enforcement success likely 
should not be used as a model or justification for subsequent interventions into closed 
groups. Ostensibly, officials correctly reasoned that the church might attempt to conceal 
ecclesiastical records regarding celestial marriages of FLDS members, particularly given 
that secular records of such illicit unions would constitute evidence of criminal acts. 
Obviously, officials’ strong desire to comprehensively search all structures on the 
compound was premised as a search for evidence of polygamist crimes, underage sexual 
445 Evans, “The Past as Prologue,” 46. 
446 Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Eldorado Investigation, 15. 
447 Whitehurst, “Warren Jeffs Gets Life in Prison for Sex with Underage Girls.” 
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abuse, and additional, as yet undetected criminal activity. However, as such records’ very 
existence was a matter of mere speculation or conjecture prior to their discovery, and 
because likely no one outside of select members of the church’s leadership had 
knowledge of them, this circumstance embodies one of the key challenges in dealing with 
an opaque community—particularly one that exploits a religious institution to retain it 
impenetrability. Indeed, it was only through the domino effect of officials’ detection of 
tangential criminal activity at YFZ Ranch that enabled the extension of their search into 
what was clearly communal church property. Any future governmental interventions into 
opaque compounds cannot assume that such extenuating evidence will become available 
once the “walls are breached.” And although it is unknown if such was the operational 
presumption of Texas officials, the apparent rush to accept the validity of Swinton’s 
complaint as a means of entering the compound, as well as the nature of the tactics 
utilized, law enforcement may have hoped for, if not counted on, exactly such a 
fortuitous evidentiary “snowball effect.”  
C. THE FLAWED OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The Eldorado raid was perhaps initially viewed as a successful, albeit massive 
state intervention into pervasive, institutionalized illegal activity shamelessly cloaked in 
the righteousness of religious devotion. However, following both the revelation that the 
Swinton/Jessop abuse report was a hoax and negative publicity of seeing busloads of 
crying children separated from their distraught parents, both the public and the courts 
began to raise fundamental questions regarding the legitimacy of the raid. After DFPS 
was unable to meet the burden of proof supporting emergency removal of the children, 
the Texas Third Court of Appeals vacated its order granting the agency temporary 
managing conservatorship of the children. An appeal to the Texas Supreme Court failed 
to overturn this decision, though the Court did dissent with regard to the cause for 
protection of pubescent girls. On June 2, 2008, the District Court ordered all the FLDS 
children be returned to their parents, and all impacted families were reunited by June 4. 
The Court did, however, leave other protective measures in the order intact, allowing 
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CPS to continue its investigation.448 DFPS would ultimately close cases on 424 of the 
439 children at the ranch after parents signed “safety plans” agreeing to prevent and 
prohibit underage marriages, thereby ensuring they would not be subject to future 
abuse.449 
1. A “Pervasive System of Belief” 
Both the court decisions and behavior of FLDS female adherents during the 
intervention revealed flaws in Texas authorities’ presumptions regarding pervasive abuse 
and intending absconders. Although the court agreed that the five as yet minor girls who 
had become pregnant at the ranch required the state’s protection, it found no evidence 
that all children at the ranch were in imminent danger. The court noted that the only 
evidence DFPS had presented suggesting pubescent girls were in danger was the 
“pervasive system of belief” among FLDS adherents at the ranch that condones 
polygamous marriage and pregnancies among underage females. It furthermore wrote 
that,  
The existence of the FLDS belief system…by itself, does not put children 
of FLDS parents in physical danger. [Rather] it is the imposition of certain 
alleged tenets of that belief system on specific individuals that may put 
them in physical danger.450  
The now “liberated” FLDS women likewise confirmed they did not perceive 
themselves to be in an abusive or incarcerating environment. Having been initially 
allowed to accompany their children to the DFPS shelters, on April 14, 57 FLDS women 
were separated from the children aged five and older for whom they were caring, as is 
standard practice in cases of abuse. All were given the option to be transported to a 
domestic violence shelter. Six women were taken to shelters, but none opted to stay. An 
additional 47 mothers later separated from their children aged five and under were 
likewise offered transport to shelters on April 23, with seven initially choosing shelters 
448 Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Eldorado Investigation, 3–4. 
449 Ibid., 5. 
450 In re Steed, Fastcase, Court of Appeals of Texas, Third District, Austin, 2008, 9. 
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before voluntarily returning to the ranch.451 Collectively, these actions indicate that 
contrary to officials’ operating assumptions, neither systemic child nor spousal abuse was 
being committed at the ranch. Indeed, even if the atmosphere of the YFZ Ranch was 
filled with a toxic “pervasive belief system,” which promoted marital and child rearing 
practices repugnant to most outsiders, the actions of the removed FLDS women and 
children while under their own volition indicated that any victimhood they might be 
experiencing was more widely suffered outside than within the confines of the FLDS 
compound.  
With regard to the legal justification for such actions, in its finding for Santosky 
vs. Kramer,452 the Supreme Court has defined current burden of proof requirements for 
states to initiate child removal processes by the “clear and convincing” standard. This 
requirement places an even greater burden on states than the traditional “preponderance 
of the evidence” civil standard, creating an enhanced evidentiary challenge for state 
agencies that is further exacerbated when dealing with the already problematic situational 
awareness and victim/witness cooperative environments presented by opaque 
communities. These hurdles are even further raised in the case of religious, communal 
enclaves such as FLDS in which potentially abusive behavior is intermingled with 
constitutionally protected religious beliefs, civil rights and privacy freedoms, and 
alternative lifestyle domestic arrangements that challenge the definition of family makeup 
and structure.  
2. Competing Legal Parameters 
With regard to opaque groups, the crucial determinant is whether and to what 
degree the government can show evidence of abuse, regardless of the ideology or 
religious beliefs of the suspected offenders. Ross defends the decision of the Texas court 
system that the Fourth Amendment required “individualized suspicion of each parent” 
rather than generalized suspicion of the customary and pervasive beliefs and actions of an 
451 Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Eldorado Investigation, 7–8. 
452 Santosky v. Kramer, U.S. Supreme Court 1982. 
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entire community before removal proceedings can be initiated.453 She further states, 
“mass child protection efforts, like all attempts at mass justice, violate the basic 
requirement of individualized fault and tend to rely on stereotypes rather than evidence 
and analysis.”454 Ross proposes that child protective services might have determined 
such individualized fault using the existing tools at its disposal, including home visits and 
oversight, parental education, and counseling, though she does not explore the degree to 
which such actions themselves can be compelled without demonstrable suspicion of 
abuse.455 She suggests that public schools act as an “early warning system of child 
abuse” and that by compelling children from opaque groups such as the FLDS to attend 
classes off the ranch, officials could monitor them for signs of mistreatment or duress.456  
Suggestions for such targeted, involuntary, and potentially prejudicial treatment 
of the FLDS children aside, it is quite possible that compulsory public school attendance 
would be fruitless for situational awareness purposes, as well-indoctrinated FLDS 
children—similar to their parents—would likely eschew outside intrusion by gentile 
teachers and administrators who, as they might be told, were only looking to wrest them 
from their families. Forcing FLDS children to attend public school in jurisdictions that 
allow home schooling could be expected to create controversy, accusations of official 
prejudice targeting a religious group, and potential lawsuits. Aside from this suggestion, 
what is lacking from Ross’s own analysis is suggested constructive methods or inroads 
by which homeland security stakeholders can be reasonably expected to develop such 
individualized and nuanced suspicion, evidence, and analysis. A question then emerges as 
to whether governmental interests in child protection allow for compelled “exposure” of 
closed communities through such quasi-prejudicial yet unproven monitoring efforts.  
In response to exactly such pervasive challenges, Nilson argues in a revisionist 
legal note, “a parent’s religious beliefs can be evidence of physical abuse and thus a 
453 Ross, “Legal Constraints on Child-Saving,” 399. 
454 Ibid., 409. 
455 Ibid., 405. 
456 Ibid., 408. 
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danger to a child’s safety, prompting the need for removal.”457 She maintains that 
constitutional protections under the First and Fourteenth Amendment are not absolute and 
can be considered in custody determinations, particularly when religious beliefs 
themselves are deemed abusive. Furthermore, Nilson argues that because enclaves such 
as the YFZ Ranch, “can be analogized to a family for the purpose of removal in that it is 
a closed community that resembles a household,” and because abuse of one child within a 
family is grounds for removal of other children, removal actions such as those taken by 
Texas authorities should be deemed permissible.458 Most importantly, noting that as  
the current evidentiary standard leaves the child’s interest to remain free 
from abuse not as protected as the parent’s interest in custody of his or her 
child…further protection is required and can be achieved by lowering the 
standard of proof (from ‘clear and convincing’ to ‘preponderance of the 
evidence’).459  
Although an examination of the validity of such legal assertions is beyond the scope of 
this study, it is worth noting that it is precisely the legal frustrations borne by official 
interactions with opaque communities such as the FLDS that generate proposals to amend 
these fundamental and time-honored protections for families and the societal ascendency 
of parental rights.  
3. The Problem of Proving Bigamy 
Aside from these mass raids, the use of bigamy laws to target consenting adult 
polygamists has not been frequently exercised. A central problem to enforcement efforts 
is that religious polygamists practice a form of marriage that does not technically break 
the law. Because the government does not regulate “spiritual” marriages and first wives 
are the only legally binding marriages entered into by adherents, there exists little legal 
grounds to pursue what is essentially a voluntary cohabitation arrangement.460 In Canada, 
official legal opinions suggested that in the case of FLDS communities there, plural 
457 Nilson, “Yearning for Zion Ranch Raid,” 307. 
458 Ibid., 332. 
459 Ibid., 308. 
460 Evans, “The Past as Prologue,” 47. 
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marriages would likely even be deemed outright permissible according to freedom of 
religion constitutional guarantees.461 Recently, and likely for this very reason, Utah and 
Arizona have instead prioritized investigation of domestic violence, child abuse, and 
fraud allegations in polygamous communities such as Short Creek.462 By focusing on 
these verifiable crimes with victims who view themselves as such, authorities have a far 
greater likelihood of both achieving successful prosecutions and establishing sound legal 
inroads into the detection of additional criminal activity within opaque communities.  
4. Misinformed Presumptions versus Situational Intelligence 
The YFZ Ranch’s status as an opaque enclave created operational challenges that 
necessitated authorities search for alternative sources of information on the group. As 
with the case of the Branch Davidians, Texas authorities found a ready supply of such 
information among anti-cult experts, apostates, and alleged subject matter experts. 
However, over reliance on intimate knowledge of the group from departed former 
members likely colored investigators’ objectivity toward the community and engendered 
a negative assessment bias, particularly in the lead up to the raid when investigators are 
pressured to locate immediate sources of corroborating evidence for complaint affidavits. 
In an unfortunate case of self-confirming, circular reporting, Flora Jessop, the anti-FLDS 
activist who had voluntarily contacted Schleicher County back in 2004 to provide 
assistance, had herself spoken with and directly recorded 30–40 hours of calls from 
Swinton/Jessop.463 Flora prompted Swinton to contact Texas authorities, reported the 
contact herself, and voluntarily provided tapes of the recorded conversations to the Texas 
Rangers. In doing so, Texas officials viewed Flora Jessop’s involvement as lending 
credibility to Swinton/Jessop’s sensational tale of abuse. Jessop, an apostate and subject 
matter expert, validated the authenticity of Swinton’s claims to be a FLDS member and 
provided her professional assessment of the circumstances through her work with Help 
461 MacQueen, “The Battle for Bountiful,”4. 
462 Utah Attorney General’s Office, Arizona Attorney General’s Office, and Family Support Center, 
The Primer, 8. 
463 Wright, “Deconstructing Official Rationales for the Texas State Raid on the FLDS,” 128. 
 163 
                                                 
the Child Brides—an organization founded by Flora to assist underage FLDS victims of 
forced polygamist marriages.464  
Though the voluntary assistance provided by such activists is understandably 
welcomed in the situational awareness void blanketing closed groups, authorities are 
often unaware of the extreme prejudices and competing agendas of such actors. Activists, 
apostates, and former adherents such as Jessop or, in the case of the Branch Davidians, 
Marc Breault harbor intimate, highly visceral motivations when acting against the very 
groups to which they were previously devoted. The very fact that such actors dedicate 
great amounts of time and effort to revealing atrocity tales and assisting attempts to 
expose crimes perpetrated by the targeted groups—in Jessop’s case, it has become her 
profession and life’s work—indicate their utter devotion to their cause. Having 
themselves escaped the now perceived pernicious influence of the organization, such 
activists likely feel uniquely suited to assist others in realizing the falsehood of the 
group’s ideology and exiting the its social control.  
Because such activists may see law enforcement as a means of seeking revenge 
against their former tormentors within the group, they may be inclined to provide 
sensationalized accounts of deviant behavior by the group or make unfounded claims of 
criminal activity in an attempt to motivate enforcement actions by officials. However, 
unlike homeland security officials, such activists are neither bound by laws and 
departmental policies nor do they answer to governmental structure or constituents. As 
such, and as in the case of the YFZ Ranch raid, if the basis for governmental intervention 
prompted in part by organizational opponent activism goes awry, these actors do not face 
the professional liabilities and consequences that official stakeholders must confront. The 
magnitude of Flora Jessop’s failure to ferret out Swinton as an imposter given Flora’s 
intimate, insider knowledge of the FLDS and the extent of time that they conversed 
suggests Flora may herself have been unable to objectively assess Swinton’s allegations. 
Whether this was unintentionally due to her emotional attachment to her work and desire 
to assist intending absconders or because she consciously viewed Swinton’s allegations 
464 Ibid., 129. 
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as a viable premise by which to enlist law enforcement assistance to intervene at the 
ranch is unknown. Regardless of the reason, law enforcement’s use of expertise and 
assessments from anti-cult activists and apostates with potentially competing agendas 
must be taken with a degree of circumspection.  
Additional indications of Texas’ authorities rush to intervene into the YFZ Ranch 
were evident in official statement made following revelations that the Swinton’s call was 
a hoax and admissions that the premise for entering the FLDS compound was based on 
false information. Stephanie Goodman, chief spokesperson for Texas’ social service 
agencies, noted to reporters that the calls were “not central” to the case and that although, 
“calls got us to the gates, it’s not what caused us to remove the children.” After Texas 
courts overturned the mass detention, Goodman would claim, “I cannot help but believe 
that we changed the culture there.” DFPS spokesman Patrick Crimmins would also later 
defend his agency, suggesting, “We wanted to find out if those children had been abused 
and neglected and do whatever we needed to do protect them from being harmed in the 
future.”465 Such statements indicate, both an organizational presumption that FLDS 
members were routinely and categorically engaging in abusive behavior as well as an 
official agenda to seek interventionist measures regardless of the sound legal basis for 
doing so. 
5. The Opacity Factor 
It would appear that in addition to officials’ distaste for FLDS practices and 
beliefs, the opaque nature of the enclave led to an official presumption of the existence of 
pervasive and widespread criminal activity on the ranch. Though the incidence of known 
polygamist activity by FLDS members, historical cases of compelled placement 
marriages of underage females, and potential for sexual abuse under Jeffs’s tenure as 
church president was well established, the potential to determine if such crimes were 
being perpetrated on the Eldorado compound were limited. Given that YFZ Ranch was a 
walled, patrolled compound, lack of criminal complaints reported by underage victimized 
brides and limited evidence of child abuse could as easily be explained by officials as 
465 Wright and Richardson, “Introduction,”6. 
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FLDS control over and imprisonment of intending absconders, victims, and witnesses as 
it could be attributed to lack of incidence of such violations. In the absence of regular 
contact and communication with FLDS community members, Texas officials were left to 
assume and plan for the worst conceivable scenarios, some of which had already been 
manifested by the groups’ leader and prophet Jeffs. It would appear that the community’s 
opacity so thoroughly troubled stakeholders that any premise under which to validate 
their suspicions, including giving wide latitude to the credibility of sensational claims of 
an unidentified alleged victim, was quickly embraced as an expedient to investigate what 
all parties were relatively certain would be much more flagrant crimes taking place on the 
compound.  
With regard to the perceived threat emanating from the YFZ Ranch, the nature of 
Texas’s authorities tactical response also indicates a presumption of a much greater threat 
than was evident on the compound. Included among the raid team that executed the 
Eldorado search warrant were Texas Rangers, personnel from four county sheriff’s 
offices, officers from the San Angelo Police Department, and Texas Game Wardens. 
Though Texas DPS would not disclose the number of personnel taking part, media 
reported that over 1,000 personnel from these and other agencies were deployed. 
Impacted FLDS members reported that police stationed snipers around the compound 
perimeter and officers wearing paramilitary tactical gear and riding in tracked armored 
vehicles were visible during the initial search.466  
The size and militancy of authorities’ show of force is notable given that FLDS 
had never shown a propensity for violence during previous raids. Though law 
enforcement normally only elects raid tactics in those extreme cases where there is 
imminent threat to law enforcement or clear indications of potential armed resistance, the 
show of force displayed by Texas authorities was obviously grossly disproportionate to 
effect an arrest of a single subject based the suspected domestic assault charge for which 
the warrant was issued.467 The fact that authorities were aware that a large number of 
women and children were present at the ranch seems likewise incongruous with the 
466 Ibid., 7. 
467 Ibid., 16. 
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perceived need for a tactical entry utilizing tracked vehicles and snipers. It would seem 
much more likely that authorities utilized these extreme precautions based primarily on 
the dearth of situational awareness regarding the potential for FLDS members to defend 
the compound and the estimated size or makeup of any potential defensive force. 
Moreover, as officials had established that the compound was fenced, rumored to have 
sentries, and its main entrance gate guarded by what was described as a guard tower or 
surveillance and communications platform that overlooked the single point of approach, 
police were understandably suspicious that the YFZ Ranch was designed with tactical 
defensive advantage in mind. In the absence of information that could allay officials’ 
fears that community members might violently resist a police incursion into their 
purposely opaque and secretive compound, police were left to “prepare for the worst” and 
elect tactics that corresponded with their most disastrous estimates regarding how the 
warrant execution would proceed.  
Note that although the FLDS members have themselves never resorted to 
violence, a separate Mormon fundamentalist community was plagued by a string of 
violent struggles for church succession in the 1970s and 1980s. The Church of the 
Firstborn in the Fullness of Times, aka Church of the Lamb of God was a Fundamentalist 
Mormon community founded by the LeBaron brothers that split from the mainline LDS 
church and settled in Chihuahua, Mexico in 1945. This millenarian group claimed 
approximately 500 members in Mexico and Utah. Core tenets of the group included a 
belief that the United States would experience Armageddon in 2010. Following a dispute 
between brothers Joel and Ervil over Joel’s vow to reestablish plural marriage, Joel 
excommunicated Ervil for being unstable. In response, in 1972, Ervil arranged to have 
Joel murdered. This act was followed by additional murders, directed by Ervil, against 
those who questioned his subsequent divine “revelations.” Violence was then directed 
against Rulon Allred in 1977, himself the leader of a fundamentalist sect perceived to be 
competing with the LeBarons. Allred’s murder was followed by a string of assassinations 
in the 1980s, after which the LeBaron group splintered. Though some adherents continue 
to live in Mexico and follow Joel LeBaron’s teachings, little is known about the 
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leadership or nature of this remnant.468 The internal dynamics and historical context 
surrounding this group are by no means directly related to the collective set of current 
circumstances present in the FLDS. However, the LeBaron group does offer historical 
precedence of how, when faced with the contested succession of an allegedly divinely 
inspired fundamentalist leader within a group espousing apocalyptic eschatology, an 
opaque group can resort to violent tactics as a perceived legitimate means of dispute 
resolution. It is unknown, however, if this historical precedent contributed to Texas 
authorities chosen enforcement posture.  
D. THE YFZ RANCH RAID LEGACY 
Aside from critiques of the flawed premise for law enforcement’s intervention 
into the YFZ Ranch and subsequent metastasized investigative focus, questions remain 
regarding whether the results of the Eldorado raid justify the collective monetary, social, 
and public trust costs. The raid may also have negatively affected any future outreach 
efforts with the FLDS church and its members. Examining what opportunities for 
dialogue did exist and exploring potential alternative outcomes to the intervention offers 
homeland security stakeholder potential lessons for avoiding future costly and 
unnecessary governmental raids. 
1. Costs/Benefit Ratio  
The monetary costs for this raid were significant. According to DFPS figures, 
official estimates for expenditures related to the “San Angelo Mass Care Event” totaled 
$12,436,310.469 Among these costs was $4.2 million for goods and services, including 
over $955,000 for shelter and food and $1.065 million for bus transportation alone.470 
Texas spent $3.3 million on foster care placement and supporting services.471 
Considering this money resulted in the detection of only 12 confirmed victims of sexual 
468 Utah Attorney General’s Office, Arizona Attorney General’s Office, and Family Support Center, 
The Primer, 15. 
469 Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Eldorado Investigation, 21. 
470 Ibid., 20. 
471 Ibid., 21. 
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abuse through underage marriage and the return of all but one child from foster care to 
their families at the ranch, from a purely budgetary standpoint, the raid would appear to 
be a wasteful use of taxpayer funds. In addition, although searches subsequent to the raid 
did result in 12 indictments and the lifelong incarceration of Warren Jeffs, the evidence 
needed to convict these criminals could have been obtained without the mass removal 
and detention of an entire community’s children under chaotic circumstances.  
In addition to the costs and threats of civil litigation, the YFZ Ranch raid failed to 
achieve either the tacit or implied goals of Texas authorities. As Sarah Jessop was a 
figment of Swinton’s imagination, she was obviously not liberated from her equally 
fictitious abusive husband. The mass child removals and expected liberation of spiritual 
wives ostensibly being held against their will also did not occur, as the majority of FLDS 
wives and minors apparently wanted nothing more than to reunite with their husbands 
and families and be left in peace, as indicated by their rejection of offers to be transported 
to domestic abuse shelters. Though such aberrant behavior is arguably prevalent 
throughout cases of domestic violence, the fact that not one of the “liberated” FLDS 
women chose to remain in an abuse shelter would seem to indicate that the incidence of 
battered females or those confined in involuntary unions was not the community-wide 
phenomenon Texas authorities initially expected to discover. The sweeping and 
expensive collection of DNA evidence, though certainly useful in determining parentage, 
was used as the primary source of evidence in only one sexual assault case against 
Raymond M. Jessop. It should be noted that DNA evidence is equally ineffective as 
evidence for proving polygamy, as the existence of extra-marital children does not itself 
prove plural marriage.472 Texas officials’ efforts at “changing the culture” and 
“protect[ing] them from being harmed” likewise failed, as the raids were generally 
neither effective at investigating or prosecuting the alleged crimes of bigamy nor did they 
curtail the community’s continued support for polygamist activity against which it was 
conceived.473  
472 Lalasz and Gonzales, “Large-Scale FLDS Raids: The Dangers and Appeal of Crime Control 
Theater, 191. 
473 Ibid., 194. 
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2. Potential Future Impact 
Conversely, the raids may well have further isolated an already opaque group and 
confirmed church leadership’s admonitions regarding religious persecution and 
governmental desires to separate FLDS children from their families, thereby 
strengthening their control over adherents by bolstering their purported prophetic status. 
The mass separations likely had the unintended consequence of causing psychological 
and emotional harm to the very victims officials sought to protect. This resulted in 
members feeling the sanctity of their homes had been violated and their children had been 
separated in an illegal and prejudicial manner, with possible negative repercussions to the 
children’s collective emotional well-being and attachment bonds.474 Because the personal 
impact that removal of the children had on YFZ Ranch families was ultimately 
determined by the courts to be an invalid imposition of governmental control into 
adherents’ personal sphere, the raid only confirmed and intensified FLDS members’ 
collective inherent distrust of public agencies, law enforcement, and social service 
officials. In thereby decreasing the prospects for future cooperation with officials and 
increasing the probability that FLDS members will continue to break the law, the raid 
may have had the unintended consequence of making it actually more difficult to protect 
FLDS members from future criminal acts.475 
Looking 55 years back into their own church history and contextualizing the 
ordeal in an unbroken dialectic of tribulations shared by their ancestors, the event also 
stands as yet another manifestation of religious persecution by the state—one the church 
likely views as having been successfully sustained due to divine protection of their 
morally superior cause. The fact that courts had repeatedly invalided removal orders, 
dismissed state cases, and overturned prosecutions from both previous interventions and 
the YFZ Ranch enforcement action could be construed as evidence of a pattern of 
governmental (Babylonian) overreach and attempted official misappropriation of legal 
processes by bigoted, nonbeliever (Gentile) authorities. FLDS adherents and leaders 
474 Wright and Richardson, “Introduction,”14; Lalasz and Gonzales, “Large-Scale FLDS Raids: The 
Dangers and Appeal of Crime Control Theater,” 193. 
475 Lalasz and Gonzales, “Large-Scale FLDS Raids: The Dangers and Appeal of Crime Control 
Theater,” 193, 195. 
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interpreted the raid as a collective test of faith, and members could draw inspiration from 
the biblical examples of martyrs, saints, and prophets who had themselves withstood 
greater forms of persecution and torment. Accordingly, the raid may have only further 
reinvigorated the FLDS community’s distrust of foreign intervention, making it both 
more opaque and strengthening its collective resistance to external opposition.476  
In terms of validating the state’s interest in protecting YFZ Ranch children from 
abuse and neglect, the Texas District Court held that FLDS families could be compelled 
to attend parenting classes, cooperate with investigative efforts, and provide CPS workers 
access to their residences from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. to conduct unannounced home visits.477 
With regard to this last order in particular, the court apparently confirmed that the 
availability of situational awareness and visibility over the domestic circumstances of 
opaque community members constitutes a defensible state interest. A similar 1992 mass 
raid by Australian authorities of The Children of God/The Family International 
communes in Sydney and Melbourne, during which 130 children were forcibly removed 
from their families, resulted in a similar ruling. One week after the raid, the presiding 
magistrate ordered the release of all children from state custody under the condition that 
they “be allowed regular supervisory visits…to monitor their health and whereabouts.”478 
The question then arises as to how homeland security agencies and governmental 
stakeholders might reasonably argue for and obtain similar judicial orders, based on 
protection of children or other homeland security imperatives, to allow them to penetrate 
the opacity of such groups as the FLDS in the future. In particular, officials will be 
challenged to advocate for judicial support for such additional authority and access into 
the private sphere of closed groups in a manner that is reasonable, politically viable, 
sustainable by normal operations, and free from public perceptions of governmental bias, 
prejudice, or infringement of privacy and civil rights. How and under what circumstances 
Texas officials might have obtained the necessary evidence to fulfill a legal burden of 
476 Evans, “The Past as Prologue,” 47–48. 
477 The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Eldorado Investigation, 9. 
478 Susan J. Palmer, “Rescuing Children?,” in Saints under Siege: The Texas State Raid on the 
Fundamentalist Latter Day Saints, ed. Stuart A Wright and James T. Richardson (New York and London: 
New York University Press, 2011), 62. 
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proof in order to gain such expanded access and oversight over a purposely closed group 
remains a wicked problem inherent to the opaque community phenomenon.  
3. The Opportunity for Dialogue 
Throughout the varying levels of governmental interaction with the inhabitants of 
the YFZ Ranch, the need to deal directly with FLDS leadership and dangers of seeking 
alternative sources of information about activities occurring within the compound became 
evident. FLDS adherents are indoctrinated to show deference and respect to a patriarchal, 
authoritarian interpretation of social order. Corresponding adherence to church hierarchy 
is then enforced through the prophet’s control over dispensation of means of salvation 
through celestial marriage and priesthood status and the corresponding marital and 
familial bonds thereupon predicated. As church members are also commonly both 
financially and professional vested in church enterprises and even reside in FLDS-owned 
or -administered properties, the motivations to remain loyal to the church leadership who 
control this microcosmic society are significant. The fact that a twice-convicted 
megalomaniac sat atop this hierarchy created massive challenges for any homeland 
security official attempting to establish a constructive dialogue with the group.  
The pervasive nature of Jeffs’s social control apparatus thus created additional 
religious and psychological hurdles to community-police cooperative efforts. 
Unfortunately, any effort to compel Jeffs to comply with legal prohibitions that conflict 
with his professed religious imperatives had the potential to be categorized by Jeffs, and 
thus viewed by the FLDS faithful, as religious persecution. In categorizing governmental 
enforcement efforts, indictments, prosecutions, and his eventual incarceration as 
Babylonian oppression and by framing his personal crimes and resulting legal misery as a 
shared religious “test of faith,” Jeffs effectively demonized officials who were attempting 
to act in the greater FLDS community’s best interests. In such a situation, it would be 
imperative that homeland security officials clearly communicate the legal basis and 
operational necessity for their actions to impacted adherents, thereby offering their own 
counter-narrative and refutation against their criminal leader’s mala fide contentions. 
While such as strategy may ultimately prove unsuccessful, officials must at least 
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endeavor to show their actions are not purposely prejudicial against an entire class or 
group of followers. Though it is unknown whether or to what extent Texas officials 
embraced such a communication strategy with YFZ Ranch leadership prior to or during 
the intervention, the early outreach efforts of Sheriff Doran would appear to constitute 
this very type of proactive official information campaign.  
4. Potential Alternative Outcomes 
The full depth and breadth of official efforts at all levels of the Schleicher County 
and Texas governments to obtain ongoing situational awareness on the activities at YFZ 
Ranch are unknown. Regardless of those actions embraced prior to the raid, however, 
there would have been ample opportunities for regulatory and legal contact with and 
oversight over the group. Numerous county agencies and departments had legitimate 
interests in the ongoing construction and improvements being made on the property. 
County tax assessors and building inspectors would have frequent cause to inspect the 
multi-family dwellings under construction for taxation and code compliance. Fire 
inspectors would likewise have legitimate reason and legal cause to assess the temple and 
other large buildings to estimate safe carrying capacity and fire abatement efforts. Audits 
conducted to ensure home schooling waivers were on file, curriculum, and educational 
development was acceptable, and any mandatory vaccinations were up to date could also 
have been arranged. Routine wastewater inspections, well and water use compliance, 
rural fire department stipulations, and other health and safety issues could have been 
leveraged to gain access to the closed confines of the ranch. In short, in situations in 
which there exists a situational awareness need regarding an intentionally opaque 
commune, any compelled interaction with governmental agencies or process could 
constitute a source of critical information. 
Obviously, there exists the danger that use of such techniques could be perceived 
to be prejudicial or targeted use of municipal and county inspection and regulatory 
authorities to monitor a private group. To the extent these activities are being routinely 
and legally executed by the responsible parties, however, law enforcement, fire, health, 
emergency management, and other homeland security entities arguably have a legitimate 
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interest in participating in visits to inspect or audit such communes. Reasons for 
participation by law enforcement and other stakeholders could include a regulatory 
agency’s request for police escort, first responder familiarization with the commune’s 
layout and infrastructure in the event a response is needed or combined agency 
community outreach. Alternatively, stakeholder agencies could seek to debrief and 
exploit official sources of situational awareness from governmental assets with whom 
they may not normally interact. Rather than rushing to accept the veracity of spurious 
abuse complaints to gain access to the ranch, officials could have leveraged such visits 
and sources of information to develop the same “plain sight” probable cause indicating 
criminal activity that ultimately served as the legitimate basis for the YFZ Ranch search. 
It is unknown if or to what extent such efforts to obtain tangentially obtained information 
were pursued prior to the YFZ Ranch raid.  
Finally, in the event the YFZ Ranch had continued to maintain its opacity to 
facilitate suspected illicit behavior, it appears civil actions may have been available to 
homeland security stakeholders as a viable recourse. Rather than target FLDS for 
polygamist crimes, sexual abuse, and other illegal activity known to be pervasive in the 
community yet only suspected, not established, to having been or being committed by 
specific individual members with the complicity of church leadership, other states have 
targeted FLDS opaque enclaves through civil process. In June 2012, the Assistant U.S. 
Attorney in Arizona filed a federal civil lawsuit against the municipalities of Colorado 
City, Arizona and Hildale, Utah, as well as two utilities that serve the twin cities, alleging 
they, “engaged in and continue to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives 
persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the First, Fourth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the laws of the United 
States.”479 The suit alleged that these entities illegally discriminated against individuals 
who were not themselves FLDS members, utilizing official offices and services to 
enforce and act in concert with the will of church leadership. In March 2014, a federal 
jury decided for the plaintiff, demonstrating that such actions can prove successful, even 
479 U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. vs. Town of Colorado City, Arizona; City of Hildale, Utah; Twin 
City Power; and Twin City Water Authority, Inc., 2 (n.d.). 
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when potential criminal evidence is tightly compartmented by or involves conspiratorial 
behavior within an opaque group.480 Although the YFZ Ranch did not include non-
members among its inhabitants, similar suits targeting UEP-controlled business practices, 
use of child labor, failure by the church to relinquish apostates’ finances and property, 
and other potential government filed torts constitute a separate means of judicial relief to 
impacted jurisdictions and surrounding communities.  
Eventually, civil process was successfully utilized with regard to the ranch as 
well, though portions of the derogatory evidence utilized in this suit were obtained during 
the 2008 raid. Ultimately, the YFZ Ranch itself would be forfeited in April 2014 under a 
2012 civil suit filed by the Texas Attorney General’s Office alleging the property was 
purchased using funds derived through illegal activity. The majority of the residents had 
already departed the compound, and neither the United Order of Texas—the ownership 
vehicle of the ranch—nor FLDS controlling members fought the case.481 Admittedly, the 
use of these federal and state civil cases to counter suspected FLDS activities likely 
created a contentious atmosphere between government officials and church leadership. 
As such, it would seem advisable that use of civil process should be limited to those 
instances in which no other means of obtaining situational awareness or official 
interaction with the group are available.  
In the final analysis, despite the enforcement and prosecutorial successes achieved 
by Texas law enforcement, critics can argue the premise for the 2008 YFZ Ranch raid 
was flawed and that officials made numerous significant tactical and legal missteps 
during the intervention. Looking back at both the YFZ Ranch and Short Creek raids, 
Evans in fact suggests that officials, frustrated at their inability to combat polygamy 
crimes, appear to have “substituted the claims of child abuse for the morally offensive 
practice of plural marriage.”482 However, given the lack of situational awareness 
information available to homeland security stakeholders before and during the raid, the 
480 Nate Carlisle, “After Big Lawsuit, Family Gets Water from Polygamous Town,” The Salt Lake 
Tribune, May 14, 2014. 
481 Jennifer Rios, “Last Residents Leaving YFZ Ranch,” San Angelo Standard Times, April 17, 2014, 
http://www.gosanangelo.com/news/2014/apr/17/last-residents-leaving-yfz-ranch/ 
482 Evans, “The Past as Prologue,” 47. 
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size and makeup of the FLDS diaspora, the conspiratorial and uncooperative nature of 
many of the ranch’s inhabitants, and the pervasive, organizationally enforced opacity of 
the community, officials cannot be universally censured for some of these errors. It 
appears that homeland security stakeholders and government officials approached the 
FLDS presence at the YFZ Ranch using an operational framework that presumed the 
existence of illicit behavior, widespread abuse of women and children, the presence of 
intending absconders, and the potential emergence of numerous unknown additional 
threats emanating from the compound. This framework prompted officials to treat FLDS 
members collectively rather than individually for the purposes of intervention and 
investigation. 
Although the raid did result in the prosecution of multiple subjects, including the 
despotic leader of the group, for numerous crimes that were apparently institutionalized 
and condoned by the church, it also exacted significant costs in terms of taxpayer funds, 
likely emotional and psychological damage to innocent women and children, and loss of 
public trust and confidence. Had homeland security stakeholders adopted an alternative 
framework and approached the YFZ Ranch using a more objective operational 
perspective, perhaps a more targeted investigative and enforcement approach could have 
been formulated. Alternatively, had officials established and maintained regular and 
recurring communication with group leaders through various forms of voluntary and 
compelled interaction with governmental entities, they might have been better able to 
resolve criminal allegations, satisfy both official and public demands for situational 
awareness, ensure any potential intending absconders or abuse victims had access to 
governmental services and protection, and provide for the safety and welfare of all YFZ 
Ranch residents.  
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VII. FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION
“If we are not ingenious enough to out smart the most radical and violent 
among us, then their disorder will replace our order, their lawlessness will 
replace our law, and their irrationality will replace our rationality.” 
–Commissioner Charles W. Bowser, Esq.
Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission 
March 6, 1986 
A. FINDINGS 
Collectively, these three cases demonstrate that homeland security practitioners 
exhibit a tendency to employ an oppositional framework when approaching opaque 
communities within their jurisdiction. Regardless of government actors’ understanding of 
a given opaque community’s ideology, makeup, capabilities, intentions, and any 
therewith associated actual or potential danger, the closed and unknowable nature of the 
group appears to have led to reactive decision making that exacerbated the negative 
trajectory of the government/community relationship. In all three cases, officials’ lack of 
situational awareness regarding a socially closed group appears to have generated a 
pervasive governmental perception of threat. Various coalitions comprised of concerned 
citizens from the surrounding impacted community, opaque community absconders and 
apostates, anti-cult and counter-group activists, and the media—each armed with their 
unique, often subjective agendas—emerged to foment opposition to the collectively 
reviled or misunderstood group. These coalitions then amplified stakeholders’ collective 
perceived threat by airing grievances, circulating atrocity tales, providing agenda-driven 
“expert” assessments, and actively soliciting various governmental entities to undertake 
enforcement or interventionist measures.  
1. Key Evidence
In all three cases studied, homeland security stakeholders’ professed ultimate 
concerns and motives for interventions into opaque communities were eventually 
eclipsed by cascading elevations in tactical posture towards and defensive responses by 
the targeted group. It is noteworthy that in each case, the cited basis for the initial 
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incursion was repeatedly dismissed by tactical commanders or quickly played a 
secondary or tertiary role in deliberations regarding the escalation of force or justifiable 
degree of intrusion into the community. Warrants being served on members of MOVE 
were forgotten as frustrated police endeavored to breach a fortified row house, dislodge a 
parapet, and compel the surrender of occupants—including innocent associates 
authorities previously sought to protect—at all costs. An investigation and warrant search 
targeting potential illicit weapon modification violations by a small number of Branch 
Davidians was quickly overshadowed by what was later determined to be legitimate 
communal defense of imminent domain against unreasonable and excessive 
governmental use of force. A heavy-handed inquiry into a dubious domestic abuse 
complaint led to a mass child removal operation, desecration of a temple, and seizure of 
secret church records unrelated to the initial criminal allegation. In each case, concerns 
for the safety and welfare of innocent “victims” of targeted opaque community members 
were universally abandoned in the rush to intervene into the closed group and force 
submission to governmental sovereignty, regardless of the perceived legality or 
reasonability of selected use of force tactics.  
It is clear that in each of the examined cases, the previously identified influences 
emerged and were influential in both creating and calcifying homeland security 
stakeholder oppositional frameworks. In each instance, community and political pressure 
to intervene in the private activities of opaque communities increased due to: 
presumption of intending absconders (Branch Davidians and FLDS); projected, 
unfounded concern for women and children members (all cases); and suspected activities 
that offended the prevailing social conscience or prefaced illegality (all cases). All case 
studies revealed an emergence among homeland security officials of a pervasive, 
perceived threat emanating from the opaque community due to the unavailability of 
situational awareness information and intelligence. These circumstances led stakeholders 
to elect unreasonable and largely unnecessary tactical response measures and to pursue 
escalation of use of force continuums in the absence of reliable means of estimating 
threat or assessing potential dangers to officer safety. Finally, officials’ rejection of 
alternative means of dispute resolution, including a repeated failure to pursue or exhaust 
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targeted negotiations, and obvious preference for tactical incursions despite associated 
risks to the lives and welfare of innocent community members substantiated the 
apocalyptic narratives professed by the leadership of all three groups. This in turn created 
a self-fulfilling catastrophic trajectory in which homeland security officials often played a 
pre-scripted role, further preventing the establishment of the constructive dialogue or 
inter-organizational trust relationships necessary for productive negotiation under 
situations of extreme duress.  
2. Common Aggravating Factors
Perhaps more striking is the degree to which homeland security practitioners 
eschewed available alternative methods of dealing with suspected infractions committed 
by individual opaque community members. Authorities instead appear to have repeatedly 
attributed member’s individual crimes and isolated instances of illicit behavior to the 
entire community, creating self-imposed barriers to viable alternative investigative and 
enforcement options. In the case of MOVE, Philadelphia Police had multiple 
opportunities to both arrest fugitives away from their barricaded residence and to separate 
non-complicit women and children members from those being sought. Federal authorities 
could have more earnestly attempted to lure Koresh, Fatta, Schroeder, and others actually 
suspected of being involved in illegally modifying weapons to the Mag Bag or other 
location away from the Davidian compound. This likewise would have separated these 
suspects from Koresh’s innocent adherents, restricting governmental use of “dynamic 
entry” tactics to those against whom such show of force was reasonable and justified. 
Finally, Texas authorities could have taken numerous measures both to corroborate 
details from Jessop’s complaint prior to entering the YFZ Ranch and pursue a warrant 
search of church records for evidence of child abuse and underage marriage absent 
indiscriminate and arbitrary child protective investigations into an entire community. It is 
thus not the presence of suspected criminal behavior among certain individual opaque 
community members but rather officials’ failure to select reasonable investigative 
techniques using the least intrusive methods or having the least impact on innocent 
bystanders from the greater and non-complicit opaque community population that seems 
to have been most negatively affected by said officials’ lack of situational awareness.  
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The given opaque community’s failure to either offer a conduit for establishing 
dialogue with the group, advance a counter narrative to opposition groups, or themselves 
otherwise unilaterally and proactively address allegations and grievances only allowed 
stakeholders’ perceptions of latent threat to fester. In the absence of an available viable 
spokesperson to refute unfounded allegations (FLDS), an ability to translate and defend 
the group’s concerns in secular terms (Branch Davidians), or the offer of a conciliatory 
dialogue with its opponents (MOVE), these oppositional coalitions coalesced into self-
corroborating echo chambers. Officials, at this point often bowing to significant political 
pressure to intervene and sensing their oppositional framework validated in the absence 
of disconfirming evidence, developed operational myopia. Ultimately, stakeholder 
agencies then embraced expedient investigative and enforcement inroads, ignoring 
readily available sources of intelligence or alternate paths to dispute resolution. In the 
cases studied, these efforts culminated in authorities’ selection of disproportionately 
heavy-handed enforcement posture and tactical missteps. Now facing an inability to 
effectively resolve their differences in a situation of heightened emotion under duress, 
parties on both side of each altercation incurred exorbitant human and financial tolls.  
3. Opaque Community Perspectives
Prior to examining potential solutions to this phenomenon, it is useful to view 
homeland security stakeholders’ oppositional framework from the impacted opaque 
community’s vantage point. Both the Branch Davidians and MOVE perceived 
governmental intervention into their communities as illegitimate, likely in part due to 
governmental failure to establish constructive ongoing dialogue with either group. In 
particular, the Branch Davidians viewed a preemptive federal raid as premature and 
unnecessary given Koresh’s repeated conciliatory overtures, leading them to 
contextualize government-perpetrated violence against an otherwise peaceful religious 
community as a manifestation of their charismatic leader’s millenarian narrative. MOVE 
apparently mistakenly believed it could, via repeated public proclamation, simply 
withdraw from the legal and social rules and constraints of the society in which members 
lived. In doing so, the group embraced antagonistic and inflammatory rhetoric to air its 
grievances and test the bounds of governmental will to respond. MOVE thus likely 
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perceived Philadelphia officials to be tolerating its incremental community intimidation 
campaign, viewing subsequent large-scale police interventions as purposely antagonistic 
bait and entrapment operations. Both groups therefore felt their defensive posture was 
justified given the context—a perception that was not shared by the intervening 
governmental authorities, who to varying degrees interpreted the groups’ behaviors 
absent its ideological context as hostile, aberrant, and extremely reckless to innocent 
members.  
The YFZ ranch raid provides additional nuance into these situational context 
filters by presenting a non-violent group that drew a governmental response 
incommensurate with the professed governmental justification for intervention. The raid, 
conducted under what was subsequently determined to be unfounded criminal allegations 
that aligned with governmental presuppositions regarding the community’s illicit 
activities, substantiated church leadership’s existing anti-government narrative regarding 
prejudice against their religious beliefs, and an official desire to forcibly expropriate the 
community’s children. Therefore, FLDS likely viewed homeland security stakeholders’ 
actions as being indicative of an official desire to criminalize, publicly expose and 
humiliate, and disperse through misappropriation of child protective processes a private 
enclave of religious adherents. This perceived latest round of governmental persecution 
was in turn integrated with an ongoing FLDS religious narrative and interpreted as yet 
another existential trial and test by God of the community’s collective strength of faith. 
Because the FLDS’s reluctant yet nascent embrace of local stakeholders’ efforts to 
establish dialogue with the group was usurped and abrogated by state officials’ and 
politicians’ prevailing agendas, the group likely viewed interaction with any 
governmental entity as simply a hidden pretext for further harassment, persecution, and 
intervention.  
4. Confirmation of Independent Variable 
Consequently, it appears the common independent variable that either led to or 
prevented successful resolution of governmental interventions into these opaque 
communities was the ability or failure by officials in adopting a strategy of pursuing 
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constructive, empathetic dialogue and routine interaction with opaque community 
leadership. In all three cases, local officials had at various times successfully deescalated 
potentially violent situations and eschewed perceived needs for governmental 
intervention by proactively and openly communicating with the closed group. In those 
cases that ended tragically, a failure to achieve a substantive, properly contextualized 
dialogue heightened perceptions of threat, compounded miscommunication between the 
adversarial parties, engendered bilateral intransigence in negotiations, and ultimately 
frustrated all attempts to establish a fertile environment for compromise and conflict 
avoidance. Although the most comprehensive documentation related to these 
communication barriers involves post-incursion periods of negotiation and duress, the 
available historical record is fraught with missed cues and unexploited inroads to 
constructive dialogue by homeland security officials that, had they been utilized, may 
have prevented heavy handed enforcement actions, fruitless interventions, or tragic 
tactical escalations.  
5. Applicability to Future Events 
Ultimately, homeland security practitioners cannot prevent an opaque community 
from developing in or relocating to their respective jurisdiction, at which times variations 
of the identified challenges illuminated in the case studies presented will inevitably 
emerge. Other jurisdictions have already dealt with opaque communities for some time 
with varying degrees of success. FLDS communities similar to the YFZ Ranch continue 
to exist near Pringle, South Dakota and Mancos, Colorado. The Muslim community 
Jamaat al-Fuqra (“Muslims of America”) near Red House, Virginia as well as at other 
closed rural enclaves constitutes a perennial situational awareness challenges to 
homeland security officials in those jurisdictions. Given that authorities cannot instill or 
compel a will or desire to cooperate upon the opaque group itself, the only recourse is to 
examine and modify their own behavior to ensure the greatest likelihood of a successful 
relationship with the closed community they face. With regard to the Waco tragedy, 
Newport highlights this need for independent initiative and self-reflection among official 
stakeholders when facing in particular future millenarian groups: 
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The state may not be able to change a group’s doctrinal propensities, but it 
can control its own reactions, and in doing so may exert significant 
leverage over the outcome. The overt behavior of some millenarian groups 
will undoubtedly force state action, but the potential for violence can be 
mitigated if law-enforcement personnel avoid dramatic presentations of 
force. If, on the other hand, they naively become co-participants in 
millenarian’s end-time script, future Wacos will be not merely probable; 
they will be inevitable.483 
What similarly appears evident in each homeland security related interaction with 
secessionist, survivalist, militia, millenarian, or apocalyptic ideologies is that any effort 
by governmental actors to achieve constructive dialogue and cooperation on matters of 
mutual interest have the unfortunate potential to fall victim to the group’s existing anti-
governmental narratives. Group leaders can exploit outreach efforts by law enforcement 
to steer or leverage intra-group power dynamics. The perceived motive and purpose 
behind genuinely benign and altruistic official attempts to integrate opaque communities 
into emergency planning and response efforts can be purposely or inadvertently warped 
through the kaleidoscopic lens of conspiracy theories, making them appear to be 
clandestine efforts to control, infiltrate, influence, or destroy the group with which such 
partnership is sought.484 Just as occurred in all three examined cases, if an opaque 
community leader declares that the government only wants to register, control, 
expropriate, or remove members’ guns, children, and finances, opportunities to interpret 
legitimate official interest in any of these will inevitably present themselves and serve as 
evidence in support of such assertions. 
Although an interactional framework for successfully integrating opaque 
communities into homeland security efforts presupposes a governmental commitment to 
empathetic understanding of their beliefs, this is likely not sufficient to prevent future 
miscommunication-predicated tragedy. If homeland security stakeholders fail to view 
opaque communities as constituencies with full and equal rights to their alternative 
worldviews—as arcane, personally offensive, and generally unpopular as these may be—
483 Newport, “Cults, Religious Conflict, Religious Liberty and Frameworks of Order,”14. 
484 For a comprehensive discussion of conspiracy theory barriers to law enforcement interactions with 
subculture groups, see Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller, The Power of Unreason—Conspiracy Theories, 
Extremism and Counter-terrorism (London: Demos, 2010), 150.   
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they risk succumbing to their own Manichean mind-set predisposed to detect and disrupt 
presumed illicit activity. Once such a dualistic view becomes ingrained in governmental 
actors and empathetic, unbiased communication degrades into evidence-seeking and 
negotiation-oriented discourse, the actions of both government and community members 
risk being cross-interpreted according to pre-existing filters and narratives, leading to 
self-fulfilling, yet wholly avoidable, oppositional events. In other words, though an 
opaque community’s beliefs may well have amplified members’ perceived duress and 
ultimately led to a tragic apogee, such beliefs did not uniformly or patently prevent 
constructive dialogue prior to governmental imposition of interventionist tactics.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
By recognizing the existing interactional frameworks with which they normally 
perceive opaque communities, homeland security practitioners can ensure they better 
cooperate and establish productive dialogue with the closed group absent bias, unfounded 
perceptions of threat, and oppositional filters. Officials who pursue targeted interaction 
and establish effective communication channels will be better enabled to obtain 
situational awareness regarding the community’s true activities and intentions, resolve 
any legal disputes, dispel misinformation and rumors, and deescalate any confrontations 
between the community and outside actors. Through adoption of circumspective and 
properly contextualized interactional frameworks vis-à-vis opaque communities, 
stakeholders will be less prone to overestimating perceived threats or misinterpreting 
seemingly aberrant but innocuous opaque community member behavior. This capacity 
will further enable officials to establish tripwires indicative of actual threat escalation or 
disconcerting evolution of community intentions, ideology, or membership. In addition, 
officials will be better able to avoid making rash or unmeasured interventions into closed 
groups based on tenuous legal justifications and will have improved decision-making 
abilities in tactical situations that are deemed inexorable. Adoption of these improved 
operational qualities will enhance homeland security practitioners’ stature, 
professionalism, and capabilities both among the impacted opaque community and larger 
constituency served. 
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1. Identified Potentially Viable Frameworks 
Instances of successful interaction and communication between opaque 
community members and officials appear throughout the case studies analyzed and offer 
nascent but promising templates for future successful integrative efforts. Opaque 
community outreach exemplars were evident in each case, though the concurrent 
escalation of events prevented a comprehensive test of their viability in every instance. In 
the case of the Branch Davidians, Koresh repeatedly highlighted his cordial relationship 
with McLennan County Sheriff Jack Harwell, both before and during the standoff. 
Koresh had attempted to openly address law enforcement scrutiny of Mount Carmel by 
contacting a deputy after detecting an undercover officer posing as deliveryman, and 
Harwell’s reputation with the Davidians was successfully leveraged in arranging the only 
face-to-face negotiation with the community during the siege. Prior to the Eldorado raid, 
Sheriff Doran had successfully developed intermediaries with FLDS leadership at the 
YFZ Ranch, leveraging these relationships in hosting meetings to facilitate mutual trust 
between the group, community leaders, and law enforcement. Finally, members of 
Philadelphia Police Department noted that officers were successful in communicating 
with MOVE during its formative years, and community action groups enjoyed some 
success in negotiating with MOVE members. It was likely only after MOVE developed 
its own oppositional framework to perceived police harassment and persecution that this 
dialogue became constrained and, ultimately, openly combative on both sides.  
Among the case studies examined, it appears that two general scenarios emerged 
that frustrated formerly productive interaction with opaque groups. First, in the cases of 
both the YFZ Ranch and Branch Davidians, competing agendas of supra-jurisdictional 
entities and stakeholders appears to have thwarted existing successful 
government/opaque community relationships. Sheriffs in both Schleicher and McLennan 
Counties had established what appeared to be effective and enduring local relationships 
with their respective opaque groups. These relationships were later surmounted, likely 
discounted, and ultimately under-exploited by higher authority stakeholders from 
overlaying jurisdictions. The FBI did briefly leverage Sheriff Harwell’s personal 
relationship with Koresh and Texas state officials did apparently incorporate Sheriff 
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Doran’s input into their tactical decisions, with successful results in both cases. However, 
officials with little to no contact with or empirical understanding of the targeted opaque 
communities were ultimately responsible for decision- making regarding compelled 
governmental interactions with the targeted group. Though one might argue these 
officials’ superseding agendas or operational constraints prevented full integration of 
local rapport with community members, the resultant unfortunate outcomes may 
nonetheless have been avoided if existing relationships with these entities had been fully 
exploited to establish productive dialogue and avoid further conflict.  
A second and less manageable scenario involved the excommunication, 
banishment, or replacement of viable communication partners by the opaque group. In 
the case of the YFZ Ranch, one of Sheriff Doran’s FLDS contacts was excommunicated 
and his wives reassigned to other members of the group, allegedly due to his relationship 
with the law enforcement. It is unknown if this penalty specifically targeted non-
compliance with church chain-of-command protocols or was in response to unauthorized 
provision to outsiders of what was deemed sensitive community information. Donald 
Glassey’s utility was likewise severely diminished given that although he was present at 
MOVE’s foundation, it appeared his knowledge of the inner workings of the organization 
were limited by the time he was vetted as a confidential informant. Though 
Rodriguez/Gonzalez’s actions in an undercover capacity do not constitute a conventional 
channel of communication with an opaque community “insider,” he was nonetheless 
utilized by Koresh as a conduit for messaging prior to his being directed to leave the 
compound and intercede with his superiors on behalf of the Davidians. Direct and open 
communication with duly empowered opaque community leaders would have been 
preferable to any of the aforementioned scenarios. In the absence of such established 
conduits and protocols, however, the removal or cessation of any source of information 
from an otherwise entirely closed compound constitutes a grave setback to situational 
awareness maintenance efforts. 
Though perhaps unique to FLDS opaque enclaves due to their presence in 
numerous rural jurisdictions, sheriff’s offices have independently collaborated on issues 
related to opaque communities with promising results. In 2007, sheriffs from three 
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impacted jurisdictions met in Eldorado to discuss experiences and share information 
related to the FLDS.485 Such exchanges can be used to allay fears, reinforce positive 
operational frameworks, and provide a professional advice and counseling network for 
resolution of specific challenges in dealing with opaque groups. Though this meeting was 
group specific, training for county and municipal stakeholder agencies impacted by 
closed communities could provide replicable “best practices” and assist homeland 
security officials in avoiding the trap of restrictive and biased frameworks in dealing with 
such constituencies. As one attendee of the 2007 Eldorado meeting noted, “I need to 
provide [FLDS] with law enforcement and EMS. We’ve got their kids registered with the 
state for their home schooling. I feel real well about it right now, as long as I keep an 
open mind.”486 Such statements indicate a laudable degree of stakeholder self-awareness 
and objectivity: both enviable characteristics for officials serving in opaque community 
liaison roles.  
Evidence throughout the three case studies indicates that homeland security 
practitioners’ threat analysis of the opaque community was flawed and tended to perceive 
community-wide threat where none was present. In addition to building reciprocal trust-
based relationships with closed community leaders and members, officials will also need 
to develop and hone analytical frameworks that prevent a group’s opacity from acting as 
a threat confirmation bias or constituting a fallacy of composition. Analytical bias, 
selection of reliable sources, access to and interaction with the object of study, and the 
competing realities of the larger political environment have all been identified as key 
drivers of effective analysis.487 These stakeholder biases, combined with a lack of 
available sources of information or access to community members, compound the 
difficulties of effectively analyzing purposely-opaque groups. Yet by simply recognizing 
the limitations of available analysis, employing robust analytical tools, and 
contextualizing one’s operational framework and professional situational awareness 
485 “Sheriffs Compare Notes on FLDS,” Deseret Morning News (Salt Lake City), May 9, 2007. 
486 Ibid. 
487 David Brannan, Anders Strindberg, and Kristin Darken, A Practitioner’s Way Forward: Terrorism 
Analysis (Salinas, CA: Agile Press, 2014), 15–32.  
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requirements with rigorous and objective standards for assessing threat, homeland 
security stakeholders will avoid many of the pitfalls encountered by their counterparts in 
Philadelphia, Waco, and Eldorado.  
The use of social identity theory (SIT) may be useful in this endeavor. SIT “is 
based on an insistence that human action needs to be understood in its social context,” 
and that “through social identity, the subject is defined in social terms.”488 As a surveyor 
of opaque community behavior, homeland security stakeholders can employ SIT 
methodology to deconstruct and gain insight on community behavior, reactions to social 
stimuli, and likely attitudes towards governmental interest. SIT acts as a tool for self-
assessment as well, however, enabling practitioners to view their own behavior and 
attitudes through the lens of their inherent social motivations, drivers, and influences. It 
“offers a framework for integrating insights from a variety of analytical models within an 
intercultural framework…it also allows the researcher to account for his or her own 
hermeneutic biases, as well as those of the research subject.”489 An existing body of 
applied theory research regarding SIT is available for use by homeland security 
practitioners in interactions with closed communities within their jurisdictions.490 By 
utilizing SIT in an interactional setting, stakeholders have an analytic tool that increases 
their understanding of opaque group members’ behavior and social motivators as well as 
the possible existence of their own oppositional mindset.  
In their article “Interacting with “Cults”—A Policing Model,” Szubin, Jensen, and 
Gregg offer insightful recommendations for just such introspective, analytically 
supported interaction with arcane and culturally misunderstood new religious 
movements. The authors note that in dealing with obscure groups, perpetuating myths 
regarding the brainwashing of emotionally vulnerable members or assumptions that 
charismatic leaders are simply orchestrating financial cons are detrimental to community 
outreach efforts. Rather than simply stigmatizing the group by characterizing it as a 
488 Stephen Reicher, “The Context of Social Identity: Domination, Resistance, and Change,” Political 
Psychology 25, no. 6 (2004): 921, 929. 921–945 
489 Brannan, Strindberg, and Darken, A Practitioner’s Way Forward, 61. 
490 For a comprehensive discussion of SIT’s potential utility at the operational level, see A 
Practitioner’s Way Forward: Terrorism Analysis by Brannan, Strindberg, and Darken.  
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“cult” and monitoring it as a presumed threat (i.e., adopting an oppositional framework), 
the authors recommend reaching out to sources of expertise within both the federal 
government and academia to educate and contextualize their assessments. By offering a 
typology of social risk factors, including neutral behaviors such as “unquestioning 
adherence to their leader,” adoption of “unfamiliar customs or rituals,” and segregation 
from the surrounding community, which the authors note, “says little about a group’s 
attitude towards violence or suicide,” the article provides tools by which authorities can 
question their innate assumptions or potential bias and set objective behavioral tripwires 
indicative of threat amplification.491 They further identify establishment of constructive 
dialogue and relationships of trust as an effective means of enabling mutual 
understanding and fulfillment of situational awareness needs. Though not itself an opaque 
community, their case study involving the arrival of 150 members of the Taiwanese Chen 
Tao movement in Garland, Texas in August, 1997 stands as a paradigmatic employment 
of such outreach. A Garland police lieutenant assigned as the official liaison with the 
group established an effective rapport with Chen Tao members, facilitated dispute 
resolution, efficient event planning, and the mutually satisfactory management of media 
interest. Szubin, Jensen, and Gregg  note, “the rapport allowed authorities to become so 
well acquainted with group activities that they probably would have noticed any changes 
that might have signaled planned violence or suicide” and permitted authorities to ask 
and meaningfully assess responses to questions regarding potential violent or suicidal 
intentions by the group.492  
2. Opportunities for Establishing Communication 
 Stakeholders should consider a variety of operational and jurisdictional issues, 
practicalities, and community sensitivities when identifying viable means of outreach to 
opaque groups. 
491 Szubin, Jensen, and Gregg, “Interacting with ‘Cults:’ A Policing Model,” 19–23. 
492 Ibid., 22. 
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a. Ideal Candidates 
(1) Issues Impeding use of Federal Assets 
There are a number of impediments—legal, operational, and practical—that 
hinder federal law enforcement’s abilities to collect and maintain intelligence on closed 
communities, establish regular and constructive dialogue with such groups, and seek 
methods of addressing known or suspected legal and regulatory infractions, community 
concerns, and homeland security planning and coordination efforts. First and foremost, 
practical circumstances prevent federal agencies and personnel from maintaining regular 
and recurring contact with opaque groups. Particularly with regard to opaque 
communities that domicile in rural and remote locations, federal assets are often 
challenged to travel frequently to communes and closed community property. Though 
such frequent contact is less problematic in urban settings, federal contact with 
individuals and groups is normally initiated through investigative interest. Unlike local 
law enforcement, fire department, social service employees, building and code inspectors, 
public utility personnel, teachers, and various other state, county, and municipal 
governmental entities, federal law enforcement traditionally has little need or predicate 
for regular and recurring compelled contact with opaque community members. Because 
these alternate local officers and assets do collectively have routine cause for such 
contact outside the scope of investigation or enforcement events (i.e., duress scenarios), 
they would appear to be better positioned than federal personnel to leverage interactions 
with opaque community members in the course of their customary duties into cooperative 
dialogue and the fulfillment of situational awareness requirements. Finally, although 
there may be potential federal interlocutors located at local offices, these officers are 
commonly either not permanently assigned to these offices, are required to rotate to new 
offices on a regular basis per agency policy, or seek promotions or other career 
opportunities that would draw them away from the given jurisdiction, which hinders their 
ability to establish long-term personal relationships with members and leadership of 
opaque groups.  
A second impediment to the use of federal law enforcement for opaque 
community outreach involves the performance metrics and oversight mechanisms used to 
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focus, steer, and monitor federal law enforcement activity. The executive branch 
generally expects federal law enforcement officers to identify, investigate, and support 
the prosecution of federal crimes rather than dedicate time and energy to community 
relation efforts. Current metrics measuring case hours, arrests, seizures, and prosecutions 
prioritize enforcement over soft diplomacy and relationship building. These impediments 
aside, though a given federal office’s supervisory chain could perhaps be convinced that 
dedication of official time and attention to development of an interactive dialogue with a 
local closed community may be a judicious use of agency resources, such a proposition 
would require both interest and advocacy on the part of the requesting party and a holistic 
view of homeland security and federal crime abatement on the part of this individual’s 
supervisory chain. The reasonability of such a set of circumstances, combined with the 
rotational nature of most federal law enforcement human capital strategies, suggests that 
only in the most fortuitous scenario could such agency-supported investment of federal 
assets and organizationally ingrained willingness to adopt stewardship responsibilities for 
such local issues be conceived. Consequently, any dedication of federal law enforcement 
assets to opaque community communication and outreach efforts would need to be 
accompanied by revisions to agency missions and priorities as well as performance 
metrics if managerial support for such activity can be expected. A key challenge in 
designing such metrics involves establishing a definition of “successful” outreach that 
would satisfy congressional oversight and audits to justify public investment in such 
programs. This same issue has plagued efforts by foreign counterterrorism strategies to 
measure the quality of governmental engagement or to establish a means of definitively 
identifying a program’s success or failure.493  
As mentioned in previous chapters, two federal agencies with homeland security 
information sharing and intelligence gathering mandates—the FBI and DHS I&A—are 
well positioned to interact with opaque groups. However, corporate cultures, operational 
security protocols, authorities, and restrictions on information sharing frustrate their 
potential contributions to opaque community integration efforts. The FBI, as the lead 
493 Brad Deardorff, “Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 9.   
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federal law enforcement agency, is most likely to interact with opaque groups pursuant to 
investigations of federal crimes and intelligence assessment cases.494 The FBI’s 
Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG) maintains the aforementioned 
assessment case category as a formal investigative activity that requires “no particular 
factual predication” to initiate.495 Type 4 Assessments, the purpose of which is defined as 
to “obtain and retain information to inform or facilitate intelligence analysis and 
planning” appear in particular to be potentially well suited for maintaining situational 
awareness on opaque groups. Type 4 assessments are neither “threat specific” nor 
duration constrained. However, they do require an “authorized purpose and clearly 
defined objective(s)” and “cannot be based on the exercise of First Amendment protected 
activities or on race, ethnicity, national origin or religion, or a combination of only such 
factors.”496 The DIOG also identifies “liaison activities and tripwires,” loosely defined as 
informal public outreach and community liaison efforts, as an authorized FBI activity, 
though any actions utilizing delineated “investigative method[s]” necessitate formal case 
initiation procedures.497 Though collectively, these actions may authorize and 
sufficiently formalize protocols for opaque community liaison activities and enable the 
FBI to fulfill its own intelligence requirements, they remain solely within the purview of 
the FBI’s investigative and intelligence collection functions. Any information gleaned 
from such actions is likely prohibited from being freely shared outside FBI channels or 
with non-law enforcement entities, as discussed below. Because the DIOG also prohibits 
official situational awareness gathering activities regarding opaque groups established 
solely on religious or other First Amendment protected beliefs, these types of officially 
sanctioned inquiries may be neither permitted nor applicable to a full spectrum of closed 
community types.  
The dissemination of any information captured by the FBI is highly restricted per 
agency regulations. FBI case report are currently handled and stored on a classified 
494 U.S. Department of Justice, The Attorney General’s Guidelines. 
495 Federal Bureau of Investigations, Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG) 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2011), 5–1. 
496 Ibid., 5–17; 5–18. 
497 Ibid., 11–1. 
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network that houses both the legacy Automated Case Support (ACS) and Sentinel case 
management systems. Unfortunately, because FBI documents commingle sensitive and 
classified information, processes to redact and share information beyond the FBI with 
state and local department and offices are restrictive and manually burdensome.498 
Additionally, the FBI’s current information sharing policies, protocols, and corporate 
culture have been shown to be problematic for the routine sharing with and between state 
and local law enforcement agencies. Gomez notes,  
The FBI has repeatedly asserted its commitment to information sharing, 
but the available information indicates that the primary focus on this effort 
will continue to be primarily dependent on ‘ad hoc’ methods, like the 
JTTF, FIG and Fusion Centers. Unfortunately, these ‘ad hoc’ methods are 
susceptible to obstructive behavior by individual FBI employees, who may 
be opposed to sharing information, overly protective of information or 
other obstructionist motivations.499  
Deardorff bolsters this sentiment, noting, “JTTFs do not have the authority or a 
formal mechanism to disseminate information beyond participants in the task force,” and, 
“enjoy only limited analytical capability for counterterrorism matters in support of local 
and regional issues or threats because intelligence collection priorities are generally 
related to foreign-focused national intelligence requirements, not societal factors that 
influence domestic radicalization.”500 Due to these organizational barriers and collective 
restrictions with sharing classified case and intelligence reports with state and local 
homeland security stakeholders who do not hold FBI security clearances, as well as 
limited availability of networks capable of storing and handling such information, use of 
FBI systems as a repository for information on opaque groups is deemed overly 
restrictive and operationally problematic.501  
DHS I&A, through its legislative mandate and in support of multiple federal 
strategies to support the national network of state and local fusion centers, has additional 
498 Peter L. Gomez, “Enhancing FBI Terrorism and Homeland Security Information Sharing With 
State, Local and Tribal Agencies” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 35–36.  
499 Ibid., 17. 
500 Brad Deardorff, The Roots of Our Children’s War (Williams, CA: Agile Press, 2013), 141–142. 
501 Gomez, “Enhancing FBI Terrorism,” 11. 
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opportunities to assist homeland security efforts to obtain and maintain situational 
awareness intelligence on opaque communities.502 Because fusion centers are locally 
owned and controlled assets supported by the federal government, they are uniquely 
enabled to tailor the collection, receipt, analysis, and dissemination of relevant homeland 
security threat information from and between federal, state, and local stakeholders.503 
Fusion centers serve as a conduit for national security related information, including 
classified intelligence, to state and local partners.504 Because DHS I&A is not an 
investigative agency and the majority of its reporting is purposely made available at the 
unclassified level via the Homeland Security Information Network, the agency does not 
face the same information sharing restrictions that prevent full dissemination of FBI 
information.505 However, DHS I&A employee contact with opaque communities would 
be limited to secondhand information gathering from state and local partner agencies and 
personnel, meaning the agency could not currently fulfill the role of providing direct 
liaison with opaque groups. Also, as a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community, I&A 
is restricted in the types of information it can collect and process regarding U.S. citizens, 
hampering its ability to act as a repository for comprehensive situational awareness 
intelligence on opaque groups.506 These necessary and prudent restrictions aside, I&A’s 
lack of an investigative mandate and ability to act as a force multiplier and intermediary 
for federal information sources allows state and local partners a significant degree of 
autonomy and operational flexibility unavailable via partnerships with traditional federal 
law enforcement entities.  
(2) Benefits of Local Liaison Providers 
502 “Fusion Centers’ Support of National Strategies and Guidance,” U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, accessed July 17, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/topic/fusion-centers-support-national-strategies-and-
guidance. 
503 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers.” 
504 “New Information-Sharing Tool for Fusion Centers Announced,” U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, accessed July 17, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/09/14/new-information-sharing-tool-
fusion-centers-announced. 
505 “HSIN-Intelligence,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed July 17, 2014, 
http://www.dhs.gov/hsin-intelligence. 
506 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “More About the Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
Mission;” White House, “Executive Order 12333.” 
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Given these restrictions to the use of federal law enforcement and intelligence 
assets to promote interaction with and maintain information regarding opaque 
communities, it would appear local stakeholders are more suitable candidates to provide 
liaison services to such groups. Based on insights gained from the selected cases, it would 
appear the office of county sheriff is particularly well suited to fulfill this role. First, the 
office of sheriff is normally the only popularly elected law enforcement position with 
whom constituents have regular contact. As such, the office constitutes a quasi-political 
post with law enforcement powers. Through posse comitatus-derived common law or 
statutory authority, it is also the law enforcement office of primacy in most jurisdictions. 
Sheriffs may therefore enjoy a greater degree of perceived democratic legitimacy than 
federal or state law enforcement officers, over whose selection local populations have no 
say. Sheriffs can be viewed as “one of us” by local populations, and the office is widely 
free of the stigmas associated with federal and state hegemony or interest in local issues. 
A personal, local relationship between an elected law enforcement representative and the 
opaque community constituency he or she serves would therefore seem to be an ideal 
platform from which to build liaison relationships.  
Through judicial service of process functions, support to civil procedures, 
operation of local correctional facilities, and integration with county departments and 
agencies, sheriffs are the local entity most likely to have compelled interaction with 
opaque communities. As most common legal infractions involving opaque community 
members would involve violations of state and local rather than federal laws and 
regulations, sheriffs would have the greatest need for routine enforcement contact, in 
particular as the service agent for any warrants from county courts. Finally, because 
sheriffs and their deputies are responsible for a limited geographic area and normally 
enjoy a lengthy tenure in their position, they are well positioned to maintain long-term, 
personal relationships with opaque group members and leadership. Note that as two of 
the three selected cases involved opaque groups situated in rural settings—a common 
practice by communities looking to withdraw from greater society—counties rather than 
municipalities are more likely to be the office of primary jurisdiction over enclaves and 
compounds situated in unincorporated areas. 
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Unlike various other federal and state agencies, a sheriff’s traditional mandate to 
“maintain the peace” of a given jurisdiction is likewise sufficiently vague to allow for 
dedication of time and assets to opaque community outreach efforts. Sheriffs, by virtue of 
selection by electorate, hold executive powers and answer directly to their constituents, 
which allows them to advocate for interaction and cooperation with closed groups 
without the burdens of administrative oversight or justification metrics. Although sheriff 
offices would need to ensure adherence to the aforementioned information collection and 
storage restrictions using 28 CFR Part 23 compliant systems, they are better able through 
routine contact and local presence to develop institutional knowledge and situational 
awareness of an opaque group and advise their constituents accordingly.  
There are two caveats to the proposal that the office of sheriff is generally an ideal 
liaison position. First, in large urban areas, major city police departments may be better 
positioned to maintain regular contact with opaque enclaves due to municipal jurisdiction 
and greater contact frequency between officers and group members. Practicality and 
operational convenience matters aside, such arrangements could be coordinated with the 
respective county authority to ensure full exploitation of the unique stature frequently 
associated with the popularly elected position of sheriff. Second, homeland security 
stakeholders should take care never to reject an available alternative interlocutor, 
regardless of their office, authorities, or discipline. If a given opaque community has an 
existing relationship or ongoing dialogue with a governmental function, office, employee, 
sheriff offices and other stakeholder agencies should take care to nurture and exploit this 
inroad to situational awareness as a platform for further relationship development. As 
discussed below and highlighted throughout the case studies, due to the premium placed 
by social groups on strong interpersonal relationships founded on trust, efforts that 
attempt to usurp or abrogate existing functional relationships between individual 
governmental personnel and opaque community members should be maintained and 
incorporated into situational awareness gathering activities at all costs.  
It would therefore appear that homeland security stakeholders at the county level 
are the most appropriate candidates for relationship building with opaque groups. The 
key to successful implementation of sheriff-led outreach strategies will, however, require 
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strong support from the state and local levels. First, higher jurisdictions would need to 
collaborate with while deferring to the sheriff’s interactional decisions and assessments 
regarding opaque communities, regardless of outside political pressure to impose 
jurisdictional supremacy over dealings with such groups. Arredondo advocates for this 
collaborative model, noting that in the Eldorado raid, Texas authorities “[should] have 
deferred to the sheriff’s sense of the development of the case rather than announcing the 
warrant execution and demanding assistance from local agencies.”507 Second, sheriffs 
would have to be willing to share and disseminate situational awareness information 
outside of their jurisdiction to satisfy and enable state and federal stakeholders to inform 
and advise policy makers and executives who may view opaque groups as a threat. Third, 
fusion centers, DHS I&A, and the FBI would need to provide coordination and support to 
sheriffs in dealing with opaque groups, in particular if such groups (such as the FLDS) 
maintain enclaves and compounds in other jurisdictions, include foreign members, or are 
identified as having potentially violated federal laws. In the event that higher jurisdictions 
are compelled to intervene into opaque communities or enforce state and federal laws, all 
efforts should be made to leverage the sheriff’s existing relationship with an opaque 
community to clearly communicate governmental intentions, respond to concerns, 
facilitate pre-negotiated surrender of sought members, and avoid misinterpretation of 
tactical operations. Strong cooperative relationships involving all levels of homeland 
security stakeholders operating under the agreement that the sheriff would take the lead 
position in communication and contact with the opaque group will be necessary if this 
strategy is to succeed.  
3. Selection of an Appropriate Interlocutor 
Regardless of the agency, office, or position(s) selected to act as the homeland 
security liaison with an opaque community, additional consideration should be given to 
the personality, interpersonal skills, charisma, traits, and diplomatic abilities of the 
chosen interlocutor to ensure an appropriate fit between governmental representative and 
targeted group. Attempts should be made to identify a candidate who can both empathize 
507 Arredondo, “Toward a Viable Policing Model,” 141. 
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with opaque group’s ideology, ultimate concerns, and cultural sensitivities while firmly 
advocating for rule of law and governmental dominion over secular matters. Selection of 
an official communicator based on gender, race, age, religious background, or appearance 
may be anathema to stakeholder agencies and potentially criticized as governmental 
attempts to cater to a given opaque community’s culturally despicable or religiously 
intolerant beliefs. However, just as attempting to force a Muslim fundamentalist imam to 
interact with a young female officer would create potentially insurmountable 
communication barriers, attempts at compelling opaque groups to cooperate with an 
interlocutor whose presence or authority incenses or offends their core beliefs would only 
antagonize and frustrate attempts to integrate these members into the larger community.  
Due in part to their training and experience in operating according to government 
use of force continuum guidelines, law enforcement officers in particular often find it 
challenging to remain objective and deflect confrontation from entities that neither 
respect nor acknowledge their authority. Docherty identifies this very issue as a lesson 
learned following the Waco tragedy.508 Namely, that liaison officers who are unable to 
tolerate challenges to their authority are likely to develop into lightening rods for opaque 
community grievances or to make tactical decisions based on ideological grounds rather 
than objective indicators or articulable threats: 
According to Weber,  
Barricaded communities, by their very existence, post a threat to the 
identities of law enforcement agents. Unconventional political or religious 
groups that refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the state are denying the 
state’s status as a ‘compulsory association with a territorial basis’ that 
holds the right to ‘monopolize the use of force’ within its territorial 
jurisdiction.  
Law enforcement agencies are the coercive arm of the state. In order to function 
in their jobs, law enforcement agents must assume the legitimacy of the state, and they 
must believe in their right to wield force on behalf of the state. Facing barricaded subjects 
who do not grant that legitimacy compels law enforcement agents to acknowledge the 
fragility of the “negotiated order” that grant their role legitimacy, which threatens the 
508 Docherty, Learning Lessons from Waco, 277–278. 
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identities of law enforcement agents at a deep personal level. It also requires a high level 
of self-reflection while one is engaged in doing dangerous and difficult work.”509 
Finally, interpersonal relationships between homeland security stakeholders and 
opaque community members and leadership are relationships of trust. Strong 
relationships overcome mistrust, and research has demonstrated that individuals are more 
likely to trust other people than impersonal bureaucracies or organizations, with close and 
stable personal relationships proving to be crucial in building emotional or “affective” 
trust and a belief that a given institution is dedicated to the community’s welfare and 
needs.510 A need to personalize interactions with the public has been shown to be critical 
for law enforcement agencies, particularly in communities where trust in government is 
low and conspiracy theories abound.511 In his article “Intelligence and Homeland 
Defense,” Crumpton underscores this proposition, noting,  
The essence of intelligence success in the homeland is voluntary 
cooperation, with law enforcement playing a complementary role and 
employing legal intrusive means against bona fide suspects. Intelligence 
relationships, contrary to popular literature, are built more on 
interdependence and trust than on coercion.512  
As such, ideal candidates and successful community liaison personnel will need to be 
willing to embrace a long term relationship with the opaque community to allow such 
personal bonds and trust to develop. Likewise, stakeholder agency management will need 
to support investments in opaque community outreach through dedication of personnel 
and by ensuring the career track of volunteers for liaison positions aligns with agency 
support for such outreach initiatives so that employee turnover and promotions do not 
frustrate these dedicated relationship building efforts.  
509 Ibid., 277–278. 
510 Bartlett and Carl Miller, The Power of Unreason, 42. 
511 Simon Parker et al., State of Trust—How to Build Better Relationships Between Councils and the 
Public (London: Demos, 2008), 26, http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Trust_web_ALL%20_032.pdf  
512 Henry A. Crumpton, “Intelligence and Homeland Defense,” in Transforming U.S. Intelligence, ed. 
Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 208.  162–
179. 
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4. Alternative Sources of Situational Awareness Information 
With regard to the available methods for obtaining better knowledge about closed 
religious groups, Sullivan highlights the shortsightedness of officials’ perception that 
existing legal constraints to intelligence gathering limit their potential inroads to 
contextual understanding of such communities. In particular, he highlights that 
stakeholders’ preferences for illegal surveillance activities targeting law-abiding religious 
groups is due to a mistaken belief in such communities’ individual nature. Alternatively, 
Sullivan notes, “to know more about religion does not require transgressing the law to 
gather intelligence. University curricula in religious studies are grounded on information 
publicly available in libraries and bookstores.”513 The MOVE Commission concurred 
with this assessment in its recommendations, noting,  
The City should maintain and periodically update a list of experts who 
could be consulted on short notice in situations involving hostages, cult 
groups, terrorist organizations...or other crisis situations. Appropriate City 
Officials should maintain contact with these experts to insure their ready 
availability in time of need.514  
Though certainly beneficial when interacting with many obscure religious groups, this 
course of action would not necessarily contribute to comprehensive understanding and 
awareness of opaque religious communities, nor does it solve information deficiencies 
involving closed secular enclaves. Understanding the religious world views and 
accompanying ultimate concerns and motivations of a group may be a prerequisite to 
constructive and properly contextualized dialogue with its members, but it does not in 
itself solve the challenge of assessing threat, actual or merely perceived, emanating from 
such a closed diaspora.  
In order for homeland security stakeholder to obtain situational awareness on 
opaque groups that are purposely secretive or discreet, exploitation of alternative means 
of obtaining information on the group will be necessary. In addition to visual monitoring 
from public areas, installation of surveillance cameras, and use of aircraft over flights to 
513 Sullivan, “‘No Longer the Messiah,” 229. 
514 Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission, The Findings, Conclusions, 64. 
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obtain imagery of an enclave or compound, officials should explore the use of every 
compelled interaction with the group and debriefings of each office or individual with 
knowledge of the community as a potential opportunity to gather contextual information. 
Firefighters, emergency medical service, health practitioners, property records, county 
tax assessments, building code and zoning inspections, home schooling waiver 
applications, vital records, health and social service providers, driver’s licensing and 
vehicle registration records, mail carriers, local retailers, and neighbors all constitute 
entities that might have compelled or routine contact with opaque community members. 
Though client or recipient confidentiality protections may restrict sharing some of the 
information obtained from such entities, general information regarding the community 
itself rather than on individual members and/or that contains personally identifiable 
information could nevertheless be invaluable for situational awareness purposes.  
Though homeland security stakeholders do not routinely canvass these entities to 
fulfill information needs, the challenges inherent to effectively assessing opaque 
community makeup and capabilities and in setting tripwires for aberrant behavior 
indicative of threat amplification necessitate their inclusion in situational awareness 
monitoring activities. And although information obtained from one or more of these 
potential sources in the course of routine interaction with members of opaque 
communities may not in itself seem valuable, when collated with additional sources of 
information and placed in a composite, such information can prove to be extremely 
valuable to homeland security efforts. A key cultural barrier to the development of 
information sharing between law enforcement agencies and various “non-traditional” 
official sources of information involves the sharing of “law enforcement sensitive” 
information.  
Though not officially defined within 28 CFR Part 23, this term is generally 
understood to include information regarding actual and suspect criminal acts, personally 
identifiable information regarding known or suspected criminal actors, investigative 
findings, and/or criminal intelligence information. Due to the sensitivity of such 
information, many law enforcement agencies are reluctant to share such types of 
information with non-law enforcement entities in the interest of discretion, evidentiary 
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process, operational security, and preservation of investigative potential. In addition, 
there exists a common misunderstanding among law enforcement that “law enforcement 
sensitive” information is either a formal legal term or statutory definition that restricts its 
dissemination within law enforcement channels, neither of which is true. The Department 
of Justice has, in fact, issued opinions that clearly establish  
that the term does not require that an agency have law enforcement or 
investigative authority in order to qualify under an intelligence project’s 
‘need to know’ and ‘right to know’ criteria,” and that, “accordingly, those 
professionals, whether working…at other Federal, State, or local agencies 
engaged in this pursuit, may appropriately be provided access to the 
information they need to do the same, regardless of whether or not they 
themselves, or the agency in question, carry the title ‘law enforcement 
officer’ or ‘law enforcement agency.’515  
As such, it remains at the discretion of the law enforcement stakeholder to 
determine whether non-traditional contributors and consumers of criminal intelligence 
fulfill these criteria. Consequently, sworn officers, investigators, and intelligence 
personnel should refrain from perpetuating misinformed and self-imposed limitations on 
their ability to obtain situational awareness information on opaque groups through 
proscribed sharing of “law enforcement sensitive” information on specific members of 
opaque groups with non-law enforcement entities.  
The recommendations of Philadelphia’s MOVE Commission were likewise 
prescient on this point. The commission’s third proposed enhancement to the city’s 
governmental operations included development of an “Information Collection and 
Analysis” capability:  
The City should promptly establish an integrated system for the collection, 
analysis and appropriate dissemination of relevant information relating to 
crises which affect public health, safety and welfare. The City Solicitor 
should have an advisory role in such a system to ensure that civil liberties 
and rights are respected. Interdepartmental communication should be 
strengthened to improve operational coordination.516  
515 John J. Wilson, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of the General 
Counsel Legal Opinion on the Scope of 28 CFR Part 23 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 
March 31, 2005).    
516 Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission, The Findings, Conclusions, 58. 
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Seven years before Waco and 22 years before the YFZ Ranch raid, this recommendation 
clearly presages a holistic view of homeland security efforts that crosscuts the spectrum 
of governmental agencies and functions as a preferred means of countering the challenges 
of an opaque group. Note that this mechanism is clearly delineated from the separate but 
complementary critical functions of both “police intelligence” (recommendation 13) and 
the intelligence capabilities of the fire department (recommendation 22) while 
incorporating legal oversight procedures and interagency coordination considerations. 
Though the commission’s recommendations targeted a major metropolitan government, 
similar functions could be established at the county level, or integrated into the operations 
of a given jurisdiction’s respective fusion center.  
One caveat should be made with regard to any governmental attempts to infiltrate 
opaque communities or develop confidential informants from the ranks of their 
membership. Sheriff Doran’s source of information regarding the YFZ Ranch likely 
provided valuable situational awareness information up until his unmasking and 
excommunication by FLDS leadership, and BATF undercover agent Rodriguez, posing 
as Robert Gonzalez, certainly provided his agency’s leadership with crucial information 
regarding the circumstances within Mount Carmel immediately prior to the federal raid. 
Koresh even attempted to leverage Gonzalez’s false identity in a last ditch attempt to 
communicate directly with BATF leadership and deescalate the situation, despite his 
knowledge that Gonzalez’s presence was a ruse. However, it should be noted that the 
targeted communities ultimately exposed these confidential and/or undercover sources in 
both cases. It likewise appears MOVE was distrustful of Glassey, if not indeed aware of 
his status as a federal informant. Not only does discovery of confidential informants 
curtail the flow of additional situational awareness information: it also creates suspicion 
and distrust of any accompanying overt governmental overtures towards community 
relations, degrading relationships of trust. In every case in which infiltration into or 
covert collection on an opaque community is being considered, homeland security 
officials should carefully consider both whether such tactics are the only ones available 
and whether potential exposure of the operation would do more harm to their relationship 
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with the targeted community outweighing any situational awareness information thereby 
gleaned.  
The use of zoning, licensing, tax assessments, and other regulatory and municipal 
or county code mechanism is another often untapped means of gaining access to and 
prompting interaction with opaque groups. As evidenced throughout its tribulations in 
dealing with MOVE, the city’s unwillingness to enforce zoning, building code, and other 
ordinances both limited its visibility over the group’s barricaded compounds and 
telegraphed official appeasement of MOVE’s bellicose rhetoric. Similar failures to 
inspect both Mount Carmel and YFZ Ranch on a regular basis, or to enforce local 
ordinances that regulate the use of land and facilities, constituted lost opportunities for 
enhancements to situational awareness of these groups as well as identification of 
potentially more viable overtures for ongoing contact with the respective inhabitants. 
Arredondo notes,  
Planning and zoning ordinances are appropriate tools for ensuring that 
communities are properly developed and built to afford easy access by 
public services (police, fire, emergency vehicles). They are also helpful in 
discouraging enclaves and compounds, which often violate environmental 
and sanitary laws.517 
From the homeland security practitioner’s standpoint, such tools can likewise assist in 
obtaining and increasing the fidelity of situational awareness concerning geographic 
voids for which they are responsible but about which they lack needed visibility.  
Finally, in the absence of statutory inroads to compel cooperation with homeland 
security efforts from opaque communities or legal justification to intervene into its 
activities, stakeholders having legitimate cause should not discount the availability and 
potential benefits of pursing civil torts and actions against such groups. Civil process 
forces a modicum of interaction with the group, shedding light on actual circumstances, 
makeup, and activities of the community. Successful civil actions also create legal 
justification for future intervention actions such as judicial order, cease and desist notices, 
and asset forfeiture proceedings. Such actions thereby empower and legitimize law 
517 Arredondo, “Toward a Viable Policing Model,” 143. 
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enforcement or other governmental actors with viable premise to enter a denied area, 
compound, or enclave through alternative legal means. Coalitions including impacted 
community members such as “The United Residents of the 6200 Block of Osage 
Avenue” could be involved in such actions, albeit too late in the evolution of the MOVE 
tragedy. Note that the YFZ Ranch was ultimately seized through civil, not criminal, 
forfeiture to the State of Texas, demonstrating the potential impact of such efforts. It 
should, however, be recognized that such actions would and will undoubtedly anger the 
opaque community and frustrate any subsequent attempts at establishing a conciliatory or 
amicable relationship between officials and the targeted community. As an avenue of last 
resort, however, civil suits are preferable to tactical interventions into a defiant or 
barricaded closed community, and remain promising alternatives for avoiding violent 
altercations with such groups.  
5. Acknowledging Defeat: Unresponsive Opaque Communities 
Ultimately, if an opaque group eschews all forms of voluntary contact and 
homeland security stakeholders are unable to identify regulatory, criminal predicate-
based, or civil grounds for forcing compelled interaction with the group, officials may 
need to resign themselves to growing accustomed to and comfortable with the presence 
of the unknown. The 1st and 14th Amendments clearly underscore a group’s rights to 
pursue a lifestyle of its choosing and prevent undue governmental intrusion into 
members’ private affairs. Stakeholders must be willing, upon exhaustion of legal inroads 
to corroborate or substantiate a perceived opaque community-sourced threat, to withdraw 
and allow the group to exist uninhibited. As has been demonstrated in the above cases, 
oppositional frameworks and the underlying desire to intercede to satisfy situational 
awareness deficits without articulable grounds leads to legally unsupported and tactically 
problematic interventions. Stakeholders must recognize they should exhaust the use of all 
available sources and tools to obtain information on a group and, barring identification of 
criminal predicate or other indication of articulable threat, withdraw.  
Even in such cases, every effort should be made to clearly communicate and 
provide justification for official interest in certain characteristics of the opaque 
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community for the purposes of homeland security planning and response. At a minimum, 
homeland security practitioners can propose that information regarding the size and 
makeup of a given community is necessary for potential emergency response or 
evacuation contingencies. Stakeholders should clearly and repeatedly communicate their 
reasoning for why a modicum of situational awareness regarding the group is necessary 
for the mutual safety of members of both the opaque and surrounding communities, 
highlighting the governmental interest in balancing protection of the opaque group’s 
privacy and beliefs with a need to address any misunderstanding and fear among the 
populace impacted by its presence. If such concerns are expressed and requests for 
information advocated for by officials absent perceived prejudicial or discriminatory 
interest in or judgment of the opaque community and its given practices or ideology, 
stakeholders have a high likelihood of obtaining such information in a reasonable, legal, 
and non-contentious manner.  
C. POTENTIAL AREAS OF FURTHER INQUIRY 
This study revealed numerous areas of potential future research that would 
provide additional insights into the opaque community phenomenon. An examination of 
various legal aspects affecting closed groups, research into additional identified case 
studies, and comparisons to potentially applicable outreach campaigns and governmental 
messaging strategies would benefit homeland security practitioners’ understanding and 
context in this area.   
1. Legal Parameters 
Nilson, in arguing for a lowered evidentiary burden and expanded ability to treat 
enclaves as extended families for the purposes of child removal by the state notes,  
Asserting that the Ranch constitutes a legal family for the purpose of a 
parental termination proceeding is much different from a religious 
community that may share a belief system, attend religious services 
together, share meals together, etc., but are still members of the rest of 
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society because they live and work and integrate with people outside of 
their community.518 
She views the expansion of state imposition over controversial child rearing 
practices—such as those seen in MOVE, FLDS, and the Branch Davidians—as liberated 
from constitutional protections for the free exercise of religion and due process because 
closed, opaque groups fail to conform to traditional definitions of domesticity blur the 
lines between family and community. At what juncture, then, opaque groups become 
“families” for the purposes of child protection and removal efforts, governmental 
intrusions into the “home” become legitimate state actions, and official monitoring of the 
religious affairs of such groups is deemed legally justifiable action in support of a bona 
fide state interest remain fields of potential further inquiry.  
2. Additional Case Studies 
An area of potentially valuable future study would be the identification of 
successful, long-term interactions between homeland security practitioners and opaque 
communities. The aforementioned 1985 BATF raid of the CSA compound at Zarephath-
Horeb and the 1996 FBI standoff with the Montana Freemen at the “Justus Township” 
near Jordan, Montana constitute potential models of successful interventions into opaque 
communities. These events did constitute governmental interventions into opaque 
communities that fortunately ended in successful peaceful negotiations and surrender by 
community members. However, as they did not actually avoid use of force escalation and 
establishment of duress situations, these events are likely less paradigmatic of successful 
government/community dispute resolution prior to barricaded negotiations. Though these 
events may then serve as case studies for identifying viable ‘isolate and wait’ tactics 
predicated on deliberative, nuanced negotiation strategies, they could simultaneously be 
viewed as failed attempts or missed opportunities for preventing opaque groups from 
embracing barricaded resistance to governmental sovereignty. Further inquiry into the 
context and circumstances that led to these armed standoffs, to include identification of 
any pre-event efforts to establish constructive dialogue with the communities, previous 
518 Nilson, “Yearning for Zion Ranch Raid,” 342. 
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fulfillment of governmental situational awareness intelligence requirements, or earlier 
success among homeland security practitioners in resolving previous conflicts with these 
groups, constitute a area in need of additional critical study.  
Their utility as functional models for dealing with opaque groups aside, these 
cases do highlight a key aspect of the unsuccessful interactional frameworks identified in 
the three cases studied. Namely, that any “threat of the unknown” emanating from 
opaque communities is effectively eliminated through isolation and establishment of a 
safety buffer. Interventions targeting the CSA, Montana Freemen, and countless other 
cases involving law enforcement establishment of a perimeter and official resolution to 
engage a targeted community in long term negotiations absent threat of assault or other 
“stress escalation” and urgency generating tactics have led to successful resolutions. For 
this to occur, authorities must be willing to defer opaque community submission to 
judicially authorized but, in terms of actual threat, unnecessary governmental use of force 
and imposition of state sovereignty. Aggravating scenarios such as hostage situations, the 
potential for mass suicide, or suspected deployment of a weapon of mass destruction 
constitute circumstances that, if detected within an isolated opaque community, would 
necessitate abandonment of such “surround and talk” tactics. Absent such situations, once 
cordoned off and contained, opaque groups—whatever their capabilities and intentions—
can no longer pose a real or hypothetical threat to the surrounding community. 
Consequently, isolation tactics offer at minimum an attractive option that though less 
desirable than effective communication and interaction is preferable to armed incursion 
and open conflict. This again constitutes an area of existing and future study with relation 
to opaque communities.  
3. Outreach Campaigns 
Note that after establishing a dialogue and making constructive headway with a 
closed group, local law enforcement may find themselves acting as a defender or ersatz 
advocate for the group—a situation that may become personally uncomfortable or, in the 
case of elected officials such as the sheriff, politically untenable. This in fact may be a 
causative factor for a past tendency among local law enforcement to purposely seek 
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supra-jurisdictional assistance in dealing with opaque groups, such as occurred with both 
MOVE and the Branch Davidians. An area of further study may involve the exploration 
of successful methods for advocating the need for restraint and dialogue with regard to 
the opaque group among the larger constituency served. In particular, the success or 
utility of previous public awareness campaigns, officially sponsored “meet and greet” 
events between group members and their neighbors, or official coordination with local 
media to shape and inform public perceptions should be examined for potential 
replication in other jurisdictions having opaque communities.  
4. Similarities to Countering Violent Extremism Strategies 
It should be noted that many of the recommendations included above are similar 
in nature to strategies employed in countering domestic and international violent 
extremism, counter-insurgency, and counter-terrorism efforts. Whereas these activities 
normally attempt to offer a counterweight or alternative narrative to known violent 
ideology espoused by groups actively countering or purposely targeting governments and 
nations, many of the outreach efforts employed when countering violent extremism are 
potentially transferrable to opaque communities. Deardorff, in describing ideal conditions 
for implementation of countering violent extremist ideology, notes the importance of 
strategies that incorporate local government officials and agencies.519 He likewise 
identifies trust as the principle requirement for successful community collaboration, 
noting, “when one demonstrates empathy—the ability to understand, if not sympathize, 
with another’s condition—it affords the ability to speak frankly about local grievances 
with the…community and the security concerns of the government.”520 The Obama 
Administration’s 2011 proclamation entitled Empowering Local Partners to Prevent 
Violent Extremism in the United States buttresses this argument for local rather than 
federal implementation efforts, noting: 
The Federal Government will often be ill-suited to intervene in the niches 
of society where radicalization to violence takes place, but it can foster 
partnerships to support communities through its connections to local 
519 Deardorff, The Roots of Our Children’s War, 203. 
520 Ibid., 202. 
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government, law enforcement, Mayor’s offices, the private sector, local 
service providers, academia, and many others who can help prevent 
violent extremism. Federal departments and agencies have begun 
expanding support to local stakeholders and practitioners who are on the 
ground and positioned to develop grassroots partnerships with the 
communities they serve.521 
Here again, additional study regarding the potential application of these and other 
countering violent extremism strategies would be beneficial to determining how and to 
what extent such initiatives cold be employed towards altering homeland security 
practitioners existing oppositional frameworks and improving relationships with opaque 
communities prior to the emergence of violence.  
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It has been shown through this study that opaque communities present a pervasive 
and enduring challenge to the maintenance of homeland security in our nation. The social 
and ideological but not physical withdrawal of significant groups of citizens from our 
society is a perennial source of anxiety and concern, both to the surrounding community 
and to those tasked with ensuring the safety and welfare of all impacted stakeholders. 
Though homeland security practitioners cannot and should not attempt to alter the beliefs 
and legal behavior of such opaque communities, they can amend their professional 
frameworks, strive to overcome any default biases, and ensure official conduct does not 
itself unintentionally manifest a given population’s potential millenarian fears, instigate 
violent defensive reaction, or otherwise cause distress and distrust among a group 
exercising its constitutional right to congregate, pursue shared beliefs, and seek solitude 
or isolation. By recognizing the potential existence of oppositional frameworks, 
maintaining objectivity, selecting appropriate community liaison officials, and pursuing 
targeted interaction and communication with opaque communities to the greatest degree 
possible, homeland security stakeholders will largely be able to avoid the mistakes of the 
past and guarantee that the threat of the unknown is never again mistaken for or regarded 
as clear and present danger.  
521 Executive Office of the President of the United States, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent 
Violent Extremism in the United States (Washington, DC: White House, 2011), 3. 
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